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INTRODUCTION
Selective federal preemption in a country’s securities regulatory framework is required to compete successfully in the global
securities market. It prevents balkanization of a country’s securities regulatory framework. By definition, selective federal preemption includes some preservation of state or local authority in
the securities regulatory framework to address local issues, i.e.,
issues particular to each state. At the local level, state securities
regulatory authorities (SSRAs) have the power to bring, at a
minimum, fraud actions that the federal regulator does not have
the resources to address effectively. SSRAs are the “local cops on
the securities beat,”1 whose mission is to protect the small investor.2 Selective federal preemption is needed to “‘maintain uniformity and certainty’ in U.S. securities markets so that they remain ahead of markets ‘in London, Frankfurt, Tokyo or Hong
Kong.’”3 When signing the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA), which contained critical selective federal preemption provisions, President Clinton asserted
that it was needed to “enhance capital formation and the com-

1 The Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act of 2003: Hearing on
H.R. 2179 Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on House Financial Services, 108th Cong. 53 (2003)
(testimony of Christine A. Bruenn, NASAA President and Maine Securities Administrator).
2 The author defines small investors as individuals that invest relatively small
amounts of money in the U.S. securities markets.
3 Rachel Witmer, Litigation Reform: Gramm, Domenici, Dodd Introduce Bill To
Federalize Securities Class Actions, 29 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1401, 1402 (1997) [hereinafter Witmer, Litigation Reform].
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petitiveness of the American economy . . . .”4 The Securities Industry Association (SIA) also agreed that NSMIA’s selective federal preemption provisions would “clear away some of the regulatory underbrush that adds to the cost of capital[,] without
compromising investor protections.”5 Moreover, successful competition in the global securities market means that a country
must have a securities regulatory framework that promotes uniformity without stifling systemic risk; uniformity and an appropriate level of systemic risk are necessary components in a securities regulatory framework for successful competition and
innovation in the global securities market.6
A country’s securities regulatory framework is one of its
most important competitive tools in the global securities market.
A competitive securities regulatory framework promotes a large
investor class, provides large pools of capital to encourage issuers
and other market participants to take risk by expanding their
businesses, and facilitates increased employment.7 Although
some balkanization is necessary to combat local securities fraud,
some level of federal preemption is required to avoid too much
fragmentation in the securities regulatory framework. Too much
fragmentation will increase the cost of capital to unacceptable
levels, sending issuers in search of less expensive capital in securities markets with more uniformity in their regulatory framework.
A globally competitive securities regulatory framework also
requires flexibility. It must be structured to respond quickly to
constant change, one of the primary characteristics of the global
securities market. Only a regulatory authority at the federal
level will have the requisite power to respond effectively in a constantly changing global securities market. A federal regulatory
authority would regulate all securities markets in a country,
making decisions that bind all securities markets and market
participants. In addition, the federal regulatory authority would
have the power and the ability to craft a coherent policy for a
country’s securities regulatory framework. Coherent policy is
more likely to lead to uniformity and lower costs of capital, i.e.,
the creation of a more competitive securities market in the global
4 Statement on Signing the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996,
2 PUB. PAPERS 1812 (Oct. 11, 1996).
5 Rachel Witmer, Legislation: Congress Passes Major Securities Bill; Clinton Expected to Sign It OMB Says, 28 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1211, 1212 (1996).
6 International Organization of Securities Commissions [IOSCO], Objectives and
Principles of Securities Regulation, at 7, IOSCO Pub. Doc. 154 (May 2003), available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf.
7 See Clinton Signs Long-Awaited Securities Reform Bill, ON WALL STREET, Nov. 1,
1996, at 32, 32.
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securities market.
The U.S. securities markets,8 recognized as the premier securities market in the world, employs selective federal preemption in its securities regulatory framework. The Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that the laws of the U.S.
federal government shall be the supreme laws of the land.9 Accordingly, federal law displaces or preempts state law where it
expressly states that state law is preempted, where it creates a
comprehensive regulatory scheme which, de facto, preempts state
law in the entire area of the law related to a particular subject
matter, or where state law conflicts with federal law. Currently,
selective federal preemption in the U.S. securities regulatory
framework does not preclude state jurisdiction over, among other
areas, securities fraud. “‘Congress has expressly preserved the
role of the states in securities regulation’ in such areas as fraud
in the sale of securities and investment advisory services.”10
However, since the enactment of NSMIA, greater levels of federal
preemption have been employed in the U.S. securities regulatory
framework.
Generally, selective federal preemption is used in the U.S.
securities regulatory framework when a securities product or
transaction will have a national impact on the U.S. securities
markets, i.e., the effect of the product or transaction will not be
confined to one state. When a securities product or transaction
has a national impact, selective federal preemption is needed to
ensure uniformity of regulatory requirements, thus reducing
regulatory costs borne by issuers and other market participants.
Such uniformity minimizes regulatory fragmentation at the state
level. However, states retain power for securities products or
transactions that do not have a significant impact in more than
one state.11 Generally, this means that state regulatory authori8 In this article the term “U.S. securities markets” only includes securities markets
(and of course the types of securities traded on such markets) regulated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission). The term does not include markets regulated solely by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Commission regulated securities markets includes exchanges, the over-the-counter (OTC) markets,
electronic communications networks (ECN), and other alternative trading facilities (ATF).
The types of securities traded on markets regulated by the Commission include equities,
mutual funds, real estate investment trusts (REITS), unit investment trusts (UIT), and
equity-based derivatives, options, and futures. See generally U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC], http://www.sec.gov/index.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
9 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl 2.
10 Jurisdiction And Procedure: Common Law Fraud Claims Not Preempted By Federal Securities Law, Court Concludes, 33 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1634, 1635 (2001)
(quoting Zuri-Invest AG v. NatWest Finance Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
11 The author recognizes that the State of New York is an exception to this general
rule. See infra Section II.A.2 (discussing the impact of actions taken by the State of New
York on the U.S. securities regulatory framework).
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ties retain jurisdiction over securities fraud within their own jurisdictions.
Failure to implement a securities regulatory framework incorporating selective federal preemption may result in a country
losing control of its securities markets—one of the most important components of its economy. Canada is an example of what
may happen when a country fails to establish a securities regulatory framework capable of competing in the global securities
market, i.e., it fails to include selective federal preemption in its
securities regulatory framework. Canada’s securities regulatory
framework does not include a federal securities regulator authorized to set policy, rules, and regulations for the securities markets in its thirteen provinces and territories. The absence of selective federal preemption means that each province has the
ability to thwart any significant efforts to implement changes in
Canada’s securities regulatory framework, which was designed to
ensure that its securities markets remain competitive in the
global securities market.
Canada’s fragmented regulatory
framework has allowed the U.S. to assume regulatory authority
over portions of Canada’s securities markets and market participants. For example, NASDAQ Canada was established in 2000
in the province of Quebec, and primary regulation of NASDAQ
Canada was delegated to the U.S. by amending Quebec’s Securities Act.12
Successful competition in the global securities market is essential because having the premier securities market in the
world generally means being the premier economic power in the
world. Moreover, successful competition in the global securities
markets means greater pools of capital will be available to a
country’s businesses than would otherwise exist with a less
prominent global presence; this leads to economic growth and expansion, which, in turn, leads to increased levels of employment.
A securities regulatory framework, which includes selective federal preemption, is more likely to facilitate fair, efficient, and liquid markets and, at the very least, a perceived level playing field
for investors. Regulatory balkanization, the regulatory approach
taken by Canada, is more likely to produce unfavorable consequences, e.g., migration of market participants and investors to
securities markets outside the country’s jurisdiction in search of
transparent markets and better returns.
This article does not endeavor to identify the appropriate
12 See The NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc., General Form for Registration of Securities
Pursuant to Section 12(b) or 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 10),
Amendment No. 1 (May 14, 2001), available at http://www.shareholder.com/
common/edgar/1120193/950172-01-500184/01-00.pdf.
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level of federal preemption required to compete successfully in
the global securities market for each country. It only seeks to
point out that selective federal preemption is a necessary component in a securities regulatory framework to compete successfully
in the global securities market. Moreover, the author contends
that selective federal preemption has been recognized as a necessary component for a globally competitive securities regulatory
framework by a consensus of securities regulatory authorities in
the global securities market. This consensus is reflected in the
Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, published by
the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO) in May 2003.13
This article will first describe the significant characteristics
of the global securities market. Next, it will identify significant
attributes of a securities regulatory framework that successfully
includes selective federal preemption and a corresponding federal
regulator, using the IOSCO Standard. It will then compare the
characteristics of the regulatory frameworks and corresponding
securities regulators in the U.S. and Canada to the IOSCO Standard. Next, it will describe and analyze what happens when a
country fails to employ selective federal preemption in its securities regulatory framework, using Canada, our neighbor to the
north, as an example.
I.

THE GLOBAL SECURITIES MARKET

The financial crisis of other nations can no longer exist in a
vacuum. They affect every other nation as we move closer to a global
economy.14

The global securities market has arrived. In the twenty-first
century, securities markets are inextricably intertwined and advanced technology facilitates the interconnectivity of world securities markets allowing capital and information to move quickly
anywhere in the world. “During 1992, 94 foreign issuers accessed the U.S. public markets for the first time. Registered offerings by foreign issuers exceeded $33 billion . . . .” and 172 foreign issuers accessed the U.S. private markets for a cumulative
total of $13 billion.15 From 1990 through 2002, the number of
foreign issuers registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the Commission) tripled from 434 to over 1300 from
13 IOSCO Pub. Doc. 154, supra note 6, at 7. The IOSCO is a key international standard-setting body in the global securities market; its members are securities regulatory
authorities for the preeminent securities markets in the world. See Section III of this article.
14 144 Cong. Rec. 3, 4401 (1998) (statement of Sen. Grams).
15 H.R. REP. NO. 103-179, at 12 (1993).
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59 countries.16 Between 1986 and 1995, trading in foreign stocks
in the U.S. increased from $100.2 billion to approximately $723.6
billion, and trading by foreign investors in U.S. stocks alone increased from $277.5 billion to $877.6 billion.17 In addition, domestic securities markets increasingly are being integrated into
the global securities market leading to “competing, international
combinations of stock exchanges” allowing investors “to trade any
stock, any time, anywhere in a linked forum.”18
A.

U.S. Recognition of the Global Securities Market

1. The Global Securities Market and the NASDAQ Stock
Market, Inc.
In June 2000, NASDAQ conducted a private placement to
“allow [NASDAQ among other things] to respond to current and
future competitive challenges caused by technological advances
and the increasing globalization of financial markets.”19 The proceeds were used to increase its global preeminence by attempting
to extend its trading platform throughout the world.20 The second phase of NASDAQ’s private placement was completed in
January 2001 and raised $180 million; the total amount raised in
phases 1 and 2 was $326 million.21 From 2000 until 2001, NASDAQ created stand-alone stock exchanges in Canada,22 Japan,23
and Europe.24 NASDAQ asserted
16 See SEC, GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT (GPRA) 2004 ANNUAL
PERFORMANCE PLAN AND 2002 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT 6 (2003) [hereinafter
GPRA], available at http://www.sec.gov/about/gpra2004_2002.pdf.
17 Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations for 1997: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Departments of Commerce,
Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 104th Cong. 635 (1996) (Justification of the Budget Estimates, Securities and Exchange Commission).
18 3D HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL
CORPORATE LAW § 23:34, at 23-73 (2d ed. 2006).
19 The NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at F-7 (Mar. 28,
2002).
20 The NASD sold 40% of NASDAQ during the first phase of its private placement
that raised $260 million for NASDAQ and $74 million for the NASD. Greg Ip, Nasdaq
Looks to Europe: Are Preparations A Prelude to a Bid for London Exchange? WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 1, 2000, at C1.
21 Press Release, The NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc., NASDAQ Completes Private Offering and Expands Board (Jan. 25, 2001), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/
newsroom/news/pr2001/ne_section01_025.html.
22 “In April 2000, [NASDAQ] entered into a cooperative agreement with the Provincial Government of Quebec for the development of a new securities market within Canada
called [NASDAQ] Canada.” The NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc., supra note 12, at 5.
23 NASDAQ Japan began operating on June 19, 2000. Id..
24 Id. at 6.
On March 20, 2001, NASDAQ entered into a non-binding letter of intent and is
currently negotiating a definitive agreement with the London International
Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE) to create a new U.S. joint
venture company that will list and trade single stock futures. The products of
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that the foundation to create a global exchange should be built on a
strong regional presence in the dominant capital centers of the
world. . . . [T]hose centers are the United States, Europe, and parts of
Asia, particularly Japan. By establishing centers for . . . trading in
these key regions, the foundation [would] be developed for electronically linking these markets to establish a global platform.25

However, the severe down-turn in the securities markets in 2000,
combined with its poor performance through 2002, halted NASDAQ’s expansion and ultimately led to retrenchment with the
closing of trading markets established in all countries except
Canada. By 2003, NASDAQ’s strategy for achieving global preeminence changed from creating standalone exchanges in other
countries to becoming the premier market in the U.S. and being
“a market the world’s investors could count on.”26
2. The Global Securities Market and the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE)
The NYSE, in order to compete successfully in the global securities market, has changed its business model. On December
6, 2005, NYSE members voted to merge with Archipelago Exchange, an open, fully electronic exchange.27 According to the
NYSE’s CEO, John A. Thain, the combined entity “will create a
strong, dynamic and innovative enterprise capable of meeting the
demands of investors and issuers throughout the world in the
decades ahead . . . . [in order to compete] globally in a high-speed
electronically connected world.”28 NYSE’s CEO determined that
the merger was necessary because publicly held exchanges in
“London, Frankfurt, Toronto and Sydney are aggressively competing to expand their reach.”29 and market share in the global
securities market. The SEC shares this view: “If the U.S. marthe new joint venture are expected to be traded through the LIFFE
CONNECT™ electronic system.
25 Id. at 4–5.
26 NASDAQ, Inc., 2003 Annual Report, at 1 (Mar., 2004), available at
http://www.nasdaq.com/about/AR2003/2003AR.pdf. NASDAQ began to implement this
strategy by purchasing electronic communications networks (ECN), which provided more
routing capacity, connectivity, and increased market share. Id. at 6. NASDAQ Japan
closed on August 16, 2002 due to insufficient business. Nasdaq Japan Inc. to Go ‘Dormant’; Board Finds No ‘Viable Path Forward’, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1382, 1382–
83 (2002).
27 1247 out of 1307 members voted in favor of the merger, i.e., approximately 95.4%
of members eligible to vote on the transaction. Press release, New York Stock Exchange,
New York Stock Exchange Announces Certified Results of Dec. 6 Member Vote on Merger
with Archipelago Holdings, Inc. (Dec. 7, 2005), available at http://www.nyse.com/
press/1133956348217.html.
28 Press Release, New York Stock Exchange, New York Stock Exchange and Archipelago Exchange Agree to Merge—NYSE Group, Inc. Will Become a Publicly Held Company (Apr. 20, 2005), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/joint_release.pdf.
29 Id.
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kets fail to meet investor needs by offering the fairest and most
efficient trading mechanisms possible, an increasingly competitive international environment will be sure to offer alternatives
for investors.”30
B.

Canada’s Recognition of the Global Securities Market

Canada, in a report commissioned to study the need for regulatory change in its securities markets (The Wise Persons’ Committee Report), determined that:
Technological changes have radically increased the mobility of capital. . . .
....
Between 1980 and 2000, private capital flows (including gross
bank flows, portfolio flows and foreign direct investment) increased
more than six-fold to nearly US$4 trillion annually worldwide. By
2003, outstanding international debt securities worldwide totaled
US$10.3 trillion, a ten-fold increase from 1987 levels.
Multinational securities firms now conduct business around the
world and around the clock. Exchanges and trading systems operate
on a cross-border basis.31

In particular, cross-border transactions in Canadian equities
have increased from 5% of GDP in 1990 to 38% of GDP in 2002.
Canadian issuers raised more debt capital internationally than
domestically, with a significant number of Canadian issuers inter-listed on foreign stock exchanges, including 78 on the NYSE
and 81 on the NASDAQ.32 Moreover, there is a consensus among
market participants in Canada’s securities markets that successful competition means competing effectively in an environment
characterized by increasing international competition for capital—a clear recognition of the global securities markets.33 The
Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), the largest provincial securities markets regulator in Canada, contends that the existence of the global securities market is
evidenced by a number of trends, including:
• the growth of cross-border securities transactions;

30 Press Release, SEC, NYSE’s Rescission of Rule 390 and Commission’s Request for
Comment on Market Fragmentation (Feb. 23, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2000-14.txt.
31 WISE PERSONS’ COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE STRUCTURE OF SECURITIES
REGULATION IN CANADA, IT’S TIME—WPC FINAL REPORT 2 (2003) [hereinafter WISE
PERSONS’ COMMITTEE].
32 Id. at 6.
33 University of Toronto Capital Markets Institute, White Paper: A Symposium on
Canadian Securities Regulation: Harmonization or Nationalization?, at Executive Summary-i (Oct. 2002) (edited by James Baillie).
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• an increasing number of additional listings of Canadian companies
on foreign exchanges;
• the emergence of multinational securities firms servicing businesses from offices around the world; and
• an increasing number of strategic alliances and other connections
between regulated financial markets in different parts of the
world.34

The Investment Dealers Association (IDA), Canada’s largest
national securities self-regulatory organization (SRO) representing all investment dealers, also recognizes the existence of the
global securities market. The IDA agrees that “there is . . . only
one world securities market.”35
The Province of Quebec acknowledges the existence of the
global securities market.36 It recommends further harmonization
between Canada’s provinces with respect to each province’s securities laws.37
C. Recognition of the Global Securities Market Beyond
North America
Recognition of the global securities market is not confined to
the U.S.; The Federation of European Securities Exchanges
(FESE)38 also recognizes the global securities market and asserts
that it is “driven by advances in technology and telecommunications, is leading to a growing number of companies wishing to
raise capital in more than one country [and that] [i]nvestors too
are looking at integrated, or interconnected, international markets in order to maximise their return and spread their capital
risk.”39 In February 2006, the Tokyo Stock Exchange decided to
34 ONTARIO SECURITIES COMMISSION, FIVE YEAR REVIEW COMMITTEE FINAL
REPORT ~ REVIEWING
THE
SECURITIES
ACT
42
(2003),
available
at
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/FiveYearReview/fyr_20030529_5yr-final-report.pdf
[hereinafter FIVE YEAR REVIEW COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT].
35 Suitability Requirements, IDA REP. (Investment Dealers Association of Canada),
Summer 2000, at 7.
36 See Harris, supra note 33, at 90.
37 Id. at app., at xiv.
38 Established in 1974, FESE represents the interests of European securities exchanges as regulated markets. FESE has twenty-four full members representing approximately forty securities exchanges and clearing houses from all EU countries, and
Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. Federation of European Securities Exchanges, About
Members, http://www.fese.be/en/?inc=cat&id=4 (last visited Feb. 8, 2007). Members include the Athens Exchange, Italian Exchange, London Stock Exchange, Budapest Stock
Exchange, Euronext, Stockholm Stock Exchange, and Irish Stock Exchange. Federation
of European Securities Exchanges, Full Members, http://www.fese.be/en/?inc=page&id=7
(last visited Feb. 8, 2007).
39 Federation
of
European
Securities
Exchanges,
The
Federation,
http://www.fese.be/federation/index.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2006); see also Reena Aggarwal, Demutualization and Corporate Governance of Stock Exchanges, 15 J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN. 105–13, (2002).
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invest approximately $27 million to upgrade its trading systems.40 In addition, in 2002, “the Australian Stock Exchange
(ASX) ranked 12th in the world in terms of size and 16th in
terms of turnover.”41
D. The Importance of Domestic Stock Markets
Securities markets are one of the most important tools that a
country has for raising investment capital and efficiently allocating the country’s investment capital among competing businesses. They enable businesses and governments to raise debt
and equity capital from public investors in order to fund operations. Accordingly, securities markets are vital to the growth,
development and strength of market economies. They also “support corporate initiatives, finance the exploitation of new ideas[,]
facilitate the management of financial risk . . . [and] have become
central to individual wealth and retirement planning.”42 Moreover, capital markets are among the key factors in promoting a
country’s long-term economic growth.43 “Countries that are best
able to channel savings into productive investments will register
higher rates of growth and more rapid increases in living standards.”44
In 1975, the U.S. Congress amended the federal securities
laws because it recognized that “[t]he securities markets of the
United States are indispensable to the growth and health of this
country’s and the world’s economy.”45 The 1975 amendments
were designed to assist U.S. securities markets in adapting and
responding to changing economic and technological conditions
domestically and beyond U.S. borders. Without this flexibility,
Congress believed that the U.S. might lose its status as an international financial center and that its economic, financial, and
40 Tokyo Stock Exchange Plans $27 Million in Upgrades, and More, WALL ST. &
TECH., Feb. 23, 2006, http://www.wallstreetandtech.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=
180207050.
41 Sydney Media, Fact Sheet—Global Sydney, http://www.sydneymedia.com.au/html/
2291-global-sydney.asp (last visited Oct. 7, 2006).
42 IOSCO Pub. Doc. 154, supra note 6, at 1.
43 WISE PERSONS’ COMMITTEE, supra note 31, at 4.
44 Id.
45 The Structure of Securities Markets: Hearings on the Emerging Structure of U.S.
Securities Markets and the Appropriate Role for Regulation Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 106th Cong. 217 (2001) (statement of Arthur Levitt,
Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission). $190 million was raised for the
NASD. Phases 1 and 2 of NASDAQ’s private placement reduced the NASD’s ownership
significantly resulting in ownership by approximately 2,900 investors. NASDAQ investors include NASDAQ-listed companies, dealer firms, and institutional investors. Press
Release, NASDAQ, NASDAQ Completes Private Offering and Expands Board (Jan. 25,
2001),
available
at
http://www.nasdaq.com/newsroom/news/pr2001/ne_section01_025.html.
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commercial interests would suffer.
Like the U.S., Canada understands the importance of its securities markets to the overall health of its economy. Moreover,
Canada’s securities markets “are especially important in financing emerging companies that have yet to display the financial
track record of more established concerns.”46
E.

Regulatory Response to the Global Securities Market

Securities markets are essential to the health of the economy47 and successful businesses. They are also a key underlying
component to the employment of individuals and their ability to
save and invest for retirement, education, and other essential
needs. Effective competition means that a country attracts foreign businesses seeking equity capital and maintains its own
domestic businesses. A sound, efficient securities regulatory
framework is essential to having dynamic and fair capital markets. A regulatory framework that is slow, rigid, complex, and
that adapts poorly to the pace of change in the global securities
market will not facilitate successful competition.
An appropriate regulatory framework in the global securities
market should be designed to compete effectively in a world of
changing technology and fluid borders. Accordingly, a competitive securities regulatory framework must include a strong central authority with a dual mission of protection of investors and
consistent treatment for capital seekers. “[R]egulators must
strike a fine balance between ensuring efficient capital markets
for issuers and maintaining adequate protection for investors.”48
Conversely, poorly regulated markets inhibit capital formation
and economic growth. As early as 1993, the Commission realized
that it would “need to devote even greater attention and more resources to address issues raised by cross-border offerings and
listings, without either disadvantaging U.S. companies vis-a-vis
their international rivals or compromising investor protection.”49
Accordingly, the Commission’s “mission is to administer and enforce the federal securities laws in order to protect investors, and
to maintain fair, honest, and efficient markets.”50
46 WISE PERSONS’ COMMITTEE, supra note 31, at 4. “In 2002, capital markets provided 88% of the long-term financing of Canadian firms, compared to only 73% in 1990.”
Id. Canada’s economy relies heavily on raw materials (e.g., lumber and ores), not finished
products. Only the largest of such companies qualify for listing on U.S. securities markets.
47 “A sound and progressive financial system, of which capital markets are a critical
component, is a key driver of long-term economic growth.” Id.
48 Id. at 3.
49 H.R. REP. NO. 103-179, at 12–13 (1993).
50 GPRA, supra note 16, at 16.
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Among the regulators of the world’s largest securities markets, there seems to be a loose consensus of the nuts and bolts of
an appropriate regulatory framework, i.e., one that is designed to
compete effectively in the global securities market. This consensus is reflected in the Objectives and Principles of Securities
Regulation published by the IOSCO.51
II. THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF
SECURITIES COMMISSIONS
IOSCO is one of the “world’s key international standard setting bodies”52 in the global securities market. IOSCO’s mission is
to promote cooperation and provide expertise to set standards for
securities regulatory frameworks. Accordingly, its members have
agreed to: (1) “cooperate together to promote high standards of
regulation in order to maintain just, efficient and sound markets;” (2) “exchange information on their respective experiences
in order to promote the development of domestic markets;” (3)
“unite their efforts to establish standards and an effective surveillance of international securities transactions;” and
(4) “provide mutual assistance to promote the integrity of the
markets by a rigorous application of the standards and by effective enforcement against offenses.”53
IOSCO members are Securities Regulatory Authorities
(SRAs) for the preeminent securities markets in the world, including the United States, Germany, Japan, China, Great Britain, and Canada.54 IOSCO has approximately 180 members that
regulate more than ninety percent of the world’s securities markets.55 Members are classified as ordinary,56 associate,57 and afSee IOSCO Pub. Doc. 154, supra note 6, at 1.
Securities and Futures Commission, IOSCO, http://www.sfc.hk/sfc/html/EN/
iosco/iosco.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2006); see also Jane Diplock, Chairman, Executive
Committee of IOSCO & Securities Commission, New Zealand, Is Regulation Keeping Up
With Or Fettering Cross-Border Developments?, (Feb. 17, 2006) (transcript available at
http://www.sec-com.govt.nz/speeches/jds170206.shtml). IOSCO began in 1983 to replace
its predecessor, the Inter-American Regional Association (IARA). IARA, created in 1974,
was composed of Securities Regulatory Authorities from North and South America.
IOSCO, Historical Background, http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=history
(last visited Oct. 7, 2006).
53 IOSCO, General Information, http://www.iosco.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 6,
2006).
54 Because there is no single securities regulatory entity authorized to bind the Canadian securities markets, only certain Canadian provincial securities regulators are
members of IOSCO—Ontario, Quebec, Alberta, and British Columbia. See IOSCO, Membership and Committees Lists: Active Member Organizations and Contacts,
http://www.iosco.org/lists/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2006).
55 See
id.;
IOSCO,
Historical
Background,
http://www.iosco.org/about/
index.cfm?section=history (last visited Oct. 7, 2006).
56 Ordinary members include: Australian Securities and Investments Commission,
China Securities Regulatory Commission, France—Autorité des marchés financiers, Ger51
52

391- 500 NICHOLS.DOC

406

5/16/2007 1:51:13 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 10:391

filiate.58 Ordinary members are voting members, while associate
members are not allowed to vote.59 Affiliate members are SROs,
have no vote, and are ineligible for membership in the Executive
Committee and the Presidents’ Committee.60 Affiliate members
are eligible for membership in the SRO Consultative Committee.
IOSCO is administered by a General Secretariat, but performs its regulatory standard setting responsibilities through
committees. IOSCO’s committees include a Presidents’ Committee, an Executive Committee, a SRO Consultative Committee,
and various Regional Committees. The Presidents’ Committee
consists of all the presidents of member agencies and is authorized to achieve IOSCO’s mission. The Executive Committee consists of two sub-committees: The Technical Committee and the
Emerging Markets Committee. The Executive Committee has
nineteen members, including the chairpersons of its subcommittees and each regional committee,61 one ordinary member
elected by each regional committee, and nine ordinary members
elected by the Presidents’ Committee. Members of the Technical
Committee include the Ontario Securities Commission, Quebec—
Autorité des marchés financiers, the Commission, and the U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission; essentially, Technical
Committee members include SRAs from the world’s larger and
more developed securities markets.62 The SRO Consultative
Committee (SROCC) was established to provide information to
many—Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, Japan—Financial Services
Agency, Canada—Ontario Securities Commission, Canada—Quebec Autorité des marchés
financiers, Russia—Federal Service for Financial Markets of Russia, and U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission.
IOSCO, Ordinary Members, http://www.iosco.org/lists/
display_members.cfm?memID=1&orderBy=none (last visited Oct. 24, 2006).
57 Although not eligible to vote or to be elected to the Executive Committee, associate
members are members of the Presidents’ Committee. IOSCO, Categories of Members,
http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=categories (last visited Oct. 6, 2006). Associate members include the British Columbia Securities Commission (Canada), Alberta
Securities Commission (Canada), U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and the
North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc. (NASAA). IOSCO, Associate
Members, http://www.iosco.org/lists/display_members_print.cfm?memid=2 (last visited
Oct. 6, 2006).
58 IOSCO, Membership and Committees Lists: Active Member Organizations and
Contacts, http://www.iosco.org/lists/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2006).
59 IOSCO, Categories of Members, http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=
categories (last visited Oct. 9, 2006).
60 Id.
61 IOSCO,
Structure
of
the
Organization,
http://www.iosco.org/about/
index.cfm?section=structure (last visited Oct. 8, 2006). Regional committees include AsiaPacific Regional Committee, Inter-American Regional Committee, Africa/Middle-East Regional Committee, and European Committee. Id.
62 IOSCO,
Members
of
the
Technical
Committee,
http://www.iosco.org/lists/display_committees.cfm?cmtid=3 (last visited Oct. 8, 2006).
Other members of the Technical Committee are: Australia, France, Germany, Hong Kong,
Italy, Japan, Mexico, The Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and The United Kingdom.
Id..
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assist those considering foreign business operations and investment in the global securities market; specifically, it provides information about the rules and requirements for membership in
SROs of IOSCO member countries. SROCC also provides investor education information, including broker-dealer and investment adviser registration status and dispute resolution procedures. SROCC has sixty-one IOSCO affiliate members; SROCC
members include the Montreal Exchange in Quebec; the Mutual
Fund Dealers Association of Canada; the Market Regulation Services Inc. in Ontario, Canada; and the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) and the NYSE in the U.S.63 Regional Standing Committees were established to address problems specific to regions in which certain IOSCO members are located. There are four Regional Standing Committees: (1) the
Africa/Middle-East Regional Committee,64 (2) the Asia-Pacific
Regional Committee,65 (3) the European Regional Committee,66
and (4) the Inter-American Regional Committee.67
IOSCO’s Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation
(OPSR) represents a consensus among SRAs regarding the goals
and infrastructure of an effective securities regulatory framework in the global securities market.68 IOSCO members are
63 IOSCO,
SRO Consultative Committee (SROCC), http://www.iosco.org/
committees/srocc/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2006).
64 Africa/Middle-East Regional Committee members include Nigeria, Algeria, Kingdom of Bahrain, Dubai, Egypt, Ghana, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Republic of Mauritius, Morocco, Sultanate of Oman, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab
Emirates, West African Monetary Union, and Zambia. IOSCO, Members of Africa/Middle-East Regional Committee, http://www.iosco.org/lists/display_committees.
cfm?cmtid=7 (last visited Oct. 8, 2006).
65 Asia-Pacific Regional Committee Members include Thailand, Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, People’s Republic of China, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia,
Japan, Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New
Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam. IOSCO, Members of the AsiaPacific Regional Committee, http://www.iosco.org/lists/display_committees.cfm?cmtid=6
(last visited Oct. 8, 2006).
66 European Regional Committee members include Belgium, Albania, Armenia, Austria, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Republic of Croatia, Republic of
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Guernsey, Hungary, Ireland, Isle of Man, Italy, Jersey, Republic of Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Malta, The
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Republic of Serbia, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, Spain, Republic of Srpska, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and United
Kingdom. IOSCO, Members of the European Regional Committee, http://www.iosco.org/
lists/display_committees.cfm?cmtid=4 (last visited Oct. 8, 2006).
67 Inter-American Regional Committee members include Brazil, Argentina, the Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Ontario, Republic of Panama, Peru,
Quebec, Trinidad and Tobago, U.S., Uruguay, and Venezuela. Associate Members (nonvoting) include Alberta and British Columbia. IOSCO, Members of the Inter-American
Regional Committee, http://www.iosco.org/lists/display_committees.cfm?cmtid=9 (last visited Oct. 8, 2006).
68 Initially, the OPSR was adopted in 1998 and updated most recently in May 2003.
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committed to the objectives and principles enumerated in the
OPSR and “intend to use their best endeavors within their jurisdiction[s] to ensure adherence to [the] principles [stated in the
OPSR].”69 Although compliance with the regulatory framework
set out in the OPSR is not mandatory, it may be used by SRAs to
determine whether their domestic regulatory frameworks facilitate fair, efficient, and transparent markets within the global securities market. Such regulatory frameworks are more likely to
protect investors and attract issuers and other market participants. “IOSCO recognizes . . . that domestic securities markets
are increasingly being integrated into a global market.”70 Moreover, a globally competitive securities market requires a flexible
regulatory framework which can respond swiftly to a global securities market in a constant state of development. Accordingly,
the objectives and principles enumerated in the OPSR are
deemed, for the purpose of this article, to facilitate effective, and
therefore competitive, regulation in the global securities market.
A.

The IOSCO Standard

IOSCO asserts that, in the global securities market, competitive securities markets require a regulatory framework that fosters capital formation and economic growth, with an emphasis on
competition.71 Such a regulatory framework would be based on
three objectives implemented by adhering to thirty principles of
securities regulation, which have been grouped into eight categories in its OPSR.72 The three objectives are: (1) the protection of
investors; (2) ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and transparent; and (3) the reduction of systemic risk.73
Under IOSCO’s regulatory framework, effective investor protection requires issuers and other market participants to disclose
material information to investors (both retail and institutional
investors), prohibits manipulative or fraudulent practices in the
securities markets, mandates supervision of market intermediaries or operators of exchanges that provide investment services,

IOSCO Pub. Doc. 154, supra note 6.
69 Id. at 3. IOSCO members intend to seek changes in their jurisdictions to the extent implementation of IOSCO objectives and principles with respect to securities regulation are impeded by a members’ policies or legislation. Id.
70 Id. at 1.
71 Id. at 8.
72 The categories are principles relating to the regulator, for self-regulation, for the
enforcement of securities regulation, for cooperation in regulation, for issuers, for collective investment schemes (e.g., mutual funds), for market intermediaries (e.g., brokers and
dealers), and for the secondary market (e.g., exchanges, alternative trading systems
(ATSs), and clearing and settlement systems). Id. at i–iii.
73 Id. at i.
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and prescribes minimum standards for market participants.74
IOSCO’s regulatory framework also includes the notion that investors must perceive that they have fair access to material information75 before and after trading, and during market operation hours. Moreover, the regulatory framework must not favor
some investors over others, and must punish effectively any investor who attempts to manipulate securities markets or to engage in other unfair and fraudulent behavior.76
Under the IOSCO Standard, investor protection requires,
among other things, that investors receive full disclosure of material information to facilitate informed investment decisions. At
a minimum, full disclosure of material information includes accurate and complete financial statements.77 Under the IOSCO,
financial statements are “key components of disclosure requirements . . . [and] accounting and auditing standards . . . should be
of high and internationally acceptable quality.”78 The notion that
full and accurate disclosure of all material information about a
particular security results in informed investment decisions rests
on the basic assumption that investors receiving full disclosure
have the knowledge and skill to understand, analyze, and act
reasonably based on the information provided. Finally, investor
protection also requires consistent enforcement of securities laws
as well as an effective, relatively inexpensive, neutral mechanism
in which investors can resolve disputes with market participants.79
The IOSCO Standard mandates a regulatory framework capable of establishing and maintaining fair, efficient, and transparent securities markets.80 This means that the regulatory
framework must ensure that all market participants (including
brokers, dealers, and exchanges) perceive that they are competing on a level playing field. The regulatory framework must require, at the very least, the imposition of licensing and initial and
ongoing minimal capital requirements. Capital requirements
should be set at levels designed to ensure that market intermediaries have sufficient capital to meet the requirements of their
customers (investors), counterparties, or the dissolution of their

Id. at 6–7, 12.
Id. at 12. Material information is information that a reasonable investor requires
to make an informed investment decision. See TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438, 449 (1976); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, Inc., 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
76 IOSCO Pub. Doc. 154, supra note 6, at 6.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 5.
79 Id. at 6.
80 Id.
74
75
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business without loss to their customers.81 The regulatory
framework must also include “a comprehensive system of inspection, surveillance and compliance programs.”82
The IOSCO Standard also requires the reduction of systemic
risk, i.e., the risk that market intermediaries (e.g., brokers and
dealers) will fail or cease to be going concerns and adversely impact securities markets.83 Implementation of this objective requires laws and procedures specifying minimum capital requirements and adequate operational controls. When a market
intermediary ceases to be an ongoing concern, the regulatory
framework must include rules and procedures to facilitate the
orderly winding down of the market intermediary’s business and,
most importantly, attempt to confine the effect of its failure so
that it does not affect adversely other market intermediaries.84
The IOSCO Standard also states that the establishment of efficient and accurate procedures for clearing and settling securities
transactions reduces systemic risk.85 However, the IOSCO Standard cautions against eliminating systemic risk in the regulatory
framework because risk-taking by market intermediaries is essential to success in the global securities market.86
The IOSCO Standard also describes the attributes of the entity or entities charged with implementing a country’s securities
regulatory framework.87 These attributes are of particular importance because the author contends that the securities regulator described in the IOSCO Standard should be established at
the federal level and must be authorized to impose some level of
federal preemption in order to compete successfully in the global
securities market.
1. Regulator Attributes Under the IOSCO Standard
Under the IOSCO Standard, a globally competitive securities
regulatory framework requires an independent and accountable
regulator with responsibilities and authority enumerated clearly
in the applicable law.88 However, the IOSCO Standard does not
require the establishment of a single regulatory entity; the term
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 6–7.
Id. IOSCO recognizes that such an orderly winding down may include laws other
than the regulator’s securities laws. Id. at 7. Perhaps the country’s securities regulator
might do well to have a department that reviews bankruptcy proceedings to ensure that
investors and market intermediaries are treated fairly.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 7.
87 Id. at 9–11.
88 Id. at 9.
81
82
83
84
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regulator may include sharing the regulator responsibilities and
authority with two or more government or quasi-government
agencies.89 The regulator must be operationally independent to
avoid influence from political entities and the securities industry.
Moreover, regulator independence requires sufficient and stable
funding, i.e., funds to both hire and to retain skilled and qualified
staff. Accountability requires public monitoring of the regulator
and judicial review of orders issued in connection with its regulatory activities. The regulator must have these attributes along
with a steady source of funds to perform its responsibilities.
The regulator must be clear and consistent in the exercise of
its authority and in the formulation of policy. Under the IOSCO
Standard, this means that in performing its responsibilities, the
regulator must be consistent, comprehensive, transparent, fair,
and equitable.90 In promulgating rules to effect policy, the regulator should use a process that allows for participation and consultation by the public, including market participants and investors, and others affected by regulator rulemaking and underlying
policy. Moreover, the IOSCO Standard requires procedural fairness and an analysis of whether specific rules and their underlying policies unnecessarily burden capital formation.91
The regulator must actively promote the education of investors and market participants. A regulatory framework based on
disclosure requires that both investors and market participants
possess the financial knowledge and skills to understand and act
upon the information disclosed by issuers. Market participants
must also receive continuing education regarding securities
products and applicable securities laws, rules, and regulations.
In essence, the regulator “should . . . play an active role in the
education of investors and other participants in capital markets.”92
Under the IOSCO Standard, the regulator uses the assistance of SROs to fulfill its regulatory functions and responsibilities.93 Although not a requirement under the IOSCO Standard,
it is recommended that the regulator oversee SROs.94 Specifically, an SRO should be required to “meet appropriate standards
before . . . exercis[ing] its authority. . . . [and o]versight of the
SRO should be ongoing.”95 SROs are useful in the regulatory
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

Id. at 9 n.11.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 12–13.
See id. at 12.
Id. at 19.
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framework because they have expertise about market operations
and practices and, generally, have a greater ability to respond
quickly to changes in the securities markets. Most importantly,
SROs are more likely to spot a violation of securities laws before
the regulator. In addition, the IOSCO Standard presumes that,
with respect to policy and rulemaking, SROs are likely to be in a
better position to determine whether a particular rule or regulation will impose too great a burden on the securities industry
even though it achieves a laudable goal, such as investor protection.96 Finally, the IOSCO Standard presumes that the regulator
will delegate duties to the SRO that the SRO has the “incentive[]
to perform most efficiently.”97 Despite the usefulness of SROs in
the regulatory framework, the IOSCO Standard requires that
SROs be monitored closely, at all times, by the regulator.98 This
means that the regulator must approve SRO rules before they
are implemented, i.e., before they are required to be followed by
the SROs’ members. The regulator must ensure that SRO rules,
and the manner in which they are implemented by the SRO, are
fair and enforced consistently in accordance with applicable securities laws and regulations.99
The IOSCO Standard recognizes that a significant drawback
in the delegation of authority by the regulator to an SRO is that
there is a prima facie conflict of interest when the SRO is responsible for the regulation of its members and the operation and
regulation of a securities market100 simultaneously.101 When the
regulation of members and market centers are combined, there
may be pressure from the SRO’s members to favor the market
center, which is a profit center, over the regulation of member
compliance, which is always a cost center. Accordingly, the regulator must monitor the SRO to whom it has delegated regulatory
authority closely and must intervene when needed; the regulator
must also retain the authority to investigate, inspect, and enforce
securities laws in circumstances under which it has delegated
such authority to an SRO.102 Under the IOSCO regulatory
See id. at 12–13.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 12–13.
Id. at 12.
For example, this conflict was recognized and eliminated when the Commission
approved NASDAQ’s application to become a registered exchange, thus elevating it to
SRO status and relieving the NASD of this responsibility. Press Release, NASDAQ, SEC
Approves NASDAQ’s Exchange Registration Application (Jan. 16, 2006), available at
http://ir.nasdaq.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=184424. Prior to January 1996, the
NASD was also the primary regulator or SRO for NASDAQ and other trading systems
that compete with NASDAQ such as electronic communication networks or ECNs.
101 IOSCO Pub. Doc. 154, supra note 6, at 13.
102 Id.
96
97
98
99
100
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model, effective delegation of certain regulatory responsibilities
and functions by the regulator to an SRO include drafting rules,
which must be approved by the regulator prior to implementation, designed to assure member compliance with applicable securities laws and SRO rules;103 assuring fair and consistent
treatment of SRO members and prospective members; establishing member conduct standards to promote investor protection;104
enforcing SRO rules and imposing appropriate sanctions as well
as cooperating with regulator-initiated investigations and enforcement actions; and assuring fair representation of the SRO’s
members on its board of directors.105
The IOSCO Standard requires a regulator with comprehensive enforcement powers, including inspection, investigation
and surveillance powers.106 At a minimum, the regulator must
have sufficient power to obtain data, documents and other records from individuals and/or firms that the regulator determines
may have violated applicable securities laws, or that may have
relevant information. The regulator’s power should include the
authority to impose administrative sanctions, and/or to seek orders from courts or tribunals, and, where appropriate, to enter
into enforceable settlements and to accept binding undertakings.107
Effective implementation of a regulator’s enforcement powers under the IOSCO Standard requires a regulatory framework
that routinely uses inspection and surveillance. For example, the
regulator’s inspection and surveillance powers should be routine,
not in response to a suspicion of violations of applicable securities
laws. Acknowledging that regulator resources may be limited,
inspections by the regulator should be prioritized beginning with
areas “of high risk to investors or which threaten systemic stability.”108 Again, the regulator may delegate its power of inspection
to SROs or other third parties under proper supervision.109
Effective enforcement in the global securities market may
require crossing jurisdictional lines.110 Specifically, regulators
103 Id. This includes avoiding the promulgation of rules that may create uncompetitive situations and prohibiting rules that allow members and/or market participants to
gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members and/or market participants.
104 Id. The regulator, along with the SRO, must ensure that the SRO’s rules do not
conflict with public policy established by the regulator.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 14–15.
107 Id. at 15.
108 Id at 14–15.
109 IOSCO recommends that SROs or other third parties conducting inspections on
behalf of the regulator should be “subject[ed] to disclosure and confidentiality requirements.” Id. at 14.
110 IOSCO Standard also recognizes the need for domestic cooperation in an effective
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must have the power and the resources to handle cases involving
cross-border misconduct. Accordingly,
the regulator [must have] authority to obtain information . . . that
may be relevant to investigating and prosecuting potential violations . . . relating to securities transactions, and that such information
can be shared directly with other regulators or indirectly through authorities in their jurisdictions for use in investigations and prosecutions of securities violations.111

This principle is crucial to effective implementation of the
IOSCO Standard, which states that “[d]omestic laws need to remove impediments to international cooperation [between securities regulators]. . . . The inability to provide regulatory assistance
can seriously compromise efforts towards effective securities
regulation.”112 Regulators must provide regulatory assistance to
their regulatory counterparts in other countries.113 Providing
such regulatory assistance requires establishing cooperative arrangements that allow information sharing across country borders. Moreover, regulators must determine whether such information sharing arrangements sufficiently identify systemic
threats to the stability of their domestic securities markets. For
example, will the financial failure of a market intermediary in
the U.S. cause the financial failure of a market intermediary in
Canada? Another benefit of cross-border informational sharing
arrangements is that “a significant part of an issuer’s commercial
activity [may] take place in a country other than the one in which
its stock is listed.”114 This is certainly the case in large, welldeveloped securities markets such as the U.S. “Fraud, market
manipulation, insider trading and other illegal conduct that
crosses jurisdictional boundaries can and does occur more and
more frequently in a global market aided by modern telecommunications.”115 Accordingly, IOSCO recommends that its members
regulatory framework. Id. at 15–16.
111 Id. at 16.
112 Id at 17.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 18.
115 Id. “It is also common for scheme promoters, managers and custodians to be located in several different jurisdictions and they may not be in the same jurisdiction as
investors to whom the scheme is promoted.” In addition, “[s]imilar financial products may
be traded on various markets in several countries. . . . [T]here are many derivatives in
which the underlying product or reference price is traded, produced or derived on foreign
markets.” Id. IOSCO lists several examples of violations of securities laws that might
necessitate cooperation between international regulators:
[1] shifting the proceeds of crime [from domestic] to foreign jurisdictions; [2]
wrongdoers fleeing to a foreign country; [3] routing [fraudulent] transactions
through foreign jurisdictions to disguise the identity of parties or the flow of
funds; [3] the use of foreign accounts to hide beneficial ownership of shares;
and [4] the facilitation of cross-border breaches through the use of international communications media, including the Internet.
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memorialize information sharing arrangements in the form of a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).116 Although the form
and content of MOUs will necessarily differ in light of the particular facts and circumstances, IOSCO recommends that MOUs
should, at a minimum, identify: (1) the circumstances in which
assistance may be requested; (2) the type of information that may
be shared; (3) procedures to maintain the confidentiality of information provided; and (4) how the shared information may be
used.117
“IOSCO recognizes that sound domestic markets are necessary to the strength of a developed domestic economy and that
domestic securities markets are increasingly being integrated
into a global [securities] market.”118 Accordingly, successful competition in the global securities market means that the regulatory frameworks of the U.S. and Canadian securities markets
must closely resemble the IOSCO Standard.
III. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF U.S. SECURITIES MARKETS
A.

Background

Prior to 1996, responsibility for regulating the U.S. securities
markets was more evenly shared between federal and state regulatory authorities. In fact, state regulation of U.S. securities
markets began before federal securities laws were enacted. In
1911, Kansas was the first state to enact securities laws, followed
by New York in 1921. State securities regulatory authorities
(SSRAs) were considered the local cops on the beat, the front
lines in the war against securities fraud in their respective jurisdictions. However, the stock market crash in October 1929 and
its fallout was a cataclysm that facilitated acceptance of federal
regulation of U.S. securities markets.119 Beginning in 1933, ConId.

Id. at 19.
Id. Information may also be required concerning financial and other supervisory
information, technical expertise, surveillance and enforcement techniques along with investor education information. Id. IOSCO also recommends including a public policy exception to the provision of information in MOUs. Id. at 20.
118 Id. at 1.
119 Before the stock market crashed in October 1929, there was negligible support for
regulation of the U.S. securities markets by the federal government. However, it is estimated that “of the $50 billion in new securities . . . half became worthless.” SEC, The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Sept.
6, 2006) [hereinafter SEC, Investor’s Advocate]. Banks also lost significant sums of money
during the period, which spurred an economic crisis, subsequently leading to demand for
federal regulation of the U.S. securities markets by key market participants. It was believed that the public’s faith in the stock market must be restored in order for the economy to recover. Id.
116
117
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gress passed federal statutes to regulate U.S. securities markets.120
1. Federal Regulation in the U.S. Securities Markets
Federal regulation of U.S. securities markets began in 1933
with the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act)
and was quickly followed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the Exchange Act). The Exchange Act created the Commission,
a single federal regulatory authority to regulate U.S. securities
markets.121 The Commission’s mandate is to regulate U.S. securities markets by administering and enforcing federal securities
laws and by promulgating rules that implement the regulatory
framework prescribed in federal securities laws.122 At the time of
the passage of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, there
was a consensus that the maintenance of fair, efficient, and orderly securities markets facilitates greater investor participation,
liquidity, and efficient capital formation in U.S. securities markets.
The federal securities laws consist of the Securities Act of
1933,123 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,124 the Trust Inden120 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.. §§ 77a–77bbbb (2000); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78lll (2000); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b1–80b-21 (2000); and Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1–80a-64 (2000).
121 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78d (2000). The Commission consists
of five commissioners, four Divisions and eighteen Offices. Although headquartered in
Washington, D.C., the Commission has eleven regional and district Offices throughout the
U.S. Commissioners are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate. The President also designates one of the Commissioners as Chairperson. Each
Commissioner is appointed to a five-year term ending on June 5 of each year. The terms
of each Commissioner are staggered so that only one Commissioner’s term ends each year
on June 4. No more than three Commissioners may belong to the same political party.
SEC, Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119.
122 The Commission is only authorized to bring civil actions in federal court and administrative proceedings internally. Although criminal actions may be initiated under
federal securities laws, only the Office of the U.S. Attorney is authorized to bring such
actions. Commissioners meet to conduct activities authorized under federal securities
laws. Commission meetings are open to the public unless confidential matters are discussed, for instance whether to issue a formal order of investigation. A formal order of
investigation is an order issued by the Commission authorizing its staff to issue subpoenas to compel documents and testimony. Formal orders of investigation and information
obtained pursuant to such orders are non-public. SEC, About the Division of Enforcement, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/about.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2006); SEC,
Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119; 17 C.F.R. § 203.5 (2005).
123 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2000). The Securities Act prohibits fraud in the offer and
sale of securities and requires disclosure of material information to investors to facilitate
an informed investment decision. See SEC, Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119. When
enacted, the Securities Act “specifically preserved the right of each of the states to regulate the offering of securities in that state.” SEC, REPORT ON THE UNIFORMITY OF STATE
REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR OFFERINGS OF SECURITIES THAT ARE NOT “COVERED
SECURITIES” 1 (1997), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/uniformy.htm [hereinafter SEC, REPORT ON UNIFORMITY OF 1997].
124 §§ 78a–78nn. The Securities Exchange Act prohibits fraud in the purchase and
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ture Act of 1939,125 the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,126 and
the Investment Company Act of 1940,127 and are based on the
principle of full disclosure of information required by a reasonable investor to make an informed investment decision. According to the Commission:
The main purposes of [the federal securities laws] can be reduced to
two common-sense notions:
Companies publicly offering securities for investment dollars must
tell the public the truth about their businesses, the securities they are
selling, and the risks involved in investing.
People who sell and trade securities—brokers, dealers, and exchanges—must treat investors fairly and honestly, putting investors’
interests first.128

The Commission promotes full disclosure in U.S. securities
markets by requiring issuers and other market participants to
provide comprehensive and accurate information to investors
with respect to: 1) the offer, sale, and purchase of securities; 2)
the efficient and fair operation of securities exchanges and the
over-the-counter market (OTC); and 3) the operations and sales
practices of market participants.129 Section 5 of the Securities
Act prohibits the offer and sale of securities through interstate
commerce unless the issuer registers its securities with the
Commission.130 Registration with the Commission requires the
sale of securities in the secondary market and authorizes the Commission to register,
regulate, and oversee market participants, including broker-dealers, securities selfregulatory organizations (SROs), such as the NYSE and the NASD. SEC, The Laws that
Govern the Securities Industry, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Sept.
20, 2006) [hereinafter The Laws that Govern].
125 §§ 77aaa–77bbbb. The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 prescribes the content of trust
indenture agreements between issuers and their respective bondholders. SEC, The Laws
that Govern, supra note 124.
126 §§ 80b-1–80b-21. The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 requires registration of
investment advisers—firms or individuals compensated for providing investment advice
to investors—with assets under management of $25 million dollars or more in order to
protect investors. SEC, The Laws that Govern, supra note 124.
127 §§ 80a-1–80a-64. The Investment Company Act of 1940 regulates the operation
and sales practices of investment companies, i.e., companies, including mutual funds, that
primarily invest, reinvest, and trade in securities and offer their own securities to investors. The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 is no longer under the jurisdiction
of the Commission. SEC, The Laws that Govern, supra note 124.
128 See SEC, Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119.
129 This principle of adequate disclosure assumes, of course, that those receiving the
disclosure have the ability to comprehend such information and have the investment
skills and/or knowledge to use the information to make sound investment decisions. The
jury is still out on whether this is actually the case, despite the Commission’s efforts towards investor education. The Commission offers educational information on its website
including, but not limited to, the EDGAR database, which contains disclosure documents
that issuers whose securities are publicly traded must file with Commission. See generally SEC, Filings & Forms (EDGAR), http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last visited Sept.
20, 2006).
130 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
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issuer to make disclosures of material facts—information required by a reasonable investor to make an informed investment
decision.131 Accordingly, issuers must file a registration statement with the Commission, which contains, among other things,
a prospectus.132
An issuer may avoid registration of its securities by qualifying for a specific exemption from the registration requirement
under § 5 of the Securities Act. Generally, an exemption is based
on the type of security being offered and sold or the type of securities transaction. For example, securities issued by banks, municipal authorities, charitable and/or religious entities, and certain employee benefit plans are exempt from the registration
requirements of § 5 of the Securities Act.133 Transactions that
are exempt from the registration requirements of § 5 of the Securities Act include secondary market transactions by persons
other than the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer, non-public offerings by the issuer, and sales by brokers or dealers.134 Section
3(b) of the Securities Act authorizes the Commission to create exemptions from the registration requirements of § 5 of the Securities Act.135 For example, a limited offering authority is available
for offerings of less than $5 million136 and is expressed in Securities Act Rules 504 (limited to $1 million or less),137 505,138 701,139
131 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (holding an omitted fact is material
if there is a substantial likelihood a reasonable investor would have considered the matter
significant).
132 A prospectus includes, among other things, a description of the issuer, its organization and financial condition, the terms of the prospective offering, and independently
audited financial statements. After the issuer files the appropriate registration statement
with the Commission, the appropriate division of the Commission determines whether to
review the issuer’s registration statement based on non-public criteria. The Commission
must promptly tell the issuer whether its registration statement will be reviewed prior to
becoming effective. Generally, if the Commission decides to review the issuer’s registration statement, it must provide comments to the issuer within thirty days of the date that
the issuer filed its registration statement with the Commission. When the Commission
completes its review process and the issuer has supplied any additional information requests by the Commission, the issuer requests the Commission to declare its registration
statement effective so that it may offer and sell its securities to public investors. See SEC,
REPORT ON UNIFORMITY OF 1997, supra note 123, at 1–2.
133 15 U.S.C. § 77c.
134 15 U.S.C. § 77d.
135 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b).
136 This exempting authority is granted to the Commission in § 3(b) of the Securities
Act, id., and to define the phrase “not involving any public offering” in § 4(2) of the Securities Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2).
137 Under Rule 504, 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2) (2006), exemption is limited to $1 million or less and does not require specific disclosures or filings except as required under the
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. However, Regulation D of the Securities Act requires issuers using the Rule 504 exemption to file notice with the Commission
within fifteen days after the first sale of securities. § 230.503(a).
138 Rule 505, 17 C.F.R. § 230.505, provides an exemption from registration for specified purchasers. Rule 505 does not require specific disclosures for sales of securities to
“accredited investors,” but certain disclosures must be made to non-accredited investors.
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1001,140 Regulation A (mini-registration),141 and § 4(2) of the Securities Act, which exempts transactions “not involving a public
offering” from the registration requirements of § 5 of the Securities Act. Rule 506 describes transactions that are not considered
to involve a public offering of securities, i.e., that are private
placements. The type of disclosures, if any, required in private
placements depends upon the circumstances of the particular
transaction.142
The Commission also regulates key market participants in
the U.S. securities markets including securities exchanges, OTC
markets, brokers, dealers, investment advisers, and investment
companies (e.g., mutual funds).143 There were approximately
5191 broker-dealers,144 15,300 investment companies,145 and
8302 investment advisers146 participating in U.S. securities markets in 2004.
a.

How the Commission Performs its Regulatory
Duties in the U.S. Securities Markets
The Commission performs many of its regulatory responsibilities through its staff. Focusing on selective federal preemption, the primary divisions of the Commission include the Division of Corporation Finance (CorpFin), the Division of Market
Regulation (MarketReg), the Division of Investment Manage§ 230.502(b). Offerings using the Rule 505 exemption are subject to the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
139 Rule 701, 17 C.F.R. § 230.701, provides an exemption from § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e,
which lists registration requirements for employee compensation plans by non-public
companies. Although there are no specific disclosure requirements, offerings made pursuant to Rule 701 are subject to the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
140 Rule 1001, 17 C.F.R. § 230.1001, provides an exemption from registration, which
is coordinated with the exemption from registration with California.
141 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2). The Regulation A exemption, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–.263, requires the issuer to file an offering statement containing required disclosures including,
but not limited to, unaudited financial statements. Securities may not be sold under this
exemption until the Commission has qualified the issuer’s offering statement.
142 Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. However, the Rule 506 exemption does require the
issuer to file a notice with the Commission within fifteen days after the first sale of securities. § 230.503(a).
143 SEC, Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119; SEC, Over-the-Counter Markets,
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrotc.shtml (last visited Sept. 20, 2006).
144 THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC., 2004 YEAR IN REVIEW
at Our 2004 Performance (2005), available at http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/
corp_comm/documents/home_page/nasdw_014279.pdf.
145 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2005 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 9 (45th
ed. 2005), available at http://www.ici.org/factbook/05_fb_sec1.html#fund_sponsors. This
number is for the period 2004 and includes mutual funds, closed-end funds, exchangetraded funds, and unit investment trusts.
146 INVESTMENT ADVISOR ASSOCIATION, EVOLUTION RESOLUTION: A PROFILE OF THE
INVESTMENT ADVISORY PROFESSION 3 (2005), available at http://www.icaa.org/
public/evolution_revolution-2005.pdf This number is for the period 2004; in 2005, investment advisers registered with the Commission totaled 8,614.
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ment (IM), the Division of Enforcement (Enforcement), the Office
of Administrative Law Judges (ALJ), the Office of the Chief Accountant (Chief Accountant), the Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE), and the Office of International
Affairs (OIA).147 CorpFin reviews disclosure documents required
under the federal securities laws in the primary securities market148 including registration statements filed in connection with
new issues and follow-on offerings, annual (10-K) and quarterly
(10-Q) filings, proxy materials, tender offers, and mergers and
acquisitions. It also prepares administrative interpretations of
the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, and the Trust Indenture
Act of 1939 (Trust Indenture Act) regarding securities traded in
the primary securities market. With respect to rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to federal securities laws, CorpFin
drafts and recommends rules and regulations to implement the
Securities Act, the Exchange Act and the Trust Indenture Act.149
In addition, CorpFin, in cooperation with the Chief Accountant,
monitors the accounting profession with an emphasis on standards promulgated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB),150 one of several entities responsible for developing Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).151
MarketReg regulates and establishes standards for key market participants in the U.S. securities markets, including SROs,
147 See the Commission’s website for a listing of all offices and divisions along with a
discussion of their responsibilities. SEC, supra note 8.
148 See generally SEC, Division of Corporation Finance, http://www.sec.gov/
divisions/corpfin.shtml (last visited Oct. 4, 2006). The primary securities market is regulated under the Securities Act, which governs activities related to new issues, including
initial public offerings or IPOs.
149 Administrative interpretations are sometimes issued in the form of no-action letters, which are letters issued in response to public requests of whether a particular course
of action or transaction would violate the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, or the Trust
Indenture Act. Specifically, the CorpFin staff writes a letter stating whether it would or
would not recommend that the Commission take action against the issuer for engaging in
the practice and/or transaction. CorpFin also provides informal guidance by giving its
interpretation of applicable securities regulations and advice on compliance with applicable disclosure requirements to registrants, prospective registrants and the public. SEC,
Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119.
150 Id. FASB was established in 1973 and is a private organization that establishes
standards of financial accounting and reporting in the U.S. FASB standards are recognized by the Commission and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, FACTS ABOUT FASB 1 (2005), available at
http://www.fasb.org/facts/facts_about_fasb.pdf.
151 GAAP represents uniform minimum standards of, and guidelines for, financial
accounting and reporting. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Glossary of
Terms, Acronyms, and Abbreviations, http://www.aicpa.org/members/glossary/g.htm (last
visited Oct. 4, 2006). It is comprised of standards, interpretations, opinions and bulletins
used to prepare financial statements for companies whose securities are publicly-traded
in U.S. securities markets. Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, http://www.fasab.gov/accepted.html (last visited Oct. 3,
2006).
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brokers, and dealers. Its duties include reviewing SRO proposed
new rules or changes to existing SRO rules submitted to the
Commission for approval. MarketReg is also responsible for implementing and monitoring the Commission’s financial integrity
program for brokers and dealers.152 Like CorpFin, MarketReg issues no-action letters in response to public requests about
whether a particular course of action or transaction would violate
federal securities laws. Unlike CorpFin, MarketReg is responsible for surveillance of the actual trading of securities in U.S. securities markets. It also monitors the activities of the Securities
Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), a non-profit, private corporation that insures customer accounts of broker-dealers in the
event of insolvency.153
IM monitors the activities of entities and individuals regulated under the Investment Advisers Act and the Investment
Company Act, including mutual funds, UITs,154 ETFs,155 variable
insurance products,156 and federally registered investment advisers.157 IM regulatory activities include interpreting the laws and
152 SEC, Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119. The financial integrity program requires broker-dealers to make and keep certain books and records, which allow the Commission to determine, among other things, whether brokers/dealers have sufficient net
capital to avoid insolvency. Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3 (2005).
153 SEC, No Action Letters, http://www.sec.gov/answers/noaction.htm (last visited
Oct. 6, 2006); SEC, Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119.
154 A UIT is:
[a] trust, registered with the SEC under the Investment Company Act of 1940,
in which a fixed portfolio of income-producing securities are purchased and
held to maturity. This type of investment vehicle is commonly used with municipal bonds. Each unit usually costs $1,000 and is sold by brokers to investors for an average load of 4% which is included in the per share price.
TIAA-CREF
Brokerage
Services,
Investment
Glossary,
http://www.tiaacrefbrokerage.com/invest_glosry_UUnd.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2006).
155 ETFs
are open-ended registered investment companies under the Investment Company Act of 1940, which have received certain exemptive relief from the SEC to
allow secondary market trading in the ETF shares. ETFs are index-based
products, in that each ETF holds a portfolio of securities that is intended to
provide investment results that, before fees and expenses, generally correspond
to the price and yield performance of the underlying benchmark index.
American Stock Exchange, ETFs Glossary, http://www.amex.com/etf/Glossary/Gloss.htm.
156 For example, variable annuities and variable life insurance—variable annuities
are life insurance annuity contracts that consist of an underlying securities portfolio that
fluctuates based on the value of the securities. The goal is to provide periodic payments
at a specified time (usually retirement). Accordingly, it is important that the value of the
annuity is preserved to meet periodic payment requirements. Periodic payments may
change based on the market value of the underlying securities portfolio, or may be fixed at
some minimum level based on portfolio appreciation. TIAA-CREF Brokerage Services,
Investment Glossary, http://www.tiaa-crefbrokerage.com/invest_glosry_V.htm (last visited
Oct. 6, 2006).
157 SEC,
Division of Investment Management, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/
investment.shtml (last visited Oct. 6, 2006). Federal Registration requires that the investment adviser have assets under management in excess of $25 million. Investment
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regulations under the Investment Advisers Act and the Investment Company Act for the public and for divisions within the
Commission (e.g., Enforcement). IM is also responsible for drafting new rules and amendments to existing rules on behalf of the
Commission pursuant to the Investment Advisers Act and the
Investment Company Act. Like CorpFin and MarketReg, IM issues no-action letters in response to requests from regulated individuals, entities, and the public about the Investment Advisers
Act and the Investment Company Act.158 In addition, IM participates in audits of registered individuals and entities and the examination of annual and periodic reports of persons and entities
regulated under the Investment Advisers Act and the Investment
Company Act, reviews reports such persons and entities must file
with the Commission, and proposes new rules and amends existing rules, which it must submit to the Commission for approval.
Enforcement investigates159 possible violations of federal securities and recommends to the Commission whether those investigated should be prosecuted civilly in federal courts and/or
administrative proceedings.160 Investigatory and prosecutorial
activities also include settlement negotiations on behalf of the
Commission.161 If those prosecuted are found to have violated
federal securities laws, available remedies in the federal courts
Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a (2000).
158 SEC, Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119; SEC, Division of Investment Management, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment.shtml (last visited Oct. 6, 2006).
159 Investigations conducted by Enforcement are private. This means that the Commission is prohibited from disclosing that an investigation has commenced. It is the job of
Enforcement to collect sufficient information during an investigation to recommend to the
Commission that it initiate a civil action or an administrative proceeding. Enforcement
obtains information by, among other things, interviewing witnesses, examining the books
and records of regulated entities, and reviewing trading data. Enforcement, acting on behalf of the Commission, may compel regulated individuals and entities to produce information it requires to conduct its investigation. However, the Commission must issue a
formal order of investigation to obtain such information from non-regulated individuals,
including officers and directors of companies whose securities are publicly traded. SEC,
Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119.
160 Administrative proceedings initiated by the staff on behalf of the Commission begin with the issuance of an Order Instituting Proceedings (OIP) issued by the Secretary of
the Commission. 17 C.F.R. § 201.141 (2005). An administrative law judge (ALJ), compensated by, but not appointed by, the Commission presides over the hearing and evaluates evidence presented by Enforcement and respondents. The ALJ issues an initial decision subsequent to the hearing that contains findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
recommended sanctions. Both Enforcement and respondents have a right to appeal the
ALJ’s decision, or a portion thereof, to the full Commission. The Commission’s review of
the ALJ’s decision is de novo, and it may affirm, reverse, or remand the ALJ’s decision in
full or in part. Administrative sanctions include cease and desist orders, suspension or
revocation of broker-dealer and investment adviser registrations, censures, bars from association with the securities industry, payment of civil monetary penalties, and disgorgement (return of ill-gotten gains). Both Enforcement and respondent have a right to appeal the Commission’s final order to the appropriate U.S. District Court of Appeals. SEC,
Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119.
161 SEC, Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119.
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include injunctions, civil penalties, disgorgement of illegal profits, or barring or suspending individuals from acting as corporate
officers of companies whose securities are publicly-traded.162
Available sanctions in administrative proceedings include cease
and desist orders, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains,163 civil penalties, and the revocation or suspension of the licenses authorizing
regulated entities and their employees to participate in the U.S.
securities industry.
The Commission determines whether to authorize Enforcement to bring a civil action, an administrative proceeding, or
both, based on several factors. These factors include “the seriousness of the wrongdoing, the technical nature of the [case], tactical considerations, and the type of sanction or relief [sought].”164
For example, only the Commission is authorized to bar regulated entities such as brokerage firms from participating in the
securities industry. Accordingly, the Commission might initiate
an administrative proceeding to revoke the registration of the
brokerage firm, which means the firm can no longer engage in a
securities business in the U.S. securities markets.
Although the Commission only has civil enforcement authority, it may, and frequently does, make referrals and provide assistance to the U.S. Attorney’s Office and state securities enforcement authorities that do have criminal enforcement
authority under federal and state securities laws, respectively,165
against those serving as directors and officers for companies
whose securities are publicly traded.166 In 2002, the Commission,
through its Enforcement staff, brought 598 enforcement actions.167
The Chief Accountant advises the Commission about accounting and auditing matters and collaborates with domestic
and international accounting and auditing standards-setting private sector entities, e.g., the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). It also cooperates closely with the Pub162 SEC,
About the Division of Enforcement, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/
enforce/about.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2006).
163 When the Commission obtains disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, i.e., money obtained by defendants from their illegal conduct, this does not mean that such funds are
automatically returned to individual investors who have been defrauded. “The Commission’s mandate is to protect investors,” not to act on behalf of individual investors. Id.
164 SEC, Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119.
165 Id.
166 The Commission may bar a person from acting as an officer or director by filing an
action in federal district court. Id.
167 GPRA, supra note 16, at 26. Typical actions included insider trading, accounting
fraud, and providing false or misleading information about securities and/or securities
transactions. SEC, Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119.
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lic Company Accounting Oversight Board.168 In addition, the
Chief Accountant consults with Commission staff (e.g., CorpFin
staff), registrants, and others about the application of accounting
standards and financial disclosure requirements under federal
securities laws. It may also refer matters to Enforcement if it obtains information indicating possible violations of federal securities laws.
OCIE is responsible for the Commission’s examination program for registered SROs, broker-dealers, transfer agents, clearing agencies, investment companies, and investment advisers.
The Commission’s examination program consists of inspections
designed to assess compliance with federal securities laws, to detect violations of federal securities laws, and to inform the Commission of new developments, including products and technologies, in the securities industry.169
OIA’s primary purpose is to reach out to members of the
global securities market “to promote cooperation and assistance
and to encourage the adoption of high regulatory standards
worldwide.”170 According to the Commission, OIA’s activities are
essential to furthering its interests in the global securities market,171 and include negotiating information-sharing protocols in
connection with enforcement cases, providing technical assistance concerning the operation and regulation of securities markets to various countries, and participating in international organizations (e.g., IOSCO) and meetings.172 For example, OIA
assists Enforcement in obtaining and evaluating information
needed from other countries to prosecute violations of the U.S.
securities laws.
As currently staffed and funded, it would be impossible for
the Commission to perform its regulatory responsibilities for the
U.S. securities markets single-handedly. Accordingly, the Exchange Act authorizes the Commission, as primary regulator, to
delegate the performance of certain of its regulatory responsibilities to SROs. SROs must register with the Commission under §§
6 and 19(a) of the Exchange Act173 and are subject to oversight by
the Commission. To qualify for registration with the Commis168 SEC, Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119. More detailed information is available
at Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), http://www.pcaob.org (last visited Oct. 6, 2006).
169 SEC, Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (2000). Section 78s(a) authorizes the Commission to effectively
shut down an aberrant registered national securities exchange by revoking its registration with the Commission.
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sion, the SRO must evidence that it has the capacity to regulate
its members and their associated persons with a view towards
ensuring compliance with applicable securities laws and the
rules promulgated hereunder, as well as ensuring compliance
with its own rules.174 SROs are statutorily required to police
their members by conditioning membership on compliance with
applicable securities laws (including state securities laws);175
SRO policing efforts must include the imposition of sanctions on
its members for violations of applicable securities laws (federal
and state) and its own rules. The largest and the most active
SROs are the NASD and the NYSE.176 Specifically, the Commission delegates much of its responsibility for performing examinations of market participants’ books and records to SROs which
have more resources to perform such examinations on a regular
basis (once per year). Generally, examinations of books and records are conducted to ensure that market participants are complying with federal securities laws and to protect investors by determining whether market participants have sufficient capital to
support their activities in the marketplace. Examinations of the
sales practices of market participants facilitates investor protection by determining whether market participants are making
misrepresentations of, and/or omitting to state, material facts in
connection with the offer, sale, and purchase of securities in U.S.
securities markets. However, despite delegation of certain of its
regulatory duties to SROs, the Commission remains ultimately
responsible for ensuring that market participants comply with
federal securities laws.

§ 78f(b)(1).
Section 78f(c)(1) provides that only registered broker-dealers and their associated
persons may be members of a national securities exchange, such as the NYSE. See §
78f(c)(2) for a description of factors national securities exchanges consider in denying
membership to broker-dealers. Institutional investor membership is prohibited.
176 FITCH RISK MANAGEMENT, REVIEW OF SIPC RISK PROFILE AND PRACTICES: THE
MJK CLEARING EVENT, THE SECURITIES LENDING EXPOSURE, RISK MANAGEMENT
PRACTICES AND CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 24 (2003) (“The two most prominent SROs are
the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE).”). NASD Member Firms totaled 5111 in 2005. NASD, NASD Statistics,
http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS_GET_PAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_0109
90 (last visited Oct. 6, 2006). NASDAQ and NYSE are exchanges. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1)
(2000), defines an exchange as
[A]ny organization, association, or group of persons, whether incorporated or
unincorporated, which constitutes, maintains, or provides a market place or facilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities or for otherwise performing with respect to securities the functions commonly performed
by a stock exchange as that term is generally understood, and includes the
market place and the market facilities maintained by such exchange.
For a list of securities exchanges currently registered with the Commission, see SEC, SelfRegulatory Organization (SRO) Rulemaking and National Market System (NMS),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml (last visited Oct. 6, 2006).
174
175
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2. State Regulation of U.S. Securities Markets
The state regulatory framework, like the federal regulatory
framework, is comprised of a state securities regulatory authority
(SSRA)177 that regulates, within its borders, the issuance and
trading of securities; the activities of market participants; and,
until 1996, the financial integrity (operations and capital requirements) and sales practices of brokers, dealers, investment
advisers, and investment companies. SSRAs are responsible for
enforcing state securities laws passed by state legislatures.
SSRA regulatory activities include licensing investment professionals and securities firms within their respective jurisdictions,
examining broker-dealer and investment adviser firms to confirm
compliance with state securities laws, reviewing state offerings
not subject to federal securities laws, and educating investors.
The state securities registration process differs from the federal securities registration process because a majority of states
regulate securities offerings based on merit reviews rather than,
or along with, full disclosure; only a minority of states include
full disclosure in their securities registration process. Registration based on merit review means that SSRAs must determine
the fairness of prospective offerings to investors. The definition
of fairness varies from state to state. The merit review process is
designed to “prevent promotion of fraudulent or inequitable” securities offerings.178
Like federal securities laws, state securities laws include exemptions from registration requirements based on the type of securities and the securities transaction. Types of securities that
are exempt from state registration requirements include securities issued by banks or savings institutions and by certain reli177 Eleven SSRAs are appointed by their respective Secretaries of State, others by
their respective Governors, five are under the jurisdiction of their state’s Attorney General, and the remaining SSRAs operate under the auspices of their respective state banking or financial institutions, or commerce departments. The Role of State Securities Regulators in Protecting Investors: Hearing on Efforts to Enforce Securities Laws, Investment
Adviser Registration and Licensing, State Investigations into Mutual Fund Industry
Abuses, and Investor Education Programs Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 34 (2005) [hereinafter Role of State Securities Regulators]
(statement of Ralph A. Lambiase, Director, Division of Securities Connecticut Department of Banking; President, NASAA).
178 In merit reviews, SSRAs determine the fairness of the offering by considering,
among other factors, whether the offering: (1) limits sales of stock to insiders and promoters and at a significantly discounted price; (2) Requires repayment of insider loans
before the offering is conducted; (3) Ensures that material transactions are from unaffiliated third parties and are ratified by a majority of the issuer’s independent board members; (4) Demonstrates that the issuer’s net income in the past fiscal year is sufficient to
cover fixed charges, preferred stock dividends, and redemption requirements of any preferred stock being offered; and (5) Prohibits unequal voting rights without allowing preferential dividends or liquidation provisions in exchange for accepting unequal voting
rights. SEC, REPORT ON UNIFORMITY OF 1997, supra note 123, at 7–8.
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gious and charitable organizations. Securities transactions that
are exempt from state registration requirements include the offer
or sale of a security issued to specified purchasers;179 any transaction in which there is an offer to not more than ten persons in
the state during any twelve month period under certain conditions; and any transaction in which there is an offer to existing
security holders of the issuer, if certain conditions are met.180
Moreover, most states have limited offering exemptions from
their registration requirements based on such factors as the
number of offerees or purchasers, the dollar amount of the offering, or a combination of the two.181
State securities laws, although closely following the regulatory framework set out in federal securities laws, are tailored to
fit the requirements of the local marketplace. State securities
laws were, and continue to be, different in each state.182 To address the issue of uniformity, or lack thereof, in the state registration process, forty-eight states have adopted (with modifications) the Uniform Securities Act of 1956 (Uniform Act)183 drafted
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL).184 SSRAs have attempted to decrease the cost
179 Specified purchasers include banks, savings institutions, and institutional buyers.
Id. at 9.
180 Required conditions include advance notice to the state securities commission. Id.
at 9–10.
181 Id. at 10.
182 Prior to 1996, all issuers were required to comply with state securities laws of all
states. Id. at 1. Inevitably, this process raised the cost of capital unnecessarily.
183 New York and California have not adopted the Uniform Act. Uniform Law Commissioners,
A
Few
Facts
About
the
Uniform
Securities
Act
(2002),
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-usa.asp (last visited
Feb. 9, 2007). Originally, the Uniform Act was drafted in 1956 and was adopted, with
modifications, in 37 jurisdictions. It was revised in 1985 and 2002; the Uniform Act of
2002 does not conflict with current federal securities laws and has been adopted by Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Vermont, and the U.S. Virgin Islands; it has been endorsed by NASAA, the Securities Industry Association, the NYSE, the NASD, and the Investment Counsel Association of America, and is approved by the American Bar Association. Uniform Securities
Act Organization, http://www.uniformsecuritiesact.org/usa/DesktopDefault.aspx (last visited Oct. 11, 2006). Regarding registration, the Uniform Act provides for registration of
state offerings by notification, coordination and qualification. Registration by notification
requires the issuer to make only a notice filing with the SSRA. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT
§ 302, 7C U.L.A. 74 (2006). Registration by coordination enables the issuer’s state registration statement to become effective when its federal registration statement is declared
effective by the Commission. § 303, 7C U.L.A. 81. Registration by qualification means
that the state securities authority will conduct a full review of the issuer’s prospective offering within its jurisdiction. Generally, registration by qualification is used when the
issuer is exempt from registration under the Securities Act but not under state securities
laws. § 304, 7C U.L.A. 84.
184 Uniform Law Commissioners, Frequently Asked Questions about NCCUSL,
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=5&tabid=61 (last visited Oct.
11, 2006). The NCCUSL consists of lawyers, judges and law professors, who are appointed by states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. It
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of capital by adopting the Uniform Act and working together to
regulate multi-state offerings under the auspices of the North
American Securities Administrators Association.
a.

North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA)
The North American Securities Administrators Association
(NASAA) is a voluntary umbrella organization representing state
and provincial securities regulators in North America. Established in 1919, NASAA consists of the SRAs in the U.S., Canada,
and Mexico.185 NASAA’s organizational structure includes a
board of directors, standing committees, an executive director,
and staff responsible for daily operations.186 Similar to the
Commission, NASAA’s standing committees187 are comprised of
five sections—Broker-Dealer,188 Corporation Finance,189 Enforcement,190 Investment Adviser,191 and Investor Education.192
drafts uniform and model laws in topical areas of the law which would benefit from uniformity. Uniform Law Commissioners, About NCCUSL, http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/
DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=0&tabid=9 (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
185 North American Securities Administrators Association [NASAA], About NASAA,
http://www.nasaa.org/About_NASAA/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2006). Canadian membership
includes its thirteen provinces and territories of British Columbia, Yukon, Northwest Territories, Nunavut, Quebec, Newfoundland & Labrador, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. Canada does not
have a federal securities regulator. NASAA, Director of Securities Laws & Regulations,
http://www.nasaa.org/industry___regulatory_resources/Directory_of_Securities_Laws___R
egulations/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
186 NASAA is headquartered in Washington, D.C. and its departments include legal,
finance, government affairs, communications, investor education, and membership services. See generally NASAA, About NASAA, http://www.nasaa.org/About_NASAA/ (last
visited Oct. 11, 2006).
187 NASAA, Sections & Project Groups, http://www.nasaa.org/About_NASAA_
Sections__Project_Groups/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
188 Project groups of the Broker-Dealer Section include Continuing Education, Exams
Advisory, Market and Regulatory Policy and Review, Operations, Arbitration, and Variable Annuities.
NASAA, Sections & Project Groups: Broker-Dealer Section,
http://www.nasaa.org/about_nasaa/nasaa_sections__project_groups/345.cfm (last visited
Oct. 11, 2006).
189 Project groups in the Corporation Finance section include Corporation Finance
Policy, Direct Participation Programs Policy (e.g., limited partnerships), Franchise and
Business Opportunities, Shareholder Rights, Small Business/Limited Offerings, Small
Business Capital Formation, and Coordinated Interpretations. NASAA, Sections & Project Groups: Corporation Finance Section, http://www.nasaa.org/about_nasaa/
nasaa_sections__project_groups/346.cfm (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
190 Project groups in the Enforcement section include Attorney/Investigator Training,
Enforcement Technology, Enforcement Trends, Litigation Forum, Special Project Development & Coordination, and Viaticals & Life Settlements. NASAA, Securities & Project
Groups, Enforcement Section, http://www.nasaa.org/about_nasaa/nasaa_sections__
project_groups/347.cfm (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
191 Project groups in the Investment Adviser section include Operations, Regulatory
Policy & Review, Training, and Zones. NASAA, Securities & Project Groups, Investment
Adviser
Section,
http://www.nasaa.org/about_nasaa/nasaa_sections__project_groups/
348.cfm (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
192 Project groups in the Investor Education section include affinity and ethnic-based
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NASAA’s Enforcement committee coordinates enforcement
efforts for multi-state or multi-jurisdictional frauds by facilitating information sharing and attempting to allocate efficiently the
enforcement efforts of its membership. The Enforcement committee serves as a liaison, on behalf of NASAA membership, to
federal agencies (particularly the Commission) and SROs. The
Enforcement committee also attempts to identify fraud and enforcement trends in the various jurisdictions of its members. For
the reporting period 2002–2003, SSRAs “filed a total of 2,964
administrative, civil, and criminal enforcement actions; assessed
$822,315,470 of monetary fines or penalties; collected
$660,109,508 in restitution, rescission, and disgorgement and
sentenced criminals to over 717 years of incarceration.”193
NASAA has adopted several programs over the years in an
attempt to harmonize state securities laws. These efforts include
the Uniform Limited Offering Exemption (ULOE) in 1983 to facilitate uniformity regarding registering securities offerings; the
Coordinated Equity Review (CER) program; and the Small Company Offering Registration (SCOR) program. However, compliance with such programs is strictly voluntary. ULOE provides a
state exemption for offerings that are exempt under Rules 505
and 506 of Regulation D of the Securities Act.194 SCOR provides
a lead state examiner for multi-state offerings required by relatively smaller issuers, such as microbreweries, small banks, and
technology startups.195 CER targets relatively larger multi-state
offerings, e.g., securities that trade on the NASDAQ Smallcap
market or the OTC Bulletin Board.
Most importantly, NASAA members have additional responsibilities other than securities regulation within their jurisdictions. For example, the responsibility for enforcing the securities
laws of the State of New York resides with its State Attorney
outreach, online trading awareness, senior outreach, and youth outreach. NASAA, Securities & Project Groups, Investor Education Section, http://www.nasaa.org/about_nasaa/
nasaa_sections___project_groups/349.cfm (last visited Sept. 9, 2006).
193 These statistics were compiled by NASAA with over 70 percent of its 52 members
responding. Role of State Securities Regulators, supra note 177, at 40 (prepared statement of Joseph P. Borg, Director, Alabama Securities Commission & Chairman of the Enforcement Section of NASAA).
194 See ROSA MARIA MOLLER, SECURITIES REGULATIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON
SMALL BUSINESSES 32 (2000) available at http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/00/04/00-005.pdf;
NASAA, Statement on Public Offerings, http://www.nasaa.org/Issues___Answers/
Legislative_Activity/Testimony/684.cfm (last visited Sept. 9, 2006). Offerings under Regulation D of the Securities Act are limited offerings that are exempt from the registration
requirements of § 5 of the Securities Act. Regulation D exemption requirements are contained in Rules 501–08, which contain requirements to qualify for Regulation D’s limited
offering exemptions from registration. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–230.508 (2006).
195 See
NASAA,
Statement
on
Public
Offerings,
http://www.nasaa.org/
Issues___Answers/Legislative_Activity/Testimony/684.cfm (last visited Sept. 9, 2006).
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General (AG). However, the AG is divided into five major divisions with corresponding bureaus. There are four case-specific
divisions: Appeals and Opinions,196 Criminal Prosecutions,197
State Counsel,198 and Public Advocacy; plus a separate Regional
Offices Division.199 There is also a Division of Administration
that provides budget, personnel, operations, and technology services for the Attorney General.200 The Investor Protection Bureau is responsible for enforcing and administering the State of
New York’s securities laws and operates under the auspices of
the Division of Public Advocacy (Public Advocacy). Public Advocacy was established to defend and protect the public interest in
New York courts. Public Advocacy is comprised of ten bureaus,
and in addition to enforcing the State of New York’s securities
laws, it also enforces its health care laws, environmental laws,
laws that prevent trade restraint, laws that protect charitable
donors and beneficiaries, and laws that prohibit discrimination.
Moreover, the AG’s recommended budget for the fiscal year
2005–06 of $214 million must be shared by all divisions and the
corresponding bureaus.201 Unlike the Commission, SSRAs rarely
have the luxury of focusing exclusively on monitoring and enforcing state securities laws.
As a member of IOSCO, NASAA also participates in the
global securities market by exchanging views with international
criminal law and regulatory sectors focused on combating investment fraud, and by identifying ways of coordinating enforcement efforts when investigating and prosecuting securities fraud
that has crossed international borders.202
Finally, cooperation between the Commission and SSRAs is
mandated under § 19(d) of the Exchange Act. Accordingly,
196 The Division of Appeals and Opinions handles appellate litigation in both the
State of New York and Federal courts. In addition, it drafts opinions which interpret
State of New York laws for New York State agencies and municipalities. Office of NYS
Attorney
General
Eliot
Spitzer,
Tour
the
Attorney
General’s
Office,
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/tour/tour.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
197 The Criminal Prosecutions Division investigates and prosecutes criminal cases
including, but not limited to, Medicaid fraud, auto insurance fraud, white collar and organized crime occurring in New York State. Id.
198 The Division of State Counsel provides counsel and representation in legal proceedings involving New York State agencies, the Governor, other New York State officials
and the New York State Legislature. Id.
199 The Regional Offices program provides mini-satellite offices in New York State to
provide access to the programs and services of the AG and to provide cost-effective representation for New York agencies in all New York State and Federal courts. See id.
200 NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF LAW, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 29 (2002).
201 Assemb. B. 550, 2005 Leg., 228th Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2005), available at
http://www.budget.state.ny.us/archive/fy0506archive/fy0506appropbills/ppgg.pdf.
202 Role of State Securities Regulators, supra note 177, at 37 (statement of Ralph A.
Lambiase, Director, Division of Securities Connecticut Department of Banking; President,
NASAA).
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NASAA and the Commission co-sponsor an annual Conference on
Federal-State Securities Regulation (Conference). At the Conference, participants in working groups focus on regulatory topics
such as corporation finance, broker-dealer sales practices, investment advisers, investor education, and enforcement.203
Against this setting, a movement towards federal preemption in the U.S. securities markets began, in earnest, with the
passage of the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of
1996 (NSMIA).204
3. Selective Federal Preemption in the Securities
Regulatory Framework
This section identifies significant legislative action endorsing
selective federal preemption from 1996 to the present. 1996 was
chosen because Congress passed legislation that clearly demonstrated its support for selective federal preemption in the securities regulatory framework. The chart below summarizes legislation signifying Congress’s intent to use selective federal
preemption in the securities regulatory framework.

203 Press Release, SEC, SEC, NASAA to Co-Sponsor Conference on Federal-State Securities Regulation (Apr. 5, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/200446.htm.
204 Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.) (1996).
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Name

Purpose

Citation

National Securities Markets Improvement Act of
1996
Oct. 11, 1996

To modernize and rationalize the regulatory framework of the U.S. Securities
Markets including, but not
limited to, the respective responsibilities of Federal and
State governmental authorities
To prevent certain state private securities class action
lawsuits alleging fraud from
being used to frustrate the
objectives of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995
“To protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the
securities laws, and for
other purposes.”
Although never passed, this
was an attempt to further
curtail state regulatory authority in the U.S. securities
markets and was described
as a bill “[t]o enhance the
authority of the [Commission] to investigate, punish,
and deter securities laws
violations, and to improve
its ability to return funds to
defrauded investors, and for
other purposes.”

Pub. L. No. 104290, 110 Stat.
3416 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.) (1996).

Securities Litigation
Uniform
Standards Act of
1998
Nov. 3, 1998
Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002
Jul. 30, 2002

The
Securities
Fraud Deterrence
and Investor Restitution Act of
2004

a.

Pub. L. No. 105353, § 1, 112 Stat.
3227 (1998).

Pub. L. No. 107204, 116 Stat. 745
(2002).

H.R. 2179, 108th
Cong. (2d Sess.
2004); H.R. REP.
NO. 108-475, pt. 1
(2004).

The National Securities Markets Improvement Act
of 1996
According to President Clinton, the NSMIA represented the
most significant overhaul of the regulatory framework for the
U.S. securities markets in decades. NSMIA would
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enhance capital formation and the competitiveness of the American
economy by eliminating regulatory overlap between the States and
the Federal Government. . . . [The] bill achieve[d] the difficult task of
improving the efficiency of the financial markets without compromising investor protections. . . . [It] will more efficiently divide responsibility for regulation between the Federal and State governments. The
[Commission] will be charged with responsibility for activities in the
national markets, such as regulation of securities listed on the national exchanges and mutual funds, as well as large investment advisors.205 States will have responsibility for smaller issues and investment advisors206 with smaller portfolios, while retaining their
authority to take enforcement actions against fraudulent conduct in
all situations. . . . These changes will all enhance our national capital
markets, helping to create and nurture new businesses and new jobs,
and enhancing the returns of both businesses and investors.207

NSMIA was designed to facilitate the development of national securities markets and to reduce the costs and burdens of
duplicative regulation. NSMIA increased the use of selective
federal preemption by
designating the Federal government as the exclusive regulator of national offerings of securities[;] repealing anti-competitive restrictions
on entities from whom brokers may borrow; requiring the consideration of efficiency, competition, and capital formation whenever the
[Commission] makes a public interest determination in its rulemaking; providing for streamlining and coordinating of examinations of
broker-dealers by [SROs]; significantly reducing regulatory burdens
on the mutual fund industry; [and] simplifying and reducing ineffective and anticompetitive restrictions imposed by the Investment Company Act.208

NSMIA also empowered the Commission to exercise wideranging, exemptive authority. The Commission’s exemptive authority allows it, by rule or regulation, to exempt any person, security, or transaction from any requirement under federal securities laws.209 Congress contended that such exemptive authority
was needed to ensure sufficient flexibility to respond quickly to
changes in the U.S. securities industry.210 However, the Commission’s exemptive authority must be exercised to promote effi205 Large investment advisers are investment advisers with more than $25 million in
assets under management. SEC, Investment Advisors: What You Need to Know Before
Choosing One, http://sec.gov/investor/pubs/invadvisors.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2006).
206 Smaller investment advisers are investment advisers with $25 million or less under management. Id.
207 Statement on Signing the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996,
2 PUB. PAPERS 1812 (Oct. 11, 1996).
208 H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 16 (1996).
209 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3 (2000). The Commission may exercise its exemptive authority
conditionally or unconditionally. See also H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 58 (1996).
210 H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 38 (1996).
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ciency, competition, and capital formation as well as the public
interest and investor protection.211 Accordingly, the Commission
must analyze the potential costs and benefits of a particular proposed rule.212
(1) Increased Use of Selective Federal Preemption
in Securities Registration
NSMIA facilitates the creation of national securities markets
and the reduction of the cost of regulation by prohibiting state
regulation of offerings of “covered securities” or “conditionally
covered securities.” Covered securities213 include the following:
1.

Securities listed, including securities authorized for listing, on
the NYSE, the AMEX, and the NASDAQ-NMS;214

2.

Securities of the same issuer that are equal in seniority or senior
to the security listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ-NMS;215

3.

Securities issued by investment companies registered with the
Commission;216

4.

Sales of securities in items 1 and 2 to qualified purchasers;217

211 Id. Congress also intended that the Commission raise the permissible amount of
offering exemptions under § 3(b) of the Securities Act from $5 million to $10 million, including, but not limited to, increasing the exemption amount under offerings for certain
employee benefit plans, and small public offerings under Regulation A of the Securities
Act. Id. However, this broad grant of exemptive authority is not valid with respect to §
15C of the Exchange Act and to the definitions listed in § 3(a)(42)–(45) of the Exchange
Act, which govern government securities dealers. Section 105(b) of NSMIA allows the
Commission to act by issuing an order with respect to the Exchange Act to facilitate individual exemptive requests; the Commission is authorized to establish procedures and circumstances that determine whether it will issue an exemptive order. Id.
212 In addition, Congress requires a rigorous cost and benefits analysis in connection
with its review of major rules promulgated by the Commission under the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996. Id. at 39.
213 The Securities Amendments Act of 1996 generally exempts from state registration
requirements those securities listed on major stock exchanges, e.g., NASDAQ (National
Market System only) or NYSE. Id. at 57–58.
214 This includes discretionary authority for the Commission to identify securities
listed on other exchanges or trading systems that are similar to the NYSE, AMEX, or
NASDAQ-NMS. Congress’s intent is to require the Commission to monitor listing requirements of exchanges on which covered securities are listed to ensure compliance with
applicable federal securities laws. Id. at 30.
215 This provision covers securities other than equities, for example, the issuer’s debt
securities. Id.
216 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (2000). The NASD also conducts examinations of investment
companies registered with the Commission that are also its members; this includes approximately ninety percent of investment companies. The NASD’s examination includes,
but is not limited to, a review of the sales literature and advertising materials. H.R. REP.
NO. 104-622, at 31 (1996).
217 § 77r(b)(3). This section contemplates that the Commission will define a “qualified
purchaser,” which would include purchasers of mortgaged-backed securities, asset-backed
securities, other structured securities, and securities issued in connection with project financings. H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 31. Generally, Congress believes that “‘qualified’
purchasers are sophisticated investors, capable of protecting themselves in a manner that
renders regulation by State authorities unnecessary.” Id. Congress’s intent was that
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Secondary market trading transactions that are exempt from the
registration requirements under §§ 4(1), 4(3) and 4(4) of the Securities Act;218

6.

Securities exempt from registration pursuant to § 3(a) of the Securities Act;219

7.

Securities sold in private transactions pursuant to § 4(2) of the
Securities Act, if offered or sold in accordance with a rule or regulation promulgated by the Commission in accordance with § 4(2)
of the Securities Act.220

435

Conditionally covered securities221 include registered securities offerings by issuers with total assets exceeding $10 million222
with two years of audited financial statements ending before the
filing of a registration statement with the Commission. However, securities offerings in which a person223 has been statutorily
disqualified224 are subject to both federal and state regulation.
The effect of NSMIA’s increased use of selective federal preemption is to impose one set of rules for securities that are, or will be,
traded on a national basis.225 For example, SSRAs may not perform merit reviews of offerings involving covered or conditionally
covered securities.
The states’ authority to bring enforcement actions under
their securities laws prohibiting fraud and deceit in connection
with any securities offering and securities transaction is specifically preserved under NSMIA.226 Such enforcement actions
these types of structured offerings be regulated exclusively by the Federal government
and apply to all offerings, both registered or exempt from registration under the Securities Act. Id. at 32.
218 § 77r(b)(4). The issuer must be reporting under the Exchange Act, or is exempt
from the reporting requirements under the Exchange Act. H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 32.
219 Section 3(a) exempts securities if they are: a) securities of non-profit and similar
entities described in § 3(a)(4); b) intrastate offerings under § 3(a)(11)(i); and c) municipal
securities as defined in § 3(a)(2). H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 32.
220 Id.
221 A conditionally covered security also includes a security that will be a covered security upon completion of the transaction. Offerings involving securities that have been
plagued by high levels of fraud will continue to be regulated by state securities authorities, i.e., regulation of such securities is not preempted under federal securities laws.
These securities offerings include securities issued by blank check companies, partnerships, limited liability companies, direct participation investment programs, penny stock
companies, and roll-up transactions. Id. at 32–33.
222 Total assets may be measured after the transaction is completed. Id. at 32.
223 Person includes associated persons of broker-dealers. Id. at 33.
224 A person is statutorily disqualified when she is barred from associating with a
broker-dealer and/or an investment adviser or investment company. Such a person is effectively excluded from participating in the U.S. securities industry. Section 39(a)(39) of
the Exchange Act authorizes the Commission to exempt statutorily disqualified persons,
thus exempting the securities offering from state regulation. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-622,
at 33.
225 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a) (2000).
226 § 77r(c)(1).
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would include cases involving broker-dealer sales practices in
which misrepresentations and/or omissions of material facts occur. However, Congress asserted that “[NSMIA] preempts authority that would allow the States to employ the regulatory authority they retain to reconstruct in a different form the
regulatory regime for covered securities that Section 18 [of
NSMIA] has preempted.”227 Moreover, NSMIA did not reduce the
revenue stream to states by eliminating state registration requirements for securities offerings and transactions involving
covered or conditionally covered securities; states may still require notice filings and fees in connection with securities offerings and securities transactions made within their borders.228
They may suspend securities offerings and securities transactions within their borders if the issuer fails to make a filing
and/or pay a fee required under state law.229
(2) Selective Federal Preemption and BrokerDealer Financial Responsibility
NSMIA preempts state laws imposing financial responsibility and reporting requirements on broker-dealers and associated
persons of broker-dealers. Specifically, selective federal preemption applies to regulation of capital, margin, books and records,
bonding, and recordkeeping requirements.230 However, state securities laws continue to apply to broker-dealer sales practices
involving fraud in the offer, sale, and purchase of securities
traded within the jurisdiction of each state; accordingly, SSRAs
maintain the ability to initiate enforcement actions involving
fraud. In addition, broker-dealers and their associated persons
must still register and pay filing fees in each state. Again, although some state regulatory powers have been preempted by
federal securities laws, states continue to receive revenue from
H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 34.
§ 77r(c)(2)(B).
§ 77r(c)(3). States also have the authority to request any registration documents
filed with the Commission in order to compute the required fee. H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at
35. Offering documents “include any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or
communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of any security.” Id.
230 Associated persons may effect transactions for existing customers in states in
which they are not registered. This exemption from state registration requires that the
associated person “must not be ineligible to register in the [state in which the transaction
occurs] for any reason[; ]must be registered with the NASD and with at least one [state; ]
must be associated with a broker-dealer that is registered in the [state] in which the
transaction is effected”; permissible transactions are those executed for an “existing customer . . . while that customer is temporarily away from home”; and transactions executed
for an existing customer while the associated person is awaiting a response to his/her application for licensing in the state. However, the associated person cannot execute more
than ten transactions under this provision in states in which the associated person is not
licensed. H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 36–37.
227
228
229
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state filing and registration fees.
(3) Selective Federal Preemption and the
Regulation of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers
NSMIA imposed selective federal preemption by amending
the registration provisions of the Investment Company Act (ICA)
with a view towards reducing unnecessary regulatory costs and
procedural burdens. Investment companies (e.g., mutual funds)
were permitted to register an indefinite number of securities on
an annual basis. Regulatory costs were reduced significantly because investment companies were permitted to file one registration per year rather than filing a registration statement for each
offering of its securities within a one-year period.231
NSMIA authorized the Commission to require investment
companies to make and keep certain books and records in addition to those necessary to prepare their financial statements.232
This expansion of the Commission’s authority was designed to facilitate examinations to determine whether investment companies and related entities were complying with federal securities
laws. The Commission’s expanded authority does not extend to
an investment company adviser, unless it is a majority-owned
subsidiary of a registered investment company.233 Finally,
NSMIA left to the states the job of regulating investment advisers with assets of less than or equal to $25 million; however, investment advisers with less than or equal to $25 million under
management may continue to register with the Commission if
they so choose.
b.

The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act of 1998 Increased the Use of Selective
Federal Preemption
Selective federal preemption in the regulatory framework of
U.S. securities markets continued with the passage of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA).234
SLUSA established uniform national rules for securities class ac231 Fees for such registration statements are based on the aggregate sales price of securities sold during the investment company’s fiscal year. Failure to meet the annual filing deadline and to pay the requisite fee subjects the investment company to the payment
of interest based on the amount due at a rate established by the Secretary of Treasury
under the Debt Collection Act of 1982. Id. at 44; see also 15 U.S.C. § 80a-24(f).
232 H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 47. Previously, the Commission could only require investment companies to make and keep records necessary to prepare their financial statements. Id.
233 Id.
234 H.R. REP. NO. 1689, at 4–5 (1997). SLUSA amended § 28(b) of the Exchange Act.
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tion lawsuits involving covered securities.235 Its effect was to require class action lawsuits alleging certain categories of securities fraud236 and involving covered securities to be filed in federal
court under federal securities laws.237 According to Congress,
SLUSA was needed to close a loophole used by the private securities bar to avoid the provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).238 PSLRA was passed to
eliminate “vexatious litigation that was draining value from the
shareholders and employees of public companies.”239 However,
according to a report and statistical analysis of securities class
actions lawsuits (Report)240 commissioned by Congress to assess
the effectiveness of the implementation of the PSLRA, the private securities bar seemingly avoided the more stringent requirements of securities fraud cases under federal securities laws
by filing class actions in state courts under state securities laws.
The Report suggested
that the level of class action securities fraud litigation has declined by
about a third in federal courts, but that there has been an almost
equal increase in the level of state court activity, largely as a result of
a “substitution effect” whereby plaintiffs resort to state court to avoid
the new, more stringent requirements of federal cases. There has also
been an increase in parallel litigation between state and federal courts
in an apparent effort to avoid the federal discovery stay or other provisions of [PSLRA]. This increase in state activity has the potential
not only to undermine the intent of [PSLRA], but to increase the overall cost of litigation to the extent that [PSLRA] encourages the filing of

235 H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 13 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (noting class actions relating to a
covered security are“defined by section 18(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, which was
added” with the passage of NSMIA). Again, selective federal preemption focuses on securities that are traded nationally in the U.S. securities markets.
236 Specifically, securities fraud consists of misrepresentations, omissions, deception,
or manipulation in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security. Id. at 7.
237 SLUSA amended § 16 of the Securities Act and § 28 of the Exchange Act to limit
class actions involving covered securities, i.e., covered class actions. Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227, 3227 (1998).
238 H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 13–15 (1998) (Conf. Rep.). See also, e.g., Michael A.
Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 290–91 (1998). PSLRA was passed despite being vetoed by
President Clinton. H.R. REP. NO. 105-640, at 9 (1998).
239 H.R. REP. NO. 105-640, at 9 (1998); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31–32
(1995) (Conf. Rep.). Unfortunately, under the PSLRA, the private securities bar could
still determine and select the most favorable state forum in which to file a securities class
action. Because the issuer’s security was traded nationally, the plaintiff’s attorney’s selection could result in forcing shareholders and defendants to travel great distances in
order to litigate securities class actions. Moreover, different plaintiffs and classes could
file competing securities class actions in the same or different states forcing the issuer to
litigate more than one securities class action case simultaneously. Most of these issues
were resolved under SLUSA.
240 See Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The
First Year’s Experience (John M. Olin Program in Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 140,
1997).
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parallel claims.
....
. . . [The Commission] called the shift of securities fraud cases
from Federal to State court “potentially the most significant development in securities litigation” since passage of [PSLRA].
. . . [P]laintiffs’ lawyers have sought to circumvent [PSLRA’s] provisions by exploiting differences between Federal and State laws by
filing frivolous and speculative lawsuits in State court, where essentially none of [PSLRA’s] procedural or substantive protections against
abusive suits are available.241

Specifically, SLUSA prohibited securities class actions involving covered or conditionally covered securities (covered class
actions) from being filed in state courts by defining covered class
actions as:
• any single lawsuit in which damages are sought on behalf of more
than fifty persons242 or prospective class members with common
questions of law or fact;243 or
• any single lawsuit brought on behalf of one or more unnamed parties seeking to recover damages on a representative basis on behalf
of themselves and other unnamed parties similarly situated; and
• any group of lawsuits filed in or pending in the same court, involving common questions of law or fact, brought on behalf of more
than fifty persons, which are joined, consolidated, or otherwise proceed as a single action.244

SLUSA was drafted to include mass actions245 and to authorize federal courts “to stay discovery in any state court action if
deemed to aid in the federal court’s jurisdiction.”246
241 H.R.Rep. No. 105-640, at 10 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (quoting Grundfest & Perino, supra note 240). PSLRA contained a heightened pleading standard, which required plaintiffs’ complaints to state specific grounds for their claims. In addition, all motions had to
be resolved before conducting discovery. Id. at 45.
242 Corporations, investment companies, pension plans, partnerships, or other entities are treated as one person, if the entity was not organized solely for the purpose of
participating in a class action involving covered securities. 9 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL
SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 4169 (3d ed. 2004).
243 Id. at 4168. Common questions of law or fact must predominate over any questions affecting only individual persons or members. However, it is not necessary under
SLUSA to prove individual reliance of all class members on the common questions of fact.
See id.
244 Id. at 4168–69. Individual plaintiffs bringing bona fide actions will not be prohibited solely because more than fifty persons commence actions in the same state court
against a single defendant or issuer. Id. at 4170.
245 Mass actions involve many plaintiffs, have high settlement value, and “may be
abused by lawyers who seek to evade [SLUSA].” Id.
246 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 85–86 (2d ed. 2003). See, e.g., In
re Bankamerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1049 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (staying state
court class action that “threaten[ed] the orderly conduct of the federal case,” which represented more than twenty-six times the dollar amount in claims than the state court proceeding that was stayed).
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SLUSA prohibits securities class actions based on state
statutory or common law in any state or federal court, if it alleges
misrepresentations and/or omissions of material facts or the use
of any manipulative or deceptive device in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of a covered, or conditionally covered, security. Such securities class actions could not be filed in state court
under state or federal securities laws.247 In this case, the use of
selective federal preemption means that nationally traded securities can only be subject to federal securities laws, not varying
state securities laws; such uniformity facilitates a reduction in
the cost of regulation.
c. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and Selective
Federal Preemption
SOX increased the use of selective federal preemption in the
regulatory framework of the U.S. securities markets. Areas traditionally regulated by states were now partially regulated under
federal securities laws. Specifically, SOX set (1) minimum standards of professional conduct, including non-industry regulation,
for accountants performing audits of companies whose securities
are publicly traded; and (2) more stringent Commission regulation of the corporate governance of companies whose securities
are publicly traded.
(1) Regulation of Accountant Conduct and Selective
Federal Preemption
SOX uses selective federal preemption to establish a regulatory framework for accounting firms that conduct audits of companies’ required filings with the Commission. Prior to the enactment of SOX, the fragmentation of the regulatory framework
governing the accounting profession conducting audits of such
companies adversely impacted effective regulation of the accounting profession and the usefulness of information obtained from
such audits. Accordingly, a reliable regulatory framework for the
accounting firms, who are responsible for ensuring that material
information provided by such companies is correct, is an essential
component of competing successfully in the global securities
247 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b)–(e). SLUSA excludes certain types of class actions and state
court actions. State jurisdiction is preserved with respect to actions brought pursuant to
the law of the state where the issuer is incorporated, and actions brought by a state, or on
behalf of a state, in which the plaintiffs are named and are authorized by a state to participate in the class action. Essentially, SLUSA preserves SSRA power to continue investigatory and enforcement activities. Shareholder derivative class actions brought on behalf of a corporation or issuer are also excluded under SLUSA. Certain state law
fiduciary claims against officers, directors, or control persons primarily based on misrepresentations in connection with tender offers, mergers, and other such transactions are
not precluded by SLUSA. See id.
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market. In congressional hearings conducted by the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs to consider
“the effectiveness of the accounting regulatory oversight system,”
it was determined that
The profession’s combination of public oversight and voluntary
self-regulation is extensive, Byzantine, and insufficient. The Panel
found that the current system of governance lacks sufficient public
representation, suffers from divergent views among its members as to
the profession’s priorities, implements a disciplinary system that is
slow and ineffective, lacks efficient communication among its various
entities and with the [Commission], and lacks unified leadership and
oversight.248

Under SOX, companies filing with the Commission can only
retain accounting firms registered with the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)249 to conduct audits of their
financial statements.250 PCAOB, subject to Commission oversight,251 has broad power to establish and adopt standards for
auditing, quality control, and ethics for accounting firms conducting audits for companies whose securities are publicly traded.252
PCAOB’s powers include the authority to conduct inspections
and investigations and to impose sanctions.253 All final decisions
248 S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 2, 5 (2002) (quoting testimony of Shaun O’Malley, Chairman, 2000 Public Oversight Board Panel on Audit Effectiveness and former Chairman,
Price Waterhouse LLP, before the Committee on Mar. 6, 2002).
249 15 U.S.C.A. § 7212(a) (2006). PCAOB has authority only with respect to audits of
companies whose securities are publicly traded. It has no jurisdiction over the work of
accountants auditing other companies, i.e., companies whose securities are not publicly
traded. § 7211(a).
250 Registered accounting firms must also file a report annually to update all required
information. In addition, registration and annual fees are assessed to cover the cost of
processing and reviewing applications and annual reports. S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 8. Accounting firms must register with PCAOB in order to be eligible to conduct audits of public companies. Accordingly, suspension or revocation of an accounting firm’s registration
means that it can no longer engage in the practice of auditing publicly traded companies.
Id. at 7.
251 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 107(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7217(a) (2006). PCAOB
has rulemaking authority, but all rules, auditing standards, and its budget must be submitted to the Commission before becoming effective. § 7217(b). The Commission must
also hear appeals of PCAOB’s disciplinary actions and negative inspection reports.
§ 7217(c).
252 S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 8. However, SOX authorizes PCAOB to rely on professional groups of accountants or one or more advisory groups of practicing accountants or
other interested parties as long as such parties meet SOX’s statutory tests. Id.
253 Id. at 9–11. PCAOB final inspection reports are sent to the Commission and applicable accountancy boards routinely. They are also made public. Accounting firms are
allowed twelve months to correct problems uncovered during PCAOB inspections. Sanctions available for violations of applicable provisions of SOX include revoking or suspending the accounting firm’s registration, barring individuals associated with registered accounting firms from association with their current firm as well as any other accounting
firm, imposing civil monetary penalties, mandatory participation in professional education or training programs, and censure. Revoking an accounting firm’s registration with
PCAOB or barring an individual from association with a registered accounting firm may
only be imposed if the violation was committed intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or
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issued and sanctions imposed by PCAOB may be appealed to the
Commission.
Most importantly with respect to the global securities market, PCAOB also has jurisdiction over public accounting firms organized outside of the U.S. that prepare audited financial statements for issuers trading in the U.S. securities markets.254
However, PCAOB has exemptive authority, i.e., it may determine
that the role of the foreign accounting firm is sufficiently de
minimis to avoid SOX’s registration requirement.255 Whether
this requirement diminishes the competitiveness of the U.S. securities markets in the global securities market remains to be
seen.
(2) Corporate Governance and Selective Federal
Preemption
SOX, using selective federal preemption, regulates in an
area of corporate law traditionally reserved to state incorporation
laws—corporate governance. Among other things, SOX places
particular emphasis on issuer audit committees. Under SOX,
audit committees are directly responsible for the oversight, compensation, and appointment of the accounting firm hired to conduct an audit of the issuer’s books, records, and procedures. In
addition, auditors are required to report directly to the audit
committee.256 SOX was designed to increase the independence of
the audit committee, given its importance as the first line of defense for ensuring the accuracy of financial disclosures required
under federal securities laws.257 Accordingly, SOX prohibits the
payment of consulting fees to audit committee members by the
issuer, and prevents audit committee members from being affiliated persons of the issuer or its subsidiaries.258 SOX also rerepeated negligence. PCAOB is authorized to impose sanctions for failure reasonably to
supervise a partner or employee. Liability for failure to reasonably supervise a partner or
employee is based on similar standards used with respect to broker-dealer under §
15(b)(4) of the Exchange Act. SOX also contains a similar safe harbor, i.e., the accounting
firm may avoid liability by showing that it has written internal control procedures designed with a view towards preventing violations of applicable provisions of SOX and that
its internal control procedures were implemented and monitored for effectiveness. Id.
254 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 7216(a). Congress “believes that there should be no difference in
treatment of a public company’s auditors under [SOX] simply because of a particular
auditor’s place of operation. Otherwise, a significant loophole in the protection offered
U.S. investors would be built into the statutory system.” S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 11.
255 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 7216(c).
256 §§ 78j-1(k)(1), (m)(2).
257 S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 14.
258 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(m)(3). See also S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 24 (“Former SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt testified that ‘as a listing condition, stock exchanges should require at least a majority of company boards to meet a strict definition of independence,’
including barring audit committee members from accepting consulting fees from the company.”).
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quires the audit committee to establish and implement procedures for protecting whistleblowers, including allowing employees to anonymously report concerns about accounting or auditing
matters.259 Finally, the issuer must pay for independent counsel
and/or other advisers that audit committee members determine
are needed to perform their responsibilities as audit committee
members.260
Corporate governance reforms under SOX include additional
inroads on state preeminence in matters of corporate governance.
Section 302 of SOX requires the Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) to certify that the information contained in annual and quarterly reports filed with the
Commission is accurate. Accordingly, the signatures of the CEO
and the CFO are required on such reports to evidence certification. Section 303 of SOX prohibits any officer or director from
taking any action to fraudulently influence accounting firms engaged in conducting audits of companies required to file with the
Commission.261 Finally, § 404 of SOX requires that each annual
report contain a written assessment of a company’s internal controls for ensuring accurate financial reporting.
d. H.R. 2179 and Selective Federal Preemption
The most recent significant attempt to increase selective federal preemption in the U.S. securities markets regulatory
framework is The Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act of 2004 (H.R. 2179).262 H.R. 2179 was designed in
part to preempt state laws that interfered with the Commission’s
ability “to investigate and deter fraud, levy and collect fines and
disgorgement [sic] funds, and provide for a significant increase in
money available for return to injured investors.”263 Introduced
on May 21, 2003, H.R. 2179264 proposed to preempt state securities laws by, among other things,
• Allowing states to place funds obtained from successfully prosecuted fraud cases in an investor restitution fund administered and
distributed by the Commission, even if the Commission was not a
party to the agreement or settlement which was the source of such
15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(m)(4).
§ 78j-1(m)(5)–(6). See also S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 25.
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7241–42. SOX also mandates the adoption of codes of conduct for
an issuer’s senior officials and disclosure of the terms of such codes of conduct on Form
8K. Any change in, or waiver of, the provisions of such codes must be disclosed to the
public immediately. § 7264; see also § 7262.
262 H.R. 2179, 108th Cong. (2d Sess. 2004). H.R. 2179 expressly preserves the right of
states’ securities regulations to bring fraud cases in their respective jurisdictions. H.R.
REP. NO. 108-475, pt. 1, at 50 (2004).
263 H.R. REP. NO. 108-475, pt. 1, at 12.
264 H.R. 2179 was introduced by Representatives Baker, Oxley, Tiberi, Ose and Kelly.
259
260
261

391- 500 NICHOLS.DOC

444

5/16/2007 1:51:13 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 10:391

funds.265
• Continuing the Commission’s prohibition of state regulation of capital, margin, books and records, disclosure, and disclosure of conflict
of interest requirements for brokers, dealers, municipal securities
dealers, government securities brokers or government securities
dealers.266
• Preempting state or local laws exempting property from foreclosure
or forced sale to satisfy judgments obtained by the Commission in
connection with its enforcement activities.267 It would preempt
state laws that allow properties otherwise covered by state homestead exemptions to be seized by the Commission.
• Establishing that the Central Registration Depository (CRD) and
the Investment Adviser Registration Depository (IARD) are operated on behalf of the Commission.268

However, it is clear that H.R. 2179 was not designed to completely eliminate SSRAs in the securities regulatory framework.
Its purpose seems to be to increase selective federal preemption
in an area Congress deemed to be “weak areas” in the securities
regulatory framework. Also, H.R. 2179 requires the Commission
to cooperate with NASAA “to produce . . . a joint study on
strengthening the working relationship between State and Federal securities regulators.”269

265 H.R. REP. NO. 108-475, pt. 1, at 8. The Congressional Committee stresses that
states are not required to deposit disgorgement and/or civil penalties in the Commission
controlled fund. In addition, this fund would be used only for the purpose of making restitution payments to investors. Id. However, such funds are, in many cases, used to cover
the costs of state enforcement actions.
266 Proposed Amendment to H.R. 2179, 108th Cong. (2003) (offered by Rep. Baker).
However, this section of H.R. 2179 requires the Commission to consult with SSRAs in order to evaluate whether requirements established under this section of H.R. 2179 are
adequate. Id.
267 H.R. REP. NO. 108-475, pt. 1, at 2. However, Representative Harris offered an
amendment that would exempt such property from a judgment or order obtained by the
Commission if its aggregate value did not exceed $125,000 and it was acquired more than
1215 days prior to the Commission’s judgment or order. See Proposed Amendment to
H.R. 2179, 108th Cong. (2003) (offered by Rep. Harris). Subsequently, Representative
Harris offered an amendment to her amendment that would require that such property
“constitutes or is derived from” proceeds obtained in violation of securities laws and after
“payment of debts.” Proposed Amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 2179, 108th Cong. (2003) (offered by Rep. Harris). Representative Hensarling
also offered an amendment that would limit waiver of state homestead exemptions subject to Commission judgments or orders to an aggregate value of $125,000 after the payment of debts. Amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 2179,
108th Cong. (2003) (offered by Rep. Hensarling).
268 See H.R. REP. NO. 108-475, pt. 1, at 30. There is an ongoing dispute as to the
ownership of the CRD. This section states that such public disclosure programs are under
the authority of the Commission, not the states. NASAA, representing the SSRAs, also
asserts ownership of the CRD.
NASAA, CRD & IARD, http://www.nasaa.org/
Industry___Regulatory_Resources/CRD___IARD/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2006).
269 H.R. REP. NO. 108-475, pt. 1, at 28.
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IV. CANADIAN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
A.

Overview

Unlike the U.S., Canada does not, nor is it able to, use selective federal preemption in its securities regulatory framework.
Canada does not have federal securities laws directly regulating
securities markets throughout the country. Moreover, it does not
have any entity at the federal level whose sole mission is to ensure a uniform securities regulatory framework, require provincial compliance with such a securities regulatory framework, and
represent Canada in the global securities market. Instead, Canada’s securities regulatory framework consists of thirteen provincial270 securities regulators and several SROs. Each province has
its own SRA, whose jurisdiction does not extend beyond its borders.271 Furthermore, although provincial securities laws are
based on similar principles and objectives, the implementation of
provincial securities laws, inevitably, is inconsistent.272
The only organization charged with harmonizing the various
provincial securities laws and their implementation is the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA). This is problematic because, like NASAA, the CSA is a voluntary membership organization. Accordingly, provincial compliance with CSA initiatives
and policy recommendations is not statutorily mandated. SRAs
may choose to follow all, a portion, or none of CSA’s harmonization recommendations.
1. Canadian Securities Administrators
The CSA was established in an attempt to bring some uniformity to a very fragmented regulatory framework. Like its
counterpart in the U.S.—NASAA—CSA members are the thirteen SRAs responsible for securities regulation in Canada’s provinces and territories. The CSA “is an informal body that functions through meetings among its members. . . . [and does not
270 The term province in this article is meant to include Canada’s territories, the
Yukon Territory, Northwest Territories, and Government of Nunavut.
271 The provincial securities regulators are: British Columbia Securities Commission
(BCSC); Alberta Securities Commission (ASC); Saskatchewan Financial Services Commission (SFSC); Manitoba Securities Commission (MSC); Ontario Securities Commission
(OSC); Commission des Valeurs Mobilieres du Quebec (CVMQ); New Brunswick Securities Administration Branch (NBSAB); Nova Scotia Securities Commission (NSSC); Prince
Edward Island Securities Office (Office of the Attorney General) (PEISO); Securities
Commission of Newfoundland and Labrador (SCNL); Registrar of Securities (Community
Services), Government of the Yukon Territory (RSYT); Registrar of Securities (Department of Justice), Government of the Northwest Territories (RSNT); and Registrar of Securities (Department of Justice), Government of Nunavut (RSN). WISE PERSONS’
COMMITTEE, supra note 31, at 15.
272 Id.
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have] binding authority over the securities regulators regarding
policy development or enforcement activities, and is funded by
each of its members on a voluntary basis.”273 Although created in
1937, it was not until 2003 that the CSA created a Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) to “oversee the implementation of the
CSA’s strategic plan274 and ongoing policy and rule development.”275 Despite its limitations, the CSA has focused on harmonizing the various securities laws of its members. Some of its initiatives include:
• National instruments and national policies—The development and
implementation of 25 national instruments and 24 national policies
covering key areas such as prospectus requirements, mutual funds
regulation, rights offerings, take-over bids, registration issues and
marketplace operations.
• Mutual Reliance Review System (MRRS)276—A system in which
one securities regulator is designated as the “principal regulator”
on which other jurisdictions rely for analysis and review of filings
and exemptive relief applications.
• System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR)—
A web-based system that facilitates the electronic filing of securities information as required by provincial and territorial regulators
and that provides public access to most disclosure documents filed
by reporting issuers. [SEDAR was established in 1997.]
• System for Electronic Disclosure by Insiders (SEDI)—A web-based
system that facilitates the filing and public viewing of reports on
Id. (emphasis added).
Canadian
Securities
Administrators,
CSA
Structure,
http://www.csaacvm.ca/html_CSA/about.html#structure (last visited Feb. 10, 2007). CSA’s strategic plan
includes focusing on three areas to make Canada’s securities regulatory framework globally competitive: “[1.] innovative, responsive and flexible policy-making, focused on significant threats to investors and market integrity; [2.] coordinated and streamlined administrative and regulatory operations; and [3.] strategic, firm and fair enforcement.”
CANADIAN SECURITIES ADMINISTRATORS STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES at 2, 4 (2005), available
at http://www.csa-acvm.ca/pdfs/CSA_Strategic_Objectives_Feb2005_ENG.pdf.
275 WISE PERSONS’ COMMITTEE, supra note 31, at 16. PCC has six members appointed
for two-year terms. The first members are the chairs of the BSC, ASC, MSC, OSC, CVMQ
and NSSC. The CSA also elects its chair and vice-chair for two-year terms. Id.
276 Id. at 17.
[I]f an issuer wishes to issue securities by way of a prospectus in more than one
jurisdiction in Canada, the MRRS allows the issuer to deal with one principal
regulator (usually the regulator in the jurisdiction where the issuer’s head office
is located) rather than with each of the regulators in the jurisdictions in which
the securities are being offered. Staff of the principal regulator provide comments to the issuer on behalf of all of the commissions and make recommendations. The issuer then receives a single decision document from the principal
regulator.
However, because participation in MRRS is voluntary, SRAs are free to withdraw from
the system at any time and to deal directly with the issuer. Accordingly, market participants must be prepared to deal with the individual SRA securities acts and regulations at
all times and there is no reduction in filing fees nor in fees paid to attorneys, accountants,
and investment bankers. Id.
273
274
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securities trading by insiders of reporting issuers.
• National Registration Database (NRD)—A web-based system that
permits dealers and advisers to file registration forms electronically.277
• USL Project—A project with the goal of developing uniform securities legislation and uniform rules for adoption by each jurisdiction
in Canada.278

However, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that compliance with CSA initiatives is entirely voluntary. There are no
federal or provincial securities laws that require SRAs to comply
with CSA initiatives.
Like Canada’s securities regulatory
framework, the level of participation in CSA initiatives is quite
fragmented. SEDAR, created in 1997, enjoys the highest level of
participation by the thirteen SRAs. All Canadian public companies and mutual funds are generally required to file their documents in SEDAR. However, filing requirements differ based on
which SRA has primary jurisdiction.279 SEDAR is operated by
CDS Limited,280 which is regulated by the SRAs in Ontario and
Quebec along with the Bank of Canada. SEDAR maintains
working and reporting relationships with Canada’s remaining
SRAs. 281
Moreover, Canada’s attempts at facilitating a uniform secu277 The NRD was launched by the CSA and the Investment Dealers Association of
Canada on March 31, 2003. “Generally, an individual or company whose business is trading, underwriting or advising with respect to securities is required to register annually
with one or more provincial securities regulators.” Currently, all thirteen SRAs participate in NRD. However, Quebec did not participate until January 2005. See generally National Registration Database Information, http://www.nrd-info.ca/home_index.jsp (last
visited Oct. 26, 2006).
278 WISE PERSONS’ COMMITTEE, supra note 31, at 16.
279 Id. at 35. System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval, Background on
SEDAR, http://www.sedar.com/sedar/background_on_sedar_en.htm. See also National
Instrument 13-101 System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR)
(2004)
(Can.),
available
at
http://ftp.sfsc.gov.sk.ca/scripts/ssc/files/nat-inst/13101niamendedasof-mar30-04.pdf.
280 System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval, Background on SEDAR,
http://www.sedar.com/sedar/background_on_sedar_en.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2006).
CDS Limited is owned by certain Canadian chartered banks, the Toronto Exchange, and
the Investment Dealers Association of Canada. Canadian Depository for Securities Limited, CDS Is …, http://www.cds.ca/cdshome.nsf/Main-E?OpenFrameSet (last visited Oct.
26, 2006). The IDA regulates its members based on authority delegated by Canada’s thirteen provinces and territories.
281 The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) is also actively
involved in the Canadian regulatory structure. OSFI supervises and regulates all Canadian banks, federally incorporated or registered trust and loan companies, insurance
companies, cooperative credit associations, fraternal benefit societies and pension plans.
OSFI has offices in Ottawa, Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver. See Treasury Board of
Canada Secretariat, Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada: DPR
2000–2001 § 2.3 Role, Responsibilities, and Organization, http://www.tbssct.gc.ca/rma/dpr/00-01/OSFI00dpr/osfi0001dpr01_e.asp (follow “2.3 Role, Responsibilities,
and Organization” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 14, 2006).
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rities regulatory framework may be undermined at any time if an
SRA decides that it is no longer in its best interest to participate
in the CSA or to comply with CSA initiatives. The CSA is also
subject to an interruption of funding since contributions by its
members are voluntary and are taken from the individual SRA
budgets of its members.
Like the U.S., Canada’s securities regulatory framework includes a fund to protect investors in the event that an investment
dealer becomes insolvent. The Canadian Investor Protection
Fund (CIPF) is sponsored by the Investment Dealers Association,
the Montreal Exchange, and the TSX Group of Companies.282 Investment dealers are automatically enrolled in CIPF if they are
members of one of CIPF’s sponsoring SROs. The CSA and sponsoring SROs supervise the activities of the CIPF with respect to
the financial condition of its members.283 Although the applicable SRO is responsible for conducting examinations of investment
dealers operating within its jurisdiction, CIPF is authorized to
conduct annual reviews and evaluations of each SRO’s examination activities to ensure compliance with CIPF Minimum Standards. Eligible customer accounts are covered up to a maximum
of $1 million for losses of securities, commodity and futures contracts, segregated insurance funds and cash.284
2. Investment Dealers Association of Canada (IDA)
The IDA is Canada’s largest SRO and is authorized under
the securities acts of all thirteen SRAs to regulate the activities
of Canadian investment dealers. The IDA also serves as an industry representative for its members.285 In its representative
role, the IDA is responsible for ensuring that its members’ perspectives are considered in the formulation of national policies,
282 See Canadian Investor Protection Fund, Welcome to CIPF: About CIPF,
http://www.cipf.ca/c_home.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2006).
283 CIPF activities include, among other things, establishing and reviewing national
standards for capital adequacy and liquidity, financial reporting, accounting records, internal control, segregation of customers’ fully and partly paid securities, and insurance.
CANADIAN INVESTOR PROTECTION FUND ANNUAL REPORT TO INVESTORS 2 (2003), available
at http://www.cipf.ca/look_images/03reportsumm/cipf%20ar03.pdf.
284 Id.; Canadian Investor Protection Fund, Explore CIPF Coverage: Coverage Limits
and Policies, http://www.cipf.ca/c_explore_coverage.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2006). The
maximum amount of customer loss due to an insolvent member firm is calculated by “taking into account both the delivery of any available securities, commodity and futures contracts, segregated insurance funds and cash to which the customer is entitled and the distribution of any assets of the insolvent Member firm, less any amounts owed by the
customer to the Member.” Most investors will have two accounts eligible for coverage—a
general account and a retirement account; each is eligible for $1 million coverage. If there
is more than one general account, they are combined into one account for coverage purposes. Retirement accounts are treated similarly. See id.
285 Investment Dealers Association of Canada, About the IDA: Roles and Responsibilities, http://www.ida.ca/About/Roles_en.asp (last visited Oct. 14, 2006).
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rules, practices and standards governing Canada’s securities industry.286 The IDA is overseen or supervised by SRAs and the
CIPF.287 SRAs delegate their supervisory responsibilities of the
IDA to the CSA. CSA performs its oversight responsibilities
through its regulatory oversight group by reviewing and/or approving all rule changes proposed by the IDA and conducting periodic operational reviews. As previously noted, CIPF reviews
and evaluates the IDA’s regulatory activities to ensure compliance with CIPF Minimum Standards.288
The IDA conducts inspections and audits of its members289
and requires all members to maintain risk adjusted capital
greater than zero at all times; if risk adjusted capital falls below
zero, the member must notify the IDA’s senior vice president of
member regulation.290 However, similar to the NASD in the
U.S., the IDA requires varying levels of risk adjusted capital
above zero based on the type of business activities conducted by
the member firm.291
Similar to the NASD, the IDA mandates the education of its
members’ employees, investor education, and cooperation with
governments in developing financial legislation in the public interest.292 The education of its members’ employees includes administering exams for licensing to demonstrate proficiency requirements to carry on certain types of securities activities. IDA
membership requires members (and their employees) to submit
to IDA examinations and investigations to ensure compliance
with its bylaws, regulations, rulings or policies; any applicable
securities laws of provincial and territorial securities commisId.
Investment Dealers Association of Canada, Membership: Member Regulatory
Process, http://www.ida.ca/Membership/MembRegProc_en.asp (last visited Oct. 14, 2006).
Many member firms are members of more than one SRO and, to prevent duplication, each
firm selects one particular SRO for audit purposes. See CANADIAN INVESTOR PROTECTION
FUND ANNUAL REPORT TO INVESTORS, supra note 283, at 2. The IDA has recently taken
over the audit jurisdictions of The Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) and the Canadian Venture Exchange. Press Release, Investment Dealers Association of Canada & Canadian
Venture Exchange, IDA and CDNX Announce Member Regulation Transfer to the IDA
(Jan. 4, 2000), available at
http://www.ida.ca/Files/Media/MediaRelease/General/
MRG200001040_en.pdf.
288 Investment Dealers Association of Canada, Membership: Member Regulatory
Process, supra note 287. The CIPF review includes receipt of all Monthly Financial Reports, Joint Regulatory Financial Questionnaires, and field examinations.
289 IDA’s inspections and audits include, but are not limited to, the financial status of
the firm, an annual audit by external auditors, a sales and compliance review, and a
credit practices review. Id.
290 IDA By-Law 17.1 Minimum Capital, Conduct of Business and Insurance, in IDA
RULE BOOK, http://www.ida.ca (follow “English” hyperlink; then follow “Rule Book” hyperlink) [hereinafter IDA RULE BOOK].
291 Id.
292 See, e.g., IDA Policy 6 Proficiency and Education, in IDA RULE BOOK, supra note
290.
286
287
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sions; and the bylaws, rules, regulations and policies of any
SRO.293 Examinations and investigations may be initiated by
complaints to the IDA, at the direction of the IDA’s board of directors, the request of an SRA, or by any information the IDA receives about a member’s and/or its employee’s conduct, business,
or affairs.294 In addition, the IDA requires its members to disclose their financial condition and other information to their clients295 upon request.296
IDA members, similar to their U.S. NASD counterparts,
must participate in or become a member of an arbitration program or organization to resolve disputes between its members
and their clients.297 At the request of a client, IDA members
must agree to submit the dispute to binding arbitration.298
Moreover, the arbitration program is separate and independent
of the securities industry. In addition, each IDA member must
participate in an ombudsperson service approved by the IDA’s
board of directors.299 Upon request by a client, any dispute with
an IDA member must be submitted to the ombudsperson service.300 The ombudsperson service determines whether the dispute is eligible for resolution using its services. IDA members
are bound by the rules, procedures and standards of the ombudsperson service, but the ombudsperson’s recommendations are
non-binding on each participant.301 Finally, all decisions made
by the IDA in performing its regulatory functions may be reviewed, upon request, by any SRA with jurisdiction.302
3. The Mutual Fund Dealers Association of Canada
(MFDA)
The MFDA303 was established as a not-for-profit federal corId. at By-Law 19.1 Examinations and Investigations.
Id. at By-Law 19.2 Examinations and Investigations.
The term “client” is defined as any person “who has had a transaction with a
Member within one year of the day on which a request for a statement of financial condition is made.” Id. at IDA Regulation 1400.1 Disclosure to Clients of Members’ Financial
Condition and Other Information.
296 The required disclosure of the member’s financial condition generally contains the
member’s balance sheet and income statement; disclosure of notes to member’s financial
statements (if applicable) is not required. Id.
297 The arbitration program or organization must be approved by the IDA’s board of
directors. Id. at By-Law 37.1 Alternative Dispute Resolution.
298 Id.
299 Id. at By-Law 37.2 Alternative Dispute Resolution.
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 Id. at By-Law 33.1 Review by Securities Commissions.
303 The MFDA is governed by a board of directors currently with twelve members; the
board members are from the public and the industry, such as the IFIC. Mutual Fund
Dealers Association of Canada [MFDA], Board of Directors, http://www.mfda.ca/about/
boardOfDirectors.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2006).
293
294
295
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poration in June 1998 to act as an SRO for the distribution side
of Canada’s mutual fund industry,304 i.e., it is responsible for
regulating all sales of mutual funds by its members. Specifically,
MFDA’s regulatory activities include monitoring the operations,
standards of practice, and business conduct of its members.305 In
addition, the MFDA is not responsible for regulating the activities of Canadian mutual fund dealers who are already members
of an SRO, e.g., IDA mutual fund dealers will continue to be
regulated by the IDA.306 The MFDA is authorized to conduct disciplinary proceedings and to impose fines, suspensions or loss of
registration.307 MFDA’s rules and bylaws are based on provincial
and territorial statutory requirements, recommendations of the
MFDA board of directors and industry committees,308 current industry practices, standards of similar SROs, and requirements of
SRAs.309 However, MFDA membership is only required in five of
Canada’s thirteen provinces: Ontario,310 British Columbia,311

304 MFDA, Our Role, http://www.mfda.ca/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2006). Participants in
Canada’s mutual fund industry include independent dealers, fund companies, banks/trust
companies, and insurance companies. See Profile of the Mutual Fund Dealer Industry,
MFDA IN TRANSITION (MFDA, Toronto, Ontario), Aug. 1999, at 2.
305 MFDA, About the MFDA, http://www.mfda.ca/about/aboutMFDA.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2006). The MFDA regulates the operations, standards of practice and business conduct of its members. Id. It has 176 members and over 69,000 mutual fund salespersons. Id. It does not regulate mutual funds or mutual fund manufacturers. Brochure
from MFDA of Canada, Information for Investors, available at http://www.mfda.ca/
investors/brochure/MFDA_brochure.pdf. The term “mutual fund manufacturers” is used
to describe the entity that actually creates the mutual fund itself; this entity is separate
from an entity involved exclusively in the distribution of mutual funds. Provincial and
territorial securities commissions regulate mutual funds and mutual fund manufacturers.
Finally, Some Mutual Fund Investor Protectiom [sic], THE FUND OBSERVER (CanadianFundWatch.com), Nov. 2004, at 3, available at http://www.canadianfundwatch.com/
modules.pdf?noredirect=1&name=News&file=article&sid=88.
306 You were asking…, MFDA IN TRANSITION (MFDA, Toronto, Ontario), Dec. 1998, at
8.
307 Id.
308 The five industry committees were comprised of volunteers from the mutual fund
industry, the staff of the MFDA, the Investment Funds Institute of Canada (IFIC), the
IDA, and the OSC. MFDA Applies for Recognition as SRO, MFDA IN TRANSITION (MFDA,
Toronto, Ontario), Jan. 2000, at 1.
309 The MFDA performs its regulatory responsibilities through five policy committees:
(1) the Distribution Structures Committee; (2) the Sales Compliance and Practices Committee; (3) the Proficiency and Continuing Education Committee; (4) the Capital, Insurance and Investor Protection Fund Committee; and (5) the Books, Records, and Administration Committee. Id.
310 Ontario recognized the MFDA as an SRO in February, 2001. MFDA, SRO Recognition, http://www.mfda.ca/about/recognition.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2006). The OSC
did not initiate compliance examinations of mutual fund dealers until 1996. See Mutual
Fund Dealer Compliance Issues: a Regulatory Perspective, MFDA IN TRANSITION (MFDA,
Toronto, Ontario), Apr. 1999, at 2; Canada Department of Finance, Canada’s Securities
Industry at 9, http://www.fin.gc.ca/toce/2005/cansec05_e.html (follow “Adobe Acrobat Version” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 8, 2006) [hereinafter Canada Dep’t of Fin.].
311 British Columbia recognized the MFDA as an SRO in February, 2001. Canada
Dep’t of Fin., supra note 310, at 9; MFDA, SRO Recognition, supra note 309.
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Saskatchewan,312 Alberta,313 and Nova Scotia.314
4. Market Regulation Services, Inc. (RS)
RS, a joint initiative of the TSX Group315 and the IDA, is the
independent regulation services provider for Canadian equity
markets.316 However, it is only recognized in five of Canada’s
thirteen provinces: Ontario, Quebec, Alberta, Manitoba, and British Columbia. RS monitors real-time trading operations and
market-related activities of market participants in Canadian equity markets only in provinces in which SRAs have recognized it
as an SRO. Accordingly, RS acts as an SRO only for the following trading systems and exchanges: TSX, TSX Venture Exchange
(TSX V), Bloomberg Tradebook Canada Company (Bloomberg),
Canadian Trading and Quotation System (CNQ), Liquidnet Canada Inc. (Liquidnet), and Market Securities, Inc. (BlockBook).317
As an SRO, RS implements and administers Canada’s Universal Market Integrity Rules (UMIR). UMIR and its companion
policies were designed to facilitate universal rules for regulating
equities trading on exchanges.318 They were written by securities
Saskatchewan recognized the MFDA as an SRO on February 13, 2001. Id.
Alberta recognized the MFDA as an SRO on April 10, 2001. Id.
Canada Dep’t of Fin., supra note 310, at 9. Nova Scotia recognized the MFDA as
an SRO in November, 2001. Id.; MFDA, SRO Recognition, supra note 309.
315 The TSX Group includes the TSX and the TSX V. The TSX and TSX V outsourced its compliance responsibilities when the TSX demutualized to compete with ATSs
entering the Canadian securities markets. Market Regulation Services Inc., Frequently
Asked Questions, http://www.rs.ca (follow “About RS” hyperlink; then follow “Frequently
Asked Questions” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 10, 2006).
316 Id. RS was formed on March 1, 2002, by combining the previous in-house surveillance, trade desk compliance, investigation and enforcement functions of the TSX and the
TSX V. Market Regulation Services Inc., Our History, http://www.rs.ca (follow “About
RS” hyperlink; then follow “Our History” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 10, 2006). RS recognizes the importance of the global securities market and is a member of the Intermarket Surveillance Group (ISG). ISG is an international committee of representatives from
thirty-one exchanges around the world. Market Regulation Services Inc., Special Initiatives, http://www.rs.ca (follow “About RS” hyperlink; then follow “Special Initiatives” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 10, 2006). See also Market Regulation Services Inc., Recognition Orders, http://www.rs.ca (follow “Market Policy” hyperlink; then follow “Recognition
Orders” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 25, 2006).
317 Market Regulation Services Inc., Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 315.
TSX is Canada’s senior equities market and consists of a broad cross-section of Canadian
issuers. TSX V is Canada’s public venture equity market. CNQ is Canada’s small cap
market. Bloomberg Tradebook is an ATS that facilitates Canadian institution investors’
trading in equity and fixed income securities domestically and internationally. Liquidnet
Canada Inc. allows Canadian institutional investors to trade U.S. stocks directly and
anonymously with other U.S. and European institutional investors; it bypasses both exchanges and brokers. BlockBook is a block trading network for equities traded in the Canadian securities markets. It also provides anonymous size and value while monitoring
trading on the network. Market Regulation Services Inc., The Marketplaces We Regulate,
http://www.rs.ca (follow “About RS” hyperlink; then follow “The Marketplaces We Regulate” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 10, 2006).
318 Prior to the creation of RS, each exchange regulated equities trading using its own
set of trading rules. Generally, each exchange’s trading rules were different. RS uses
312
313
314
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industry representatives, legal and compliance officers, exchanges, trade association representatives, and provincial
SRAs.319
RS is also charged with market surveillance, with a view toward preventing violations of applicable securities laws and SRO
rules and regulations. This includes the authority to issue trading halts.320 RS may initiate preliminary investigations based on
its market surveillance activities. If, during a preliminary investigation, RS determines that wrongful conduct has been committed by an entity over which it has no jurisdiction, it may forward
information from its preliminary investigation to the appropriate
provincial SRA. If RS does have jurisdiction over the prospective
wrongdoer, the matter is referred to its Investigations & Enforcement staff for possible enforcement321 action.322 If RS determines that violations have occurred that warrant disciplinary
action, the action may be settled or referred to a hearing panel
for a contested hearing.323 A Disciplinary Notice is issued and
published if the hearing panel determines that a violation has occurred.324 Final RS decisions may be appealed to the appropriate
UMIR to regulate various trading practices including manipulative or deceptive methods
of trading, short selling, front running, best execution obligations, order entry, and order
exposure. UMIR “[1] applies equally to each class of marketplace participants[; 2] cannot
be circumvented by directing trading activity to another marketplace[; 3] applies to trading of all forms of listed or quoted securities[; and 4] incorporates exceptions to the rules
to accommodate the workings of an individual marketplace or ATS.” Market Regulation
Services Inc., Universal Market Integrity Rules (UMIR), http://www.rs.ca (follow “Market
Policy” hyperlink; then follow “Universal Market Integrity Rules” hyperlink) (last visited
Sept. 10, 2006).
319 UMIR is updated by its Rules Advisory Committee comprised of representatives
from the following entities: Barristers and Solicitors, Billy de Lavery; National Bank Financial; RBC Dominion Securities, Inc.; RS; BMO Nesbitt Burns, Inc.; Investors Groups;
TSX Group Inc.; Bloomberg Tradebook Canada Company; Canaccord Capital; TD Securities Inc.; and CNQ. Market Regulation Services Inc., Board & Advisory Committees,
http://www.rs.ca (follow “About RS” hyperlink; then follow “Board & Advisory Committees” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 10, 2006).
320 Generally trading halts are issued “in anticipation of a material news announcement by [a particular] company.” Trading halts may also be initiated by a listed company
or SRA. Market Regulation Services Inc., Timely Disclosure, http://www.rs.ca/ (follow
“Surveillance” hyperlink; then follow “Timely Disclosure” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 10,
2006).
321 Enforcement is the process used by RS to determine whether to proceed with disciplinary action against regulated persons. Market Regulation Services Inc., Our Role,
http://www.rs.ca/ (follow “Enforcement” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 10, 2006).
322 Market Regulation Services Inc., Trading Analysis, http://www.rs.ca/ (follow “Surveillance” hyperlink; then follow “Trading Analysis” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 10,
2006).
323 Hearing panels consist of at least one member in good standing of Canada’s national bar association (the Law Society), two members of the securities industry, and a
current or former director, officer, or employee of an investment dealer or trading organization. Market Regulation Services Inc., Contested Hearing Decisions, http://www.rs.ca
(follow “Enforcement” hyperlink; then follow “Contested Hearing Decisions” hyperlink)
(last visited Sept. 10, 2006).
324 The hearing panel’s decision is also made public and such decisions may be re-
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SRA.325
SRAs using RS’s services oversee its self-regulatory activities. While some SRAs may perform adequate oversight, others
may not have the resources and/or political will to conduct adequate oversight of RS.326
5. The Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB)
Canada’s fragmented regulatory framework limits the efficacy of the CPAB, which was established in July 2002 to oversee
accounting firms auditing Canadian issuers.327 CSA Rule 52-108
requires accounting firms that conduct audits of reporting issuers
to register with the CPAB.328 However, compliance with CSA
rules is strictly voluntary. Accordingly, the requirement to register with the CPAB in accordance with CSA Rule 52-108 does not
apply to accounting firms in Alberta, British Columbia, and
Manitoba.329 In addition, any provincial regulator or regulatory
authority may grant an exemption to the requirements of CSA
Rule 52-108.330 Registered firms are subject to the CPAB’s inspection, investigation, and disciplinary procedures.331 Lastly,
CPAB also has rulemaking authority which is subject to SRA review prior to implementation.332
6. Canadian Securities Industry Reorganizes in 1999 to
Enhance Global Competitiveness
The Canadian securities markets were reorganized in late
1999 in order to become more competitive in the global securities
market. Canada’s major exchanges agreed to restructure along

viewed on RS’s website. Id.
325 Id.
326 Market Regulation Services Inc., About RS, http://www.rs.ca (follow “About RS”
hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 10, 2007). Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Oversight of Market Regulations Inc. (Feb. 15, 2002), available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/
MarketRegulation/SRO/rs/mou/smou-rs_25-OSCB-896.pdf.
See also WISE PERSONS’
COMMITTEE, supra note 31, at 25.
327 Canadian Public Accountability Board [CPAB], Background, http:www.cpabccrc.ca/ (follow “Who We Are” hyperlink; then follow “Background” hyperlink) (last visited
Sept. 10, 2006). The CPAB is organized as a non-profit corporation with an elevenmember board of directors and two member categories—the Council of Governors and the
Industry Members. CPAB, Structure, http://www.cpab-ccrc.ca/ (follow “Who We Are” hyperlink; then follow “Structure” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 10, 2006).
328 CPAB, Background, supra note 327.
329 See National Instrument 52-108 Auditor Oversight § 1.2(2) (2004) (Can.), available at http://www.cpab-ccrc.ca/412b56fd5a8ab.pdf.
330 Id. § 4.1.
331 Id. §§ 1.1, 3.3(1).
332 CPAB Article 11 Participating Audit Firms § 11.3 Rules, in BY-LAW NO.1—
AMENDED AND RESTATED, http://www.cpab-ccrc.ca (follow “By-Laws” hyperlink; then follow “CPAB By-Law No. 1” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 10, 2006).
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lines of market specialization.333 The reorganization was:
intended to enhance the efficiency of the trading facilities and services
of [Canadian] Exchanges, create new opportunities for the Canadian
market-place and improve the competitive position of the Canadian
securities industry in the context of the globalization of the securities . . . markets and technological developments . . . [and] to eliminate
fragmentation of the Canadian market for exchange-traded securities . . . , avoid duplication of services and leverage the strengths of
each Exchange through specialization.334

After the 1999 reorganization, the TSE (now the TSX and
part of the TSX Group) became the only exchange for trading
senior equities. The CDN, which became the CDNX,335 was
solely responsible for trading junior equities, and was merged
into the TSX Group in 2001. It was then renamed the TSX Venture Exchange (TSX V). In 2002, the TSX demutualized and became the first exchange in North America whose shares were
publicly traded.336 The ME took over all Canadian trading in derivatives.337 The Table below highlights the changes brought
about as a result of the reorganization338:

333 At that time, Canada’s major exchanges included the Alberta Stock Exchange
(ASE), the Montreal Exchange (ME), the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE), the Canadian
Venture Exchange (CDNX), and the Vancouver Stock Exchange (VSE). Canada Dep’t of
Fin., supra note 310, at 1.
334 Memorandum of Agreement Between the Alberta Stock Exchange, the Montreal
Exchange, the Toronto Stock Exchange (both for itself and on behalf of the Canadian
Dealing Network Inc.) and Vancouver Stock Exchange §§ 1.2.–1.3. (Mar. 15, 1999), available at http://www.m-x.ca/f_publications_en/restructuring.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum
of Agreement].
335 CDNX was created through a merger of the VSE (Vancouver) and ASE (Alberta),
and later Winnipeg stock exchanges. Canada Dep’t of Fin., supra note 310, at 1; see also
Market Regulation Services Inc., The Marketplaces We Regulate, supra note 317.
336 Canada Dep’t of Fin., supra note 310, at 5.
337 Id. at 1.
338 Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 334.
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Activities After 1999

Montreal
Exchange (ME)

All exchange-traded derivative products, comprising (without limitation)
any type of option and futures contracts, including options and futures
on index participation units.
All senior securities, other than exchange-traded derivatives products
including (without limitation) stocks,
rights, convertible debentures, trust
and limited partnership units, warrants, bonds and mutual fund securities and other products commonly
traded on the cash market, including
index participation units. Senior securities means the securities of all issuers that qualify for listing on the
TSX.
All junior securities, other than exchange-traded derivatives products,
defined as the securities of all other
issuers, including (without limitation)
stocks, rights, convertible debentures,
trust and limited partnership units,
warrants, bonds and mutual fund securities and other products commonly
traded on the cash market, including
junior securities under participation
units. For greater clarity, current ME
issuers that do not qualify for transfer
to the TSX will be transferred to the
ASE/VSE (and not Canadian Dealing
Network, Inc. (CDN)).
TSX will transfer CDN to the VSE
and the ASE; TSX will transfer OM
(the Nordic Exchange) to the ME; TSX
will transfer to ME the shares held by
TSX in Canadian Derivatives Clearing Corporation; ME will transfer to
TSX the shares held by ME in the
Canadian Depository for Securities
Ltd.

Toronto
Stock
Exchange (TSE)
(renamed TSX)

Alberta
Stock
Exchange (ASE)
and the Vancouver Stock Exchange (VSE)

Transfers

[Vol. 10:391
Activities Before 1999
Derivatives and
equities, including equities interlisted with the
TSX.
Equities, junior
and senior, including equities
inter-listed with
ME.

Equities, junior
and senior, some
inter-listing between the VSE
and the ASE.
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7. Organization of the Canadian Securities Industry After
1999
Currently, Canada’s major exchanges are TSX in the province of Ontario, and ME (listing primarily derivatives) in the
province of Quebec. TSX, although ranked among the top seven
exchanges in the world, measured by market capitalization of
domestic issuers, still remains significantly below those exchanges ranked above it.339 However, many Canadian businesses
list on U.S. securities markets.340
Interlistings generally raise the profile of issuers in the global market,
and trading volumes for these issuers’ shares often increase across all
markets. . . . To capture a greater proportion of trading in securities of
issuers that are listed on other markets, particularly those in the U.S.,
the TSX Group recently extended trading in U.S. dollars to 16 securities listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange, with additional securities
to be added in the future. [Moreover, t]o address changes brought on
by technology and globalization, the [Canadian] securities industry
has been taking steps to improve foreign market access for Canadian
issuers and investors. A number of Canadian securities firms, particularly those owned by banks, are building a global platform through
the acquisition of foreign businesses operating in niche markets such
as discount brokerages, wealth management and investment banking.341

To increase global competitiveness, Canada’s federal government “announced a coordinated national enforcement approach to strengthen the investigation and prosecution of serious
corporate fraud and market illegality” in 2003.342 In support of
this initiative, the provinces of Ontario and Quebec enhanced enforcement in their securities regulatory frameworks. Each province passed legislation that increased penalties and expanded the
investigative powers of their respective SRAs. This coordinated
national enforcement approach was designed to develop “a proposed regime that will give investors in the secondary market a
simpler procedure to sue companies, directors, officers, underwriters and experts that make misleading or untrue statements,
or fail to give full and timely information.”343
339 Market capitalization of domestic companies at the end of 2003 for the top exchanges in the global securities market are, in billions of U.S. dollars: (1) NYSE $11,329;
(2) Tokyo Stock Exchange $2,953; (3) The NASDAQ Stock Market $2,844; (4) London
Stock Exchange $2,460; (5) Euronext $2,076; (6) Deutsche Börse (German Exchange)
$1,079; and (7) TSX Group $889. The ME is also a member of the GLOBEX Alliance
(GLOBEX). GLOBEX is an international electronic trading network for derivatives products. The ME’s membership in GLOBEX “provides Canadian derivatives investors access
to international markets.” Id. at 6–7.
340 In 2003, 184 Canadian issuers were interlisted on U.S. exchanges. Id. at 8.
341 Id.
342 Id. at 9.
343 Id.
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Other initiatives designed to strengthen Canada’s securities
regulatory framework include the IDA’s new rules to promote the
independence of research analysts employed by securities
firms.344 In addition, the Canadian securities regulatory framework includes the Canadian Depository for Securities Limited
(CDS), which acts as a securities depository, clearing, and settlement mechanism for Canada’s securities markets.345 CDS also
facilitates access to the global securities market; it settles crossborder transactions with the U.S. securities markets and has
custodial relationships with, among others, the Depository Trust
Company in the U.S., Japan Securities Settlement & Custody,
Inc., and Euroclear France.346 CDS is regulated by the SRAs in
Ontario and Quebec along with the Bank of Canada; CDS also
works with the CSA and the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions. For example, CDS operates SEDAR on behalf of the CSA.347
8.

The Securities Regulatory Framework in Quebec
a.

Commission des Valeurs Mobilieres du Quebec
(CVMQ)/Autorite des marches financiers (AMF)
On February 1, 2004, Quebec reorganized its securities regulatory framework. The purpose of the reorganization was to
separate the administrative functions from the quasi-tribunal
functions of Quebec’s existing SRA.348 Market participants in
Quebec’s securities industry “complained that the hearings of
commissions do not have the appearance of fairness because,
from the outside, the commissioners seem to be passing judgment
on their own decisions.”349 The AMF, the entity emerging after
the combination, is authorized to regulate the securities markets
in Quebec by, among other activities, ensuring that issuers and
other financial sector market participants meet their obligations,
protecting investors, regulating the information that issuers
must disclose to investors, and supervising the regulation of se344 The CSA has proposed corporate governance guidelines and related disclosure requirements designed to replace TSX corporate governance guidelines. Id. at 9–10.
345 The Canadian Depository for Securities Limited Homepage, http://www.cds.ca/
(last visited Sept. 10, 2006).
346 Id.
347 Id. See also The System for Electronic Documents Analysis and Retrieval Homepage, http://www.sedar.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2006).
348 Quebec’s existing SRA was combined with certain other financial sectors in Quebec to form a new regulator for Quebec’s financial sector, the Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF). Autorité des marchés financiers [AMF], History, http://www.lautorite.qc.ca/
accueil.en.html (follow “About Us” hyperlink; then follow “History” hyperlink) (last visited
Sept. 10, 2006).
349 Jean-Marie Gagnon, Do We Need a National Regulator?: No: A Single Market Umpire for the Whole Country Would Be More Easily “Captured” by Big Business, Argues Laval University Professor, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Jan. 28, 2004, at A13.
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curities professionals.350
Quebec’s primary SRO is the Bourse de Montréal (the Montreal Exchange, or ME), which regulates derivative trading351 and
investment dealers in Quebec; it offers clearing services through
its wholly-owned corporation, Canadian Derivatives Clearing
Corporation (CDCC).352 It also provides educational services
about the derivatives market to both institutional and retail investors through its Derivatives Institute.353 Members of the ME
approved demutualization on September 25, 2000, and the ME
became a for-profit company.354 It also closed its trading floor
and began using only an electronic trading platform, SAM, to
trade derivatives.355
(1) Quebec’s Approval of NASDAQ Canada Diminishes Canada’s Efforts to Compete in the Global
Securities Market
Canada’s inability to use selective federal preemption in its
regulatory framework allowed Quebec to disrupt its attempt to
reorganize its securities market to compete in the global securities market. On November 21, 2000, Quebec began trading equity securities by allowing the NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc.
(NASDAQ U.S.) to establish NASDAQ Canada.356 NASDAQ Canada provides direct access to all NASDAQ U.S. listed securities,
which means that equity trading is no longer confined to the
province of Ontario. Moreover, NASDAQ Canada represents a de
350 AMF, Industry Sectors, http://www.lautorite.qc.ca/accueil.en.html (follow “About
Us” hyperlink; then follow “Industry Sectors” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 10, 2006).
351 As part of the 1999 reorganization of Canada’s securities markets, ME, on October
1, 2001, ceased trading junior equity listings. See Montreal Exchange [ME], Our Mission,
http://www.m-x.ca/ (follow “About Us—Mission” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 10, 2006);
Canada Dep’t of Fin., supra note 310, at 5; ME, Historical Highlights, http://www.m-x.ca/
(follow “About Us—Historical highlights” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 10, 2006).
352 ME, Profile Overview, http://www.m-x.ca/profil_bref_en.php (last visited Sept. 16,
2006). The CDCC is the issuer, clearinghouse and guarantor of derivative contracts
traded on the ME. It also provides clearing services to other exchanges and partners.
CDCC, a for-profit company, has provided these services since 1975. ME, THREE-MONTH
CANADIAN BANKERS’ ACCEPTANCE FUTURES (2001), available at http://www.mx.ca/f_publications_en/bax_en.pdf.
353 Financial
Advisors Association of Canada, The Derivatives Institute,
http://www.advocis.ca/content/education/CE-prog/CE-derivatives.html (last visited Sept.
16, 2006). The Derivatives Institute was established by the ME in April 2001 “to understand and use derivative instruments.”
ME, About Us,
http://www.dx.ca/a_propos_institut_en.php (last visited Sept. 16, 2006); see also RBC Action Direct
Inc., Seminars, http://www.actiondirect.com/RBC:RCq-SI71A8YAAlIkFOU/derivativesinstitute.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2006).
354 ME, Historical Highlights, http://www.m-x.ca/qui_histo_en.php.
355 SAM (Montreal Automated System) is the ME’s electronic trading platform. Id.
356 Press Release, NASDAQ, NASDAQ Concludes Record Share and Dollar Volume
Year Composite Index Finishes Lower (Sept. 16, 2006), available at
http://www.nasdaq.com/newsroom/news/pr2001/ne_section01_022.html; see also Canada
Dep’t of Fin., supra note 310, at 6.
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facto reorganization of Canada’s securities markets by Quebec
and the U.S. Recently, Canada’s attempts to reorganize its securities markets to compete in the global securities market were
further diminished when British Columbia recognized NASDAQ
Canada, again establishing equity trading within its borders.
Quebec amended its securities act to establish NASDAQ
Canada.357 The amendment recognized NASDAQ Canada as an
SRO for purposes of carrying on business in Quebec; it also recognized NASDAQ Canada’s parent, NASDAQ U.S., as an SRO in
Quebec. This amendment effectively injected the U.S. securities
regulatory framework into the Canadian securities regulatory
framework because “[t]he rules of NASDAQ Canada are those of
NASDAQ [U.S.], and are overseen by the [U.S.] Securities and
Exchange Commission . . . . NASDAQ [U.S.] is a subsidiary of the
NASD, a registered [SRO] in the [U.S.]” securities regulatory
framework.358
NASDAQ Canada began with ten securities firms participating in trading securities listed on NASDAQ U.S. (including Canadian companies) from Montreal, Quebec. Moreover, participating investment dealers are the largest investment dealers in
Canada’s securities industry.359 Participating investment dealers
are able to establish affiliated, wholly-owned Delaware corporations whereby the affiliate operates in Montreal in the same
building as its parent company and uses NASDAQ U.S. workstations.360 All affiliates are regulated under U.S. securities laws,
which require registration with the Commission and membership
in the NASD of affiliates as well as some of their personnel. The
affiliate is structured as an order entry firm and, under Quebec
law, can have only one institutional client, its parent company.361
Moreover, the affiliate must have dually-engaged employees, i.e.,
357 New Regulatory Structure for the Quebec Financial Sector: Recent Developments—
A Supplement to the June 2002 Newsletter, INFO. (Ogilvy Renault, Quebec), Dec. 2002, at
2, available at http://www.ogilvyrenault.com/WebControls/GetResource.aspx?id=2067.
Quebec also offered NASDAQ U.S. an incentive package, which included a ten year tax
holiday. Bertrand Marotte, Nasdaq Nixes Plans for Separate Canadian Stock Exchange,
GLOBE AND MAIL (Can.), Sept. 20, 2003, at B5.
358 Simon Romano, Notice and Request for Comments: NASDAQ Canada, Inc. Proposal for Improved Access for B.C. Dealers, at 2 (July 24, 2004) (on file with author).
359 The participating investment dealers are BMO Nesbitt Burns, Canaccord, Capital
Casgrain & Company, CIBC WorldMarkets Corp., Desjardins, NBC International Inc.
(USA), Pictet Overseas, Scotia Capital Markets, TD Securities Inc., Yorkton Capital
(USA). Press Release, NASDAQ, Helen Kearns Named President of NASDAQ Canada
(May
1,
2001),
available
at
http://www.nasdaq.com/newsroom/news/pr2001/
ne_section01_143.html.
360 See id. The NASDAQ Workstation II is a computerized trading tool that provides
access to all NASDAQ markets for Market Makers (firms that maintain firm bid and offer
prices in a given security by standing ready to buy or sell at publicly-quoted prices), brokers, and institutions.
361 Romano, supra note 358, at 3.
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employees who work at the affiliate and the parent company simultaneously.362 This arrangement effectively allows direct
regulation under the U.S. securities regulatory framework and
indirect regulation by Quebec’s securities regulatory framework.
Quebec regulates the same employees in connection with their
interactions with Canadian investors (institutional and retail)
and securities markets.363
NASDAQ Canada Broker-Dealer Model
Québec Securities
Commission
(AMF/CVMQ)

Canadian
Investment
Dealer (CID)

NASD Regulation, Inc.

NASD
Affiliate of
Canadian Investment
Dealer (Order
Entry Firm)

Conditions

One Client
Only—CID
Dually-Engaged
Employees

Must Disclose To Investors That NASD
Affiliate is Regulated
By NASD And SEC

Trades in US
Markets Only

Concedes Jurisdiction to Quebec
Courts And SROs

Id. at 10.
Investment dealers and their NASD affiliates must: (1) remain affiliated with a
Quebec dealer that is an IDA member in good standing; (2) undertake to the NASD and
the Commission that: (i) its NASD affiliate would carry on its business in compliance with
applicable NASD requirements; (ii) its NASD affiliate would not have any clients in Quebec (other than its Quebec parent) and would only engage in U.S. transactions; (iii) all
trading officers and employees of the NASD affiliate would be dually employed by both
the parent investment dealer and its NASD affiliate; and (iv) its NASD affiliate would
consent to jurisdiction in any action or proceeding before any court or securities regulatory authority in Quebec, and agree to provide access to and inspection rights to the
Commission. Id. at 11.
362
363
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This arrangement benefits Canadian investment dealers
[b]y enabling Canadian dealers to set up U.S. NASD member affiliates
on their own premises in Canada, staff them with Canadian employees, utilize existing infrastructure, and supervise them via their existing Canadian compliance operations, etc., the costs of accessing NASDAQ US [sic] should be reduced from those that would apply to either
foreign affiliate operations or third party jitney operations.364

At its inception, NASDAQ Canada would be established in
three phases. Phase one included opening the NASDAQ Canada
office in Montreal, Quebec; launching a NASDAQ Canada website; creating a NASDAQ Canada Index to track the market performance of Canadian issuers listed on NASDAQ U.S.; and trading of all NASDAQ-listed securities in U.S. dollars only. Phases
two and three were expected to follow depending on the success
of phase one. Phase two included participation by non-NASD
member firms in Canada, trading in both U.S. and Canadian dollars, regulatory oversight by NASD and Quebec’s SRA, and listing Canadian companies exclusively on NASDAQ Canada. Phase
three would include linking NASDAQ Canada with NASDAQ Japan and NASDAQ Europe. According to Frank G. Zarb, the CEO
of NASDAQ U.S. in 2000, “Our ultimate goal is linking
[NASDAQ] Canada to a global trading platform that will include
[NASDAQ] markets in Asia and Europe.”365
On September 20, 2003, NASDAQ abandoned its plans to
start a new exchange in Canada or to trade Canadian stocks in
Canadian dollars, effectively eliminating the possibility of a
stand-alone Canadian securities market using NASDAQ U.S.’s
trading platform. NASDAQ U.S.’s global expansion strategy was
adversely impacted by a downturn in technology stocks and the
global economy. According to former NASDAQ Canada president
Helen Kearns, “[M]arket conditions have really dictated how
quickly [NASDAQ] Canada could roll out and it’s been a difficult
market.”366 These events, among others, resulted in losses for
NASDAQ U.S. and the closing of other global ventures including
NASDAQ Japan and Europe.367
Phase one of NASDAQ Canada continues to operate in the
provinces of Quebec and British Columbia and is NASDAQ U.S.’s
364 Id. at 6. Jitney operations include such services as execution, clearing, and settlement of trades performed by U.S. broker-dealers on behalf of Canadian investment
dealers.
365 Press Release, NASDAQ, NASDAQ Announces the Launch of NASDAQ Canada
(Nov. 21, 2000) (on file with author).
366 Bertrand Marotte, Canadian Nasdaq on Hold, GLOBE AND MAIL (Can.), Oct. 28,
2002, at B1; see also Marotte, supra note 357, at B5.
367 Marotte, Canadian Nasdaq on Hold, supra note 366; Nasdaq Europe to Close,
BBC NEWS, June 26, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3024558.stm.
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only successful global venture using this business model. NASDAQ Canada continues to seek expansion to other Canadian
provinces including Ontario.368
9. The Ontario Securities Commission Regulates Canada’s
Premier Securities Markets
The OSC369 administers and enforces securities laws370 in the
province of Ontario. Canada’s premier securities markets are
housed within Ontario’s borders. It is managed by a board of directors comprised of members of the OSC or commissioners.371
Commissioners are appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in
Council for varying terms of five years or less, but may be reappointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council.372 The OSC must
have at least nine but not more than fourteen commissioners,
who may serve on a part-time basis.373 Full-time commissioners
are generally full-time executive managers of the OSC and fill
the positions of Chair, CEO, and Vice-Chair. The remaining
commissioners are part-time and conduct their responsibilities in
a non-executive capacity. A quorum requires only two commissioners.374 All commissioners have statutory responsibility for
the administration of Ontario’s Securities Act. All bylaws passed
by the OSC must be approved by Ontario’s Minister of Finance.375
OSC commissioners meet to address regulatory policy matters every two weeks, and at least quarterly to conduct nonregulatory matters. The commissioners conduct non-regulatory
Marotte, supra note 357, at B5.
In 1994, Ontario’s Securities Act was amended to change the OSC’s status from
government agency to a Crown Corporation responsible to the Ontario Legislature
through the Minister of Finance. In 1997, the OSC was converted to a self-funded Crown
Corporation.
Ontario Securities Commission [OSC], Governance & Accountability
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/Governance/ga_index.jsp (last visited Sept. 18, 2006). According to the OSC, these changes promoted “greater autonomy and independence from
the government.” FIVE YEAR REVIEW COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT, supra note 34, at 61.
370 The OSC is statutorily mandated to administer Ontario’s Securities Act and its
Commodity Futures Act in order “to provide protection to investors from unfair, improper
or fraudulent practices and to foster fair and efficient capital markets and confidence in
their integrity.” Memorandum of Understanding Between the Minister of Finance of Ontario and the OSC § 1.1.4.A.3 (May 26, 2003), available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/ (follow “Policy & Regulation” hyperlink; then follow “Memoranda of Understanding” hyperlink; then follow June 6, 2003 “Memorandum of Understanding” hyperlink) [hereinafter
MOU Minister of Finance & OSC].
371 OSC,
The Commission, http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/Governance/ga_the_
commission.jsp (last visited Sept. 18, 2006).
372 Id.
373 Id.
374 Id.; Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, Ch. S.5 s. 3(11) (2006) (Can.).
375 Ontario Securities Act § 143.3(3) requires the Minister to approve, reject or return
the bylaw to the OSC for further consideration within sixty days of delivery. R.S.O. 1990,
Ch. S.5 s. 143.3(3).
368
369
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matters through meetings of its three standing committees: Audit and Finance, Corporate Governance and Nominating, and
Compensation.376 All committee members are part-time, nonexecutive commissioners;377 however, the OSC chairman is an ex
officio, non-voting member of the Governance and Nominating
Committee.378
OSC regulatory activities include making policy, conducting
investigations, and sitting as an administrative tribunal.379 The
OSC obtained rulemaking authority as recently as 1995.380 All
OSC rules must be submitted to the Ontario Minister of Finance
for review and approval.381 The rule becomes effective if the Minister of Finance does not reject or return the rule.
Although non-binding, the OSC is statutorily authorized to
make policy. Like the OSC’s rulemaking process, proposed policies must be published for public comment.382 Although OSC
policies may not be prohibitive or mandatory, they inform market
participants about, among other topics, the manner in which the
OSC may exercise its discretionary authority, the interpretation
of Ontario securities law, and OSC practices for conducting its
duties under the Ontario Securities Act.
The OSC regulates marketplaces in Ontario, including exchanges, alternative trading systems (ATSs), quotation and trade
reporting systems, and stock exchanges, by specifying the terms

OSC, The Commission, supra note 371.
Id. Part-time members meet under the leadership of the Lead Director, who presides as chair over all meetings of part-time members charged with administering the infrastructure of the OSC. The Lead Director may make recommendations but has no decision-making authority.
OSC, Lead Director of the Board of Directors Mandate,
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/Governance/ga_lead_director.jsp (last visited Sept. 18,
2006).
378 OSC, The Commission, supra note 371. The OSC also has an Adjudicative Committee responsible for evaluating and monitoring the OSC’s adjudicative procedures and
practices. The Adjudicative Committee has no decision-making authority. See OSC, Adjudicative Committee, http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/Governance/ga_adjudicative.jsp
(last visited Sept. 18, 2006). The Adjudicative Committee is advised by an Independent
Adjudicative Counsel about hearings and related matters; it provides legal research and
drafting assistance to the Adjudicative Committee. OSC, Independent Adjudicative
Counsel, http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/Governance/ga_independent-adj-counsel.jsp (last
visited Sept. 18, 2006).
379 OSC,
ANNUAL
REPORT
2004,
at
1
(2004),
available
at
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/AnnualRpt/2004/com.html. However, the OSC cannot issue any order under the Ontario Securities Act without a hearing. Securities Act,
R.S.O.1990 Ch. S.5 s. 127(4) (2006) (Can.).
380 OSC, Rule-Making in Ontario, http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/
rrn_backgrounder.jsp (last visited Sept. 18, 2006). The OSC must publish proposed rules
for public comment for a period of at least ninety days. Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990 Ch.
S.5 s. 143.2(1)–(4) (2006) (Can.).
381 R.S.O. Ch. S.5 s. 143.3.
382 R.S.O. Ch. S.5 s. 143.8(2).
376
377
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and conditions under which they can operate in Ontario.383 The
OSC recognizes the TSX and the Canadian Trading and Quotation System (CNQ). The TSX V and the ME have received exemptions from registration in Ontario. It does not recognize
NASDAQ Canada. The OSC also recognizes quotation and trade
reporting systems (QTRSs). Such QTRSs operate facilities that
distribute quotations for the purchase and sale of securities and
report such transactions exclusively to registered dealers.384
The Ontario Ministry of Finance and the Ontario Legislature
oversee the OSC. The Minister of Finance appoints a statutorily
authorized, independent Five Year Review Committee to review
securities regulation in Ontario.385
The need for a single securities regulator was identified by the
Five Year Review Committee as “the most pressing securities regulation issue in Ontario and across Canada.” We believe strongly that a
single securities regulator for Canada is essential in order to effectively protect investors and foster integrity and confidence in our capital markets in an increasingly global marketplace. A single securities
regulator will maximize efficiency, take advantage of scale and scope,
ensure a level national playing field, and encourage Canadian competitiveness.386

The Five Year Review Committee also recommended the development of securities transfer legislation modeled on revised
Article 8 of the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code.387 The OSC
must enter into an MOU with the Ontario Minister of Finance
every five years.
The OSC also publishes an annual Statement of Priorities
and solicits comments from market participants; the Statement
of Priorities also compares OSC’s annual performance against
the goals enumerated in the previous year’s Statement of Priori-

383 Neil Mohindra, Securities Regulation Market in Canada, CRITICAL ISSUES BULL.
(The Fraser Institute), 2002, at 9; National Instrument 21-101 Marketplace Operation
(2004)
(Can.),
available
at
http://ftp.sfsc.gov.sk.ca/scripts/ssc/files/nat-inst/21101consolidatedmay20-04.pdf.
384 OSC,
Exchanges
and
Other
Marketplaces,
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/
MarketRegulation/Marketplaces/mp_index.jsp (last visited Sept. 18, 2006); see also Roel
C. Campos, Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission, Remarks at New York
University Stern: New Challenges in Regulating Financial Markets (Mar. 24, 2006).
385 OSC, supra note 379, at 1; OSC, Advisory Committee Legislative Reviews,
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/FiveYearReview/fyr_index.jsp (last visited Sept. 18,
2006).
386 David A. Brown, OSC, Executive Summary, Five Year Review Committee Final
Report: Reviewing the Securities Act (Ontario), at 1 (Aug. 18, 2004), available at
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/FiveYearReview/fyr_20040818_fairness_execsum.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2006) (citation omitted) (quoting FIVE YEAR REVIEW
COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT, supra note 34, at 29).
387 Id. at 4; see also MOU Minister of Finance & OSC, supra note, 370, § 1.1.4.B.10.
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ties.388 Market participants are also surveyed to measure the
OSC’s effectiveness in providing services and meeting obligations
to market participants. “The [OSC’s] regulatory and adjudicative
decisions must be made and be seen by the public to be made in
an independent and impartial manner.”389
The OSC wants to facilitate “Canadian financial markets
that are attractive to domestic and international investors, issuers and intermediaries because they are cost efficient and have
integrity.”390 It also recognizes that it must address issues in the
global regulatory framework to compete successfully domestically
as well as internationally; the OSC also asserts that the fragmentation of Canada’s securities regulatory framework adversely
impacts the competitiveness of Canadian securities markets in
the global marketplace:
Financial markets are global. Borders no longer serve as barriers
to capital flows. Those seeking to invest and those seeking capital go
where they see the opportunity for the best returns for the risks assumed. As capital flows become global, so do the market intermediaries and infrastructure servicing the business. Many of the largest intermediaries are global conglomerates combining banking, insurance
and securities services in one entity.391

Accordingly, the OSC has determined that it must maintain
a globally competitive securities regulatory framework.392
Mostly, the goal is reflected in the OSC’s efforts to harmonize its
securities laws/regulations with other provinces in Canada as
well as internationally, especially with the U.S. securities markets. The OSC has also established an International Affairs Office to ensure that Ontario (through the OSC) is a recognized
participant in the shaping of the international securities regulatory framework in an increasingly global securities market.393
V. ANALYSIS
A. Securities Regulatory Frameworks of the U.S. and Canada: A
Comparison with the IOSCO Standard
The securities regulatory frameworks of the U.S. and Canada, to varying degrees, meet the three objectives of the IOSCO
388 See OSC, STATEMENT OF PRIORITIES 2006/2007, at 1–3, 10 (2006), available at
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/WhatWeDo/wwd_20062007_statement_of_priorities_annual.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2006).
389 MOU Minister of Finance & OSC, supra note 370, § 1.1.4.B.10.
390 OSC,
BUSINESS
STRATEGY
2004–2008,
at
1,
available
at
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/WhatWeDo/wwd_2004-2008_osc_business_strategy.pdf.
391 Id. at 2.
392 Id.
393 See
OSC,
International
Affairs,
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/International/int_index.jsp. (last visited Sept. 10, 2006).
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Standard: protecting investors; ensuring fair, efficient, and
transparent markets; and dealing with systemic risk.394 However, the U.S. has a greater capacity to achieve the IOSCO Standard because its securities regulatory framework incorporates selective federal preemption. Moreover, Canada’s failure to use
selective federal preemption in its securities regulatory framework will significantly impair its ability to achieve the IOSCO
Standard.
Effective investor protection under the IOSCO Standard requires disclosure of material information to both retail and institutional investors, prohibits manipulative or fraudulent practices
in the securities markets, mandates supervision of market intermediaries or operators of exchanges that provide investment
services, and prescribes minimum standards for market participants.
1. Investor Protection
a. Disclosure of Material Information
The U.S. and Canadian395 securities regulatory frameworks
require issuers and other market participants to disclose all material information about the issuer’s securities in the primary
and secondary markets. Both regulatory frameworks are based
on the principle of full disclosure of material information, and the
definition of material information is substantially the same under both regulatory frameworks. The U.S. securities regulatory
framework defines material information from the perspective of
the investor’s decision to buy or sell the issuer’s securities; information is material if it is required by a reasonable investor to
make an informed investment decision.396 The province of OnIOSCO Pub. Doc. 154, supra note 6, at i.
As noted previously, the term “Canadian securities regulatory framework” refers
to the provinces of Ontario and Quebec only, because they are the most active in Canada
with respect to trading volume and regulatory activity. Describing and analyzing all thirteen provinces and territories would expand significantly the length and adversely impact
the thesis of this article.
396 Accordingly, the disclosure of material information by an issuer accessing the
primary market includes a description of the issuer, its organization, the terms of its particular offering, and independently audited financial statements. Securities Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77g(b)(1) (2000). In the secondary market, §§ 12–14 of the Exchange Act require
continuous disclosure from an issuer or reporting company required to register under
these provisions. §§ 78l–78n. A reporting company includes a company with a class of
securities listed on a national securities exchange (§ 78l(b)); a company with assets in excess of $10 million and equity securities held by at least 500 persons (§ 78l(g) and Rule
12g-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1(2006)); and a company with a Securities Act registration
statement that has been declared effective by the Commission (§ 78l). Required disclosures in the secondary market include an extensive description of the reporting company’s
business, audited financial statements for its fiscal year, management’s discussion and
analysis of the issuer’s performance and financial position, and any material events. See
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78j-1; 17 C.F.R. § 228.303; see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
394
395
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tario’s securities regulatory framework defines material information from the perspective of the effect of information on the value
or price of the issuer’s securities, i.e., information is material if it
could reasonably be expected to significantly affect the market
price or value of the issuer’s securities.397 The province of Quebec’s securities regulatory framework, similar to that of the U.S.,
defines material information from the perspective of the investor;
information is material if a reasonable investor’s decision of
whether to buy, sell, or hold an issuer’s securities is likely to be
influenced or changed by the information.398 Ontario, Quebec
and the U.S. obtain the requisite disclosure, with minor differences, by requiring issuers to submit material information to a
designated regulator. In the U.S., material information in the
primary market is obtained in the registration process; continuing disclosure in the secondary market is submitted to the Commission and stored in EDGAR.399 In Ontario and Quebec, material information in their primary markets is obtained in their
respective registration processes; continuing disclosure in their
secondary markets is submitted to provincial SRAs and stored in
SEDAR. Information stored in EDGAR and SEDAR is made
available to investors, generally, on the regulator-sponsored websites for EDGAR and SEDAR.400
Although full disclosure of material information is required
in the securities regulatory frameworks of Ontario and Quebec,
the consistency and quality of the implementation of full disclosure of material information is somewhat fragmented. There is
no federal securities law mandating full disclosure; each province
has its own disclosure requirements embodied in its own securities act. The CSA has attempted to bridge this gap by drafting
National Instrument 51-102 (NI 51-102) and MRRS.401 However,
236 (1988).
397 Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, ch. S.5 s. 1(1) (2006) (Can.).
398 Securities Act, R.S.Q. ch. V-1.1 s. 73 (2006) (Can.).
399 SEC,
Important Information About EDGAR, http://www.sec.gov/edgar/
aboutedgar.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2006).
400 SEC, Filings & Forms (EDGAR), http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last visited Oct.
14, 2006); SEDAR, http://www.sedar.com/homepage_en.htm (Oct. 14, 2006); see also National Instrument 13-101 System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval
(SEDAR) (2004) (Can.), available at http://ftp.sfsc.gov.sk.ca/scripts/ssc/files/nat-inst/13101niamendedasof-mar30-04.pdf. National Instrument 13-101 was adopted by all thirteen provinces, but with one or more changes to the original instrument in certain provinces.
401 See, National Instrument 51-102 Continuous Disclosure Oblications (2004) (Can.),
available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulations/Rulemaking/Current/Part5/rule_51102-cont-disc-ob.pdf. MRRS designates one principal regulator to review issuer disclosure
documents for securities offerings made in more than one province. As previously noted,
the provinces do not surrender their jurisdiction or discretion under MRRS and are free at
any time to withdraw and deal directly with the issuer. WISE PERSONS’ COMMITTEE, supra note 31, at 17. Notably, the chief goal of MRRS is not to facilitate uniformity, but to
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compliance with NI 51-102 and MRRS is voluntary for all thirteen provinces. Provinces may also adopt portions of NI 51-102
and MRRS. Despite the fact that these measures are designed to
facilitate uniformity in the Canadian securities regulatory
framework, voluntary compliance, instead of mandating compliance using selective federal preemption, severely undermines
this goal. Voluntary compliance means that the issuer must always be prepared to deal with the regulatory framework of each
province in which it plans to offer its securities.
b. Prohibition of Manipulative or Fraudulent Practices
Investor protection under the IOSCO Standard also requires
the prohibition of manipulative or fraudulent practices in the securities market.402 In the U.S., manipulative or fraudulent
practices are prohibited under both federal and state securities
laws.403 The federal anti-fraud provisions include § 17(a) of the
Securities Act, § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder.404 Both provisions prohibit fraud or deceit, and manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances.405
Canada’s prohibitions against fraud and manipulation are contained in National Instrument 23-101 (NI 23-101).406 However,
because selective federal preemption is not included in Canada’s
securities regulatory framework, making compliance with all or a
portion of the provisions of NI 23-101 voluntary, the provinces of
Alberta, British Columbia, and Saskatchewan have decided to retain their own rules prohibiting manipulative or fraudulent practices.407 This ability to opt out adversely impacts the consistency
required to compete successfully in the global securities market.
In the primary market, U.S. federal anti-fraud provisions do
not prohibit stabilization of stock prices when needed. Regulation M of the Exchange Act provides guidelines with respect to
reduce cost of regulation in multi-jurisdictional offerings in Canada. Memorandum of
Understanding Regarding Mutual Reliance Review System Between the OSC and Members of the Canadian Securities Administrators (Oct. 28, 1999), available at
http://www.albertasecurities.com/dms/2984/7165/7166__1353811_v1_-_MOU-_MRRS__in_word.pdf.
402 IOSCO Pub. Doc. 154, supra note 6, at 5.
403 This is one of the primary areas in the U.S. securities regulatory framework which
has not been preempted under NSMIA.
404 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a), 78j(b) (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006). Other anti-fraud
provisions under federal securities laws include § 14(e) of the Exchange Act, § 15(c)(1) of
the Exchange Act, and § 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(e),
78o(c)(1), 80b-6 (2000).
405 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q, 78j (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).
406 National Instrument 23-101 Trading Rules § 3.1 (2001) (Can.), available at
http://www.rs.ca/en/pdf/National_Instrument_23-101.pdf; Companion Policy to National
Instrument
23-101
Trading
Rules
§
3.1
(2004)
(Can.),
available
at
http://www.sfsc.gov.sk.ca/ssc/files/nat-inst/23-101cp-consolidated-may20-04.pdf.
407 National Instrument 23-101 Trading Rules, § 3.1(2).
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when and at what price the broker-dealer may enter a stabilizing
bid.408 However, federal securities laws do prohibit such manipulative or fraudulent practices as free riding,409 insider trading,410
parking,411 wash sales,412 false and misleading statements during
a distribution of securities resulting in the artificial distortion of
the market price for investors,413 and issuer repurchases designed to manipulate the issuer’s stock price.414 Canada’s fraud
and manipulation provisions also allow stabilization of stock
prices while expressly prohibiting substantially the same type of
fraudulent and manipulative conduct under the U.S. securities
regulatory framework.415
Generally, almost every state (including the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico) has broadlyworded anti-fraud provisions that apply to all securities issued
and/or traded within its borders. Most states have adopted all or
some portion of the anti-fraud provisions of the Uniform Securities Act (USA),416 but not New York and California.417 Although
Regulation M, 17 C.F.R. § 242.104 (2005).
Illegal free riding occurs any time a purchaser of securities does not have the
funds to pay for the purchase but rather intends to take a free ride on the securities purchased. See A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967) (holding that a customer ordered stock from his broker with the predetermination of paying for it only if the
price increased by the settlement date).
410 SEC, Insider Trading, http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm (last visited Oct.
21, 2006).
llegal insider trading refers generally to buying or selling a security, in
breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust and confidence, while
in possession of material, nonpublic information about the security. Insider
trading violations may also include “tipping” such information, securities trading by the person “tipped,” and securities trading by those who misappropriate
such information.
Id.
411 Parking consists of transferring record ownership of a security in order to hide the
true identity of the beneficial owner of such security. See First Montauk Securities Corp.,
Exchange Act Release No. 38,775, 64 SEC Docket 2082 (June 25, 1997).
412 SEC, Wash Sales, http://www.sec.gov/answers/wash.htm (last visited Oct. 21,
2006). Wash sales occur when you buy and sell the same security at the same time or
within a short period of time. “Wash sales violate the federal securities laws—Section
9(a)(1)(A) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934—if they are done to create the false or misleading appearance of active trading in a security.” Id.
413 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (2000).
414 Id.
415 Companion Policy to National Instrument 23-101 Trading Rules § 3.1(1)–(4)
(2004)
(Can.),
available
at
http://www.sfsc.gov.sk.ca/ssc/files/nat-inst/23-101cpconsolidated-may20-04.pdf.
416 They are: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District
of Columbia, Guam, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvannia, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 73–74
n.114 (3d. ed. 1998).
417 LOUIS LOSS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 162, 174 (4th. ed. 2006).
408
409
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Hawaii, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Wisconsin have adopted §
101 of the USA, they have also adopted other anti-fraud provisions.418 Moreover, even though Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Texas, and Ohio have not adopted the USA, they have
substantially adopted the anti-fraud provisions contained in
§ 101 of the USA.419 The language of state anti-fraud provisions
in states that have adopted the USA generally tracks the language of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act.420 Section 101 of the USA
states that
[i]t is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale or
purchase of any security, directly or indirectly
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.421

The USA anti-fraud provisions provide for both civil liabilities and criminal penalties. Under § 410 of the USA, there is
civil liability for violations of its anti-fraud provisions. However,
civil liability is available only to buyers of securities, not sellers.422 Buyers may sue under § 410 or in equity to recover consideration paid plus interest, costs, and reasonable attorneys’
fees minus any income generated by the security.423 Criminal
penalties may be imposed under § 409 for willful violations of the
USA anti-fraud provisions.424
The USA,425 a voluntary attempt by various SSRAs to
achieve consistency in state securities regulation, has failed even
in the one area, anti-fraud, in which state action is expressly
permitted under selective federal preemption. Although all
LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 416, at 74.
Id. at 74–75 n.116.
Id.
UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 101 (1956) (current version at UNIFORM SECURITIES
ACT § 501, 7C U.L.A. 150 (2006)).
422 Id. § 410 (current version at UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 509, 7C U.L.A. 162
(2006)). In the author’s opinion, the reason for allowing only civil liability for violation of
the anti-fraud provisions of the USA is that in each state, both buyers and sellers may sue
based on state common law and equitable remedies such as fraud and rescission, respectively. In other words, a statute is not needed.
423 Id. § 410(a) (current version at § 509(b)(1), 7C U.L.A. 163 (2006)).
424 Id. § 409 (current version at § 508, 7C U.L.A. 158 (2006)). Willful is defined under
the USA as “proof that a person acted intentionally in the sense that the person was
aware of what he or she was doing.” § 508 cmt. 2, 7C U.L.A. 158 (2006).
425 This description of the Uniform Securities Act of 1956 includes the Revised Uniform Securities Act of 1985 and the 2005 revision.
418
419
420
421
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SSRAs agree with the principle of uniformity as evidenced by the
USA, they refuse to adopt voluntarily the USA as drafted even
with respect to its anti-fraud provisions. Voluntary compliance
under the auspices of NASAA inevitably leads to fragmentation
in the securities regulatory framework and its related problems—different laws in each state, different levels of enforcement, varying quality of employee skills and knowledge of applicable securities laws, and increases in the issuer’s cost of capital.
The CSA, like NASAA, is attempting to achieve consistency in
provincial regulation by promulgating a Canadian Uniform Securities Act (CUSA) along with a Securities Administration Act
(SAA);426 the drafting of the CUSA and the SAA is the essence of
Canada’s Uniform Securities Legislation Project (USL Project).
However, the USL Project seems doomed to fail from the start
because: (1) the provinces are not required to adopt, in whole or
in part, the CUSA at its completion; (2) the CSA has already acquiesced to the notion that Quebec requires special (non-uniform)
treatment because of its “civil law regime and particular legislative drafting requirements”;427 (3) British Columbia was already
in the process of streamlining and simplifying its own securities
act; and (4) the USL Project allows each province to draft its own
SAA.428
Selective federal preemption prevents de facto policy and
rulemaking by a single dominant state or province in the securities regulatory framework. The state of New York houses within
its borders, arguably, the premier market within the U.S. securities markets—the NYSE. Selective federal preemption prevents
New York’s SSRA’s (the New York Attorney General, currently
Eliot Spitzer)429 regulatory activities from having a disproportionate impact on regulatory framework of the U.S. securities
markets. This may represent de facto policy and rulemaking in
the U.S. securities markets. Moreover, Spitzer’s legal mandate is
426 UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT: A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL FOR HARMONIZATION OF
SECURITIES LAWS: CONSULTATION DRAFT (2003). SAAs must be promulgated by all thirteen provinces and contain the procedural provisions for implementing the USA in each
province. The CSA acknowledges that it would be preferable to have uniform procedures,
but states that this is too difficult to accomplish.
See CANADIAN SECURITIES
ADMINISTRATION, UNIFORM SECURITIES LEGISLATION PROJECT: COMMENTARY ON
CONSULTATION DRAFTS 14 (2003).
427 CANADIAN SECURITIES ADMINISTRATION, supra note 426, at 13.
428 Id. at 14.
429 The New York Attorney General is elected for a term of four years and manages
over 500 attorneys and over 1800 employees including forensic accounts and scientists.
Office of NYS Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Tour the Attorney General’s Office,
http:www.oag.state.ny.us/tour/tour.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2006). “The Attorney General shall [p]rosecute and defend all actions and proceedings in which the state is interested, and have charge and control of all the legal business of the departments and bureaus of the state . . . .” N.Y. EXEC LAW § 63 (2002).
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only to protect securities markets within New York’s borders.
Selective federal preemption prevents domination of the U.S. securities regulatory framework by a single state whose legal mandate is only to protect securities markets within its borders, even
if the NYSE is located within its borders. Without the limits imposed by selective federal preemption in the securities regulatory
framework, Spitzer’s regulatory activities would dominate policy
and rulemaking, just as the OSC’s regulatory activities dominate
policy and rulemaking in the Canadian securities regulatory
framework.
(1) The Spitzer Phenomenon430
Spitzer’s recent enforcement activities, although laudable,
could have affected adversely the competitiveness of the U.S. securities markets in the global securities market. The competitiveness of the U.S. securities markets is weakened when a single
SSRA’s enforcement activities result in policies and rules that
change the securities regulatory framework created by Congress
and implemented and monitored by the Commission. In 2002,
Spitzer entered into an agreement with Merrill Lynch (the
Spitzer Agreement) to settle charges that its investment advice
was tainted by conflicts of interest, i.e., securities analysts at
Merrill Lynch were not being truthful and fair in public announcements about companies that were Merrill Lynch’s investment banking clients.431 The Spitzer Agreement, negotiated
solely between Spitzer and Merrill Lynch, produced significant
reforms in the way in which Merrill Lynch conducted its investment banking activities. The Spitzer Agreement had a signifi430 N.Y. EXEC LAW § 63 (2002) (allowing the Attorney General to prosecute violations
of New York state laws, as well as violations of federal laws or regulations). Any conduct
which violates state or federal law or regulation is actionable under § 63-12. Id. § 63-12;
see also People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 848 (1999); New
York v. Feldman, 210 F. Supp. 2d 294, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Executive Law § 63-12 provides:
Whenever any person shall engage in repeated fraudulent or illegal acts or
otherwise demonstrate persistent fraud or illegality in the carrying on, conducting or transaction of business, the [A]ttorney [G]eneral may apply, in the
name of the people of the state of New York, to the supreme court of the state
of New York, on notice of five days, for an order enjoining the continuance of
such business activity or of any fraudulent or illegal acts, directing restitution
and damages and, in an appropriate case, canceling any certificate filed under
and by virtue of the provisions of section four hundred forty of the former penal
law or section one hundred thirty of the general business law, and the court
may award the relief applied for or so much thereof as it may deem proper.
§ 63-12.
431 Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Spitzer,
Merrill Lynch Reach Unprecedented Agreement to Reform Investment Practices: Merrill
Lynch
to
Pay
$100
Million
Penalty
(May
21,
2002),
available
at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/may/may21a_02.html.
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cant impact on all investment banks in the U.S. because Merrill
Lynch is the largest securities brokerage firm in the U.S. securities markets, the state of New York, Spitzer’s jurisdiction, has
Wall Street432 and the NYSE within its borders. Spitzer recognized that his activities resulted in de facto policy and rulemaking for the U.S. securities markets. He stated that “[t]his agreement [between Merrill Lynch and the New York State Attorney
General] changes the way Wall Street will operate [by] severing
the compensation link between the research and banking divisions [of Merrill Lynch] that tainted investment advice.”433 In
fact, Spitzer’s settlement with Merrill Lynch was the catalyst for
a Global Settlement addressing research analyst conflicts of interest and related issues with the top ten U.S. securities firms in
the U.S. securities markets.434 The Global Settlement, negotiated by the Commission with the assistance of Spitzer, the
NASD, NASAA, and the NYSE, resulted in, among other things,
the promulgation of new rules for research analysts by the Commission.435 However, the Global Settlement would not have occurred without the Commission’s statutory power to negotiate,
accept, implement, and monitor the Global Settlement. Essentially, the Commission has the statutory authority to impose the
Global Settlement on all securities firms participating in the U.S.
432 Wall Street is the heart of the U.S. Financial District and was the first permanent
location of the NYSE.
NY.com, Financial District, http://www.ny.com/sights/
neighborhoods/financial_district.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2006); NYSE Group, Timeline,
http://www.nyse.com/about/history/timeline_events.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).
433 Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, supra
note 431. Among other things, Merrill Lynch agreed to sever the link between compensation for analysts and investment banking, prohibit investment banking input in determining analyst compensation, “[c]reate a new investment review committee responsible for
approving all research recommendations with strict standards and independence from
investment banking and the analysts themselves,” “disclose in Merrill Lynch’s research
reports whether it has received or is entitled to receive any compensation from a covered
company over the past 12 months,” “pay a $100 million penalty,” and issue a statement of
contrition for its failure to address conflicts of interest. Id.
434 Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc.; Credit Suisse First Boston LLC; Goldman, Sachs & Co.;
J.P. Morgan Securities Inc.; Lehman Brothers Inc.; Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.; Morgan
Stanley & Co., Inc.; Salomon Smith Barney Inc.; UBS Warburg LLC; and U.S. Bancorp
Piper Jaffray Inc. Collectively, these firms paid total penalties of almost $900 million dollars. Press Release, NASD et al., SEC, NY Attorney General, NASD, NASAA, NYSE and
State Regulators Announce Historic Agreement to Reform Investment Practices: $1.4 Billion Global Settlement Includes Penalties and Funds for Investors (Dec. 20, 2002),
available
at
http://www.nasd.com/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2002NewsReleases/
NASDW_002864; Press Release, SEC et al., Ten of Nation’s Top Investment Firms Settle
Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research and Investment
Banking (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm.
435 The terms of the Global Settlement included a ban on spinning IPOs, an obligation to provide independent research to clients for five years by paying for independent
research firms chosen by an independent consultant appointed by regulators, disclosure of
analysts’ recommendations, ratings, and price target forecasts to the public, and payment
of significant monetary penalties by each securities firm. See Press Release, NASD et al.,
supra note 434.
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securities markets, while Spitzer’s authority as an SSRA is only
effective in a single state—New York. Selective federal preemption empowers the Commission to bring all necessary parties to
the negotiating table and to impose a consistent solution effective
against all participants in the U.S. securities regulatory framework. The IOSCO Standard requires consistency in a country’s
domestic securities regulatory framework to compete successfully
in the global securities market. The Commission’s comprehensive statutory authority facilitates consistency in the U.S. securities markets and thus is critical to the competitiveness of the
U.S. securities markets in the global securities market.
The Office of the New York Attorney General is similar to
the OSC in the Canadian securities regulatory framework. Arguably, Canada’s premier securities markets (e.g., the TSX) are
located in Ontario and, therefore, are regulated by the OSC. Accordingly, the OSC’s policy and rulemaking activities, in effect,
set policies and rules for the Canadian securities markets even
though the OSC’s jurisdiction is confined to the province of Ontario. However, unlike the OSC, the impact of Spitzer’s activities
on the U.S. securities regulatory framework is checked by selective federal preemption, which statutorily mandates that the
Commission, a federal regulator, set policy and ensure fair and
efficient markets in the U.S. securities regulatory framework.
The activities of the OSC have a greater impact on the Canadian
securities regulatory framework because its securities regulatory
framework does not use selective federal preemption. Unlike the
U.S., there is no statutorily authorized federal regulator empowered to set policy and ensure consistency in Canada’s securities
regulatory framework.
c.

Supervision of Market Intermediaries that Provide
Investment Services
Investor protection under the IOSCO Standard also requires
supervision of market intermediaries or operators of exchanges
that provide investment services. Such supervision must incorporate a comprehensive system of inspection and surveillance
along with a compliance program. This means that there must
also be a comprehensive requirement for establishing and maintaining appropriate records to facilitate monitoring of compliance. In the U.S. securities regulatory framework this is a
shared responsibility between the Commission and securities industry SROs.436 The SROs represent the front line of supervision
by ensuring regulatory compliance by their members. Although
436

SEC, Investor’s Advocate, supra note 119.

391- 500 NICHOLS.DOC

476

5/16/2007 1:51:13 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 10:391

the Commission has delegated much of its inspection and surveillance activities to SROs, it conducts sufficient inspections and
surveillance to ensure that the SROs perform their delegated
regulatory responsibilities.437 This system of delegation allows
the Commission, a relatively small federal agency with respect to
human resources and budget, to regulate the largest securities
market in the world. If an SRO fails to perform its responsibilities adequately, the Commission has statutory authority to sanction the SRO; the ultimate sanction, of course, is to revoke the
SRO’s registration under the Exchange Act.438 Revocation of
SRO registration means that securities firms would no longer be
required to become members, thus eliminating the SRO’s statutory authority to regulate its members.
SROs acting as exchanges or trading systems in the OTC
market perform their delegated regulatory responsibilities by establishing and enforcing listing standards that issuers must meet
to trade their securities on securities exchanges or in the OTC
securities market. Also, they must ensure that their members
comply with applicable securities laws. SROs perform these requirements by promulgating rules, performing inspections, investigating possible violations of applicable securities laws and SRO
rules, and imposing sanctions against members found to have
committed such violations.439 Although there are several exchanges throughout the U.S.,440 the NYSE is the largest, in part
because of its listing requirements.441 Prior to August 31, 2006,
the NYSE was responsible for all SRO responsibilities for exchanges under the Exchange Act. Subsequently, the NYSE delegated certain SRO regulatory responsibilities to the NASD, including examining and enforcing compliance with federal
437 SEC, The Laws that Govern, supra note 124. Section 5 of the Exchange Act requires every national securities exchange to register with the Commission. 15 U.S.C. §
78e (2000). Section 6(b) of the Exchange Act requires every exchange to promulgate rules
that are designed, among other things, to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and
practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade, and to provide for appropriate
discipline of its members for any violations of the exchange’s rules and applicable securities laws. § 78f(b).
438 See §§ 78f(b)(6), 78o-3(b)(7), 78s(d)(3).
439 Regulation of Market Information Fees and Revenues, Exchange Act Release No.
42,208, 71 SEC Docket 496, at IV(A) (Dec. 9, 1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/concept/34-42208.htm.
440 There are nine securities exchanges registered with the Commission. They are
the American Stock Exchange, Boston Stock Exchange, Chicago Board Options Exchange,
Chicago Stock Exchange, International Securities Exchange, National Stock Exchange
(formerly the Cincinnati Stock Exchange), New York Stock Exchange, Pacific Exchange,
and Philadelphia Stock Exchange. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Additional Guidance for Filing
Form LM-30, http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/olms/LM30_additional.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).
441 See generally NYSE Group, NYSE Arca Listings, http://www.nyse.com/about/
listed/1155031724207.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2006).
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securities laws by common members, and enforcing and overseeing NYSE Rules that are substantially similar to NASD Rules.442
NASDAQ, the largest OTC market,443 is regulated by the NASD.
Like the NYSE, the NASD performs the regulatory functions for
issuers listed on NASDAQ, the operation of NASDAQ, and the
activities of NASDAQ member securities firms.444
SROs regulate their member securities firms primarily by
performing inspections and surveillance. Inspections or examinations require the creation and maintenance of certain records
by member securities firms.445 SRO rules for member firms require that they submit to inspections by the SRO; such inspections are designed to determine and to ensure that member securities firms are complying with all applicable SRO rules and
securities laws.446 Without the creation and maintenance of such
books and records, it would be impossible for SROs (or the Commission for that matter) to perform regulatory responsibilities
delegated by the Commission and authorized by statute. Section
17(a) of the Exchange Act, and rules promulgated thereunder,
require securities firms to create and maintain records required
for inspections conducted by SROs and the Commission.447 These
442 Program for Allocation of Regulatory Responsibilities Pursuant to Rule 17d-2, Notice of Filing of the Plan for Allocation of Regulatory Responsibilities Between NYSE
Arca, Inc. and the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Exchange Act Release
No. 54,224, 71 Fed. Reg. 43,823 (July 27, 2006).
443 NASDAQ, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT at NASDAQ’s Business in Brief (2006), available
at
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/NDAQ/92898776x0x36919/4926252F-A3F3446A-85D0-AEA84A42CB82/NASDAQ_2005AnnualReport.pdf.
444 See National Association of Securities Dealers, NASD Corporate Description:
Building Investor Confidence Every Day, http://www.nasd.com. The NASD also supervises other OTC markets, such as the OTC Bulletin Board (OTCBB) and the pink sheets.
SEC, Over-the-Counter Markets, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrotc.shtml
(last visited Oct. 9, 2006). The OTCBB is an electronic inter-dealer quotation system that
displays real-time quotes, last-sale prices, and volume information for many OTC securities not quoted on NASDAQ or listed on a national securities exchange; the OTCBB is not
a part of NASDAQ. OTC Bulletin Board, Overview and History of the OTCBB,
http://www.otcbb.com/aboutOTCBB/overview.stm. The Pink Sheets is an electronic interdealer quotation system that displays quotes and last-sale information for many OTC securities and does not have listing requirements; securities listed in the Pink Sheets are
generally foreign issuers and small, thinly-traded, closely held companies unable to meet
the listing requirements of NASDAQ, OTCBB, or the NYSE. Pink Sheets, About the Pink
Sheets, http://www.pinksheets.com/about/index.jsp (last visited Oct. 9, 2006); Pink Sheets,
Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.pinksheets.com/faq.jsp (last visited Oct. 9, 2006).
445 IOSCO Pub. Doc. 154, supra note 6, at i–ii; SEC, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT, at 68, 74–
76 (2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/annrep02/ar02full.pdf.
446 See, e.g., One Broker Gone Bad: Punishing the Criminal, Making Victims Whole:
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. On Financial Services, 107th Cong. 109–115 (2002) (testimony of Daniel M. Sibears, Senior Vice
President, Deputy Member Regulation, NASD, Inc.).
447 Exchange Act 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-1(a) (2006). Rule 17a-4 allows securities firms
to maintain records electronically if the electronic storage media meets the conditions described in the rule. § 240.17a-4(f). See also Reporting Requirements for Brokers or Dealers Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 38,245, 62 Fed.
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records include financial statements prepared in accordance with
GAAP448 and certain financial and operation reports (commonly
known as FOCUS Reports) with the Commission.449 Section 17 of
the Exchange Act also requires registered exchanges (e.g., the
NYSE) to create and maintain sufficient records for effective
oversight by the Commission.450
Dealers are also required to create and maintain certain
books and records to facilitate compliance with the OSA and the
QSA451 in the Canadian securities regulatory framework. Such
books and records include blotters or other records of original entry and ledgers reflecting all liabilities, income and expenses, and
capital accounts.452 OSA and QSA regulations also prescribe the
content and time limits of such books and records: they must be
maintained “in an accurate and intelligible form” so that they are
available “to any person lawfully entitled to examine the reReg. 6443, 6470 (Feb. 5, 1997) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4(f)) (describing amendment to Rule 17a-4 that will allow broker-dealers to use any electronic storage media that
satisfies the other requirements of the Rule); TradeWeb LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 2003
WL 22220706, at *1 (July 22, 2003) (indicating that the SEC will not enforce any regulations against TradeWeb for using electronic trade confirmation in broker deals).
448 Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. §240.17a-5(c)(2) (2006) (noting that portions of a mandatory audited statement must be “prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles”). GAAP is an acronym for generally accepted accounting principles. Annual financial statements must be filed on a calendar or fiscal year basis and must be
audited by an independent public accountant within sixty days after the date of the financial statement. § 240.17a-12(b).
449 § 240.17a-5(c)(2). Form X-17A-5 is more commonly known as a FOCUS report.
Other required books and records include daily blotters; ledgers reflecting all assets and
liabilities, income and expense and capital accounts; separate ledgers itemizing each of
the securities firm’s customer’s accounts; ledgers reflecting all long and short positions in
each security carried by the securities firm for its own account; a memorandum of each
order, whether executed or not; order tickets for each purchase and sale showing price
and time (if possible) of execution; copies of confirmations of transactions and notices of
other debits and credits sent to the securities firm’s customers; trial balances as proof of
money balances in all of the securities firm’s ledger accounts; questionnaires or applications for employment executed by each associated person of the securities firms with,
among other things, a complete disciplinary history in the securities industry and any
criminal records; and fingerprinting records of the firms associated persons. § 240.17a-3
(giving a complete list of records required to be made and kept.). All records must be created in the form prescribed by Rule 17a-3. Id. Records required in Rule 17a-3 must be
kept and retained for the periods prescribed in Rule 17a-4. § 240.17a-4(a)–(e). Exchange
Act Rule X-17A-5 requires registered securities firms to file FOCUS reports with the
Commission. Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5(a)(2). FOCUS Report is an acronym
for Financial and Operational Combined Uniform Single Report. The depth and detail
required in FOCUS Reports are determined by the business activities of each securities
firm. Documents used to prepare FOCUS Reports must be kept three years, the first two
years in an easily accessible place. § 240.17a-4(b)(8). FOCUS Reports and other required
records may be created and maintained electronically. See Order Approving Proposed
Rule Change by NASD Regulation, Inc. Relating to the Submission of Information in
Electronic Form, Exchange Act Release No. 38,591, 62 Fed. Reg. 26,735, 26,842 (May 9,
1997).
450 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-1 (2006).
451 Securities Act, R.S.Q., ch. V-1.1 s. 220 (2006) (Can.).
452 Securities Act, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 1015, s. 113 (2006) (Can.).
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cords.”453 Securities dealers’ books and records are used by SROs
and SRAs to regulate the activities of securities dealers in Ontario and Quebec.
The Ontario Securities Act defines an SRO as an entity that
represents registrants and is organized for the purpose of regulating the operations and the standards of practice and business
conduct of its members and their representatives with a goal of
promoting the protection for investors and the public interest.454
The OSC is statutorily authorized to recognize SROs.455 This
means that recognized SROs operating within Ontario are subject to financial examination by the OSC.456 Accordingly, SROs
in Ontario must make and keep certain financial records and
practice and procedure documents for review by the OSC.457 If
the OSC determines that there have been violations of the Ontario Securities Act, the SRO may be required to provide or
amend required disclosure documents.458 All SRO rules are subject to OSC approval prior to implementation. However, the absence of selective federal preemption in Canada’s securities regulatory framework makes SRO oversight somewhat convoluted.
For example, all RS rules must be approved by all SRAs that
have contracted for its services—Ontario, Quebec, Manitoba, Alberta, and British Columbia.459 The OSC is the principal regulator, which means that it is responsible for coordinating the review and approval process of all rules proposed by RS. However,
RS must file the proposed rule with all five SRAs at the same
time and all RS rules must be approved by all five SRAs by
agreement of the other four SRAs.460 “The [OSC] may . . . make
any decision with respect to any by-law, rule, regulation, policy,
procedure, interpretation or practice of a recognized selfregulatory organization.”461 There are currently three SROs recognized by the OSC: the IDA, the MFDA, and RS. Quebec also
recognizes three SROs: the IDA, the ME, and the MFDA.
Securities Act, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 1015, s. 113(2)(b) (2006) (Can.).
Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, ch. S.5 s. 21.1 (2006) (Can.).
Id. SROs are defined as Market Participants under the Ontario Securities Act.
R.S.O. 1990, ch. S.5 s. 1.
456 Id. s. 12(1).
457 Id. ss. 19(1), 19(3), and 127; Securities Act, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 1015, s. 113 (2006)
(Can.).
458 Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, ch. S.5 s. 127 (2006) (Can.).
459 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Oversight of Market Regulation Services Inc. Between: Alberta Securities Commission (the ASC) and British Columbia Securities Commission (the BCSC) and Commission des Valeurs Mobilieres du Quebec (the
CVMQ) and Manitoba Securities Commission (the MSC) and Ontario Securities Commission (the OSC) (also referred to collectively as the Commissions) app. A, 25 OSCB 896, 9
(Feb. 15, 2002).
460 Id.
461 Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, ch. S.5 s. 21.1(4) (2006) (Can.).
453
454
455
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SROs will not regulate their members with a view towards
detecting and preventing violations of applicable securities laws
without statutory oversight from a single federal regulator. In
1996, the Commission was forced to institute administrative proceedings against the NASD, in part because it failed to comply
with certain of its own rules and to enforce compliance with federal securities laws by securities firms acting as NASDAQ market makers.462 NASDAQ market makers engaged in manipulative practices in certain securities traded on NASDAQ in order to
increase profits by artificially widening spreads in such transactions.463 Specifically,
[NASDAQ] market makers observed an anticompetitive pricing convention by which most [NASDAQ] stocks were quoted only in even
eighths (i.e., $1/4, $1/2, $3/4, 0). The pricing convention resulted in
most [NASDAQ] stocks being quoted with a minimum inside spread of
$1/4, thereby increasing the transactions [sic] costs paid by many investors when purchasing or selling those stocks.464

This manipulative and anti-competitive pricing convention
resulted in wider spreads and was enforced by NASDAQ market
makers using harassment.465 In addition, the Commission determined that “[t]he NASD was unduly influenced by [NASDAQ]
market making firms with respect to rulemaking, the discipli462 See Report Regarding the NASD and the NASDAQ Market, Exchange Act Release
No. 37,542, 62 SEC Docket 1385 (Aug. 8, 1996); Order Instituting Public Proceedings,
Making Findings and Imposing Remedial Sanctions Against NASD, Exchange Act Release No. 37,538 (Aug. 8, 1996). The NASD defines a market maker as
[a] firm that maintains a firm bid and offer price in a given security by standing ready to buy or sell at publicly-quoted prices. The [NASDAQ] Stock Market is a decentralized network of competitive Market Makers. Market Makers
process orders for their own customers, and for other NASD broker/dealers; all
NASD securities are traded through Market Maker firms. Market Makers also
will buy securities from issuers for resale to customers or other broker/dealers.
About 10 percent of NASD firms are Market Makers; a broker/dealer may become a Market Maker if the firm meets capitalization standards set down by
NASD.
NASD, Glossary of Terms: M, http://www.nasd.com/Resources/Glossary/NASDW_011116
(last visited Oct. 9, 2006).
463 See Report Regarding the NASD and the NASDAQ Market, Exchange Act Release
No. 37,542, 62 SEC Docket 1385 (Aug. 8, 1996). “Spread” is “[t]he difference between the
bid price at which a Market Maker will buy a security, and the ask price at which a Market [M]aker will sell a security.” NASD, Glossary of Terms: S, http://www.nasd.com/
Resources/Glossary/NASDW_011153 (last visited Oct. 16, 2006). The “inside spread” is
[t]he difference between the best bid and best ask among all securities is the
highest bid and lowest offer being quoted among all of the Market Makers
competing in a security. Since the spread is the aggregate of individual Market Maker spreads, it is narrower than an individual dealer spread or quote.
NASD, Glossary of Terms: I, http://www.nasd.com/Resources/Glossary/NASDW_011041
(last visited Oct. 16, 2006).
464 See Report Regarding the NASD and the NASDAQ Market, Exchange Act Release
No. 37,542, 62 SEC Docket 1385 (Aug. 8, 1996).
465 See id.
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nary process and the admission of new members.”466 The NASD
spent more time investigating and bringing disciplinary actions
against certain broker-dealers that were “widely disliked” by
NASDAQ market makers.467
From 1999 through 2003, NYSE specialists engaged in
fraudulent and anti-competitive behavior designed to increase
their compensation. Specifically, all NYSE equity specialist
firms engaged in unlawful trading ahead468 and interpositioning.469
The Commission took swift and decisive action against the
abuses uncovered at the NYSE and NASD. It required systemic
changes at both the NASD and the NYSE to ensure fair and
competitive markets and to eliminate fraudulent practices that
adversely impacted the competitiveness, efficiency, and transparency of the U.S. securities markets.470 Such comprehensive
remedial action was possible because of the existence of the use
of selective federal preemption in the securities regulatory
framework.
d. Minimum Standards for Market Participants
The IOSCO Standard requires the authorization of market
intermediaries to hold themselves out to the public as such. In
See id.
See id.
NASD Manual Rule 2111(b) (2006).
A member that accepts and holds a market order of its own customer or a
customer of another broker-dealer in a [NASDAQ] or exchange-listed security
without immediately executing the order is prohibited from trading that security on the same side of the market for its own account, unless it immediately
thereafter executes the customer market order up to the size and at the same
price at which it traded for its own account or at a better price.

466
467
468

Id.

469 Order Instituting Public Administrative Proceedings, Making Findings, Ordering
Compliance with Undertakings, and Imposing a Censure and a Cease-and-Desist Order,
Exchange Act Release No. 51,524, 85 SEC Docket 517 (Apr. 12, 2005). NASD Manual
Rule 2320(b) (2006).
In any transaction for or with a customer, no member or person associated
with a member shall interject a third party between the member and the best
available market except in cases where the member can demonstrate that to
his knowledge at the time of the transaction the total cost or proceeds of the
transaction, as confirmed to the member acting for or with the customer, was
better than the prevailing inter-dealer market for the security. A member’s obligations to his customer are generally not fulfilled when he channels transactions through another broker/dealer or some person in a similar position,
unless he can show that by so doing, he reduced the costs of the transactions to
the customer.
Id.
470 See Order Instituting Public Administrative Proceedings, Making Findings, Ordering Compliance with Undertakings, and Imposing a Censure and a Cease-and-Desist
Order, Exchange Act Release No. 51,524 (Apr. 12, 2005).
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the U.S., this is accomplished primarily through registration of
securities firms with the Commission.471 Registration of securities firms facilitates compliance with applicable securities laws
by requiring securities firms to maintain an appropriate level of
capital and to abide by a code of business conduct.472
In Canada, the OSC and the CVMQ also monitor the activities of market participants by requiring registration of dealers,
underwriters,473 and other market participants. The OSA prohibits trading and otherwise participating in Ontario securities
markets unless such person, dealer,474 or adviser registers with
the OSC as a dealer or an adviser.475 Non-trading employees,
designated by the Director of the OSC, are not required to register. Unlike the U.S., Ontario allows registration of all advisers
seeking to do business within its borders, while the Commission
only mandates registration of advisers with greater than $30 million in assets under management; advisers with less than $30
million in assets under management must register with the appropriate SSRA.476 Similar to Ontario, Quebec requires the registration of dealers and advisers to engage in the securities business within its borders. The definition of dealer, however, is
much broader than the OSA or federal securities laws. Section
5(2) of the QSA includes “trading in securities as principal,

471 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2000). Brokers and dealers doing business in the U.S. securities markets must register with the Commission in a process administered by the NASD. NASD, Glossary of Terms: N, http://www.nasd.com/
Resources/Glossary/NASDW_011118 (last visited Oct. 9, 2006).
472 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000). Compliance is facilitated by requiring minimum levels of skill and knowledge, which are monitored by proficiency exams. 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2000).
473 Quebec does not have specific registration requirements for dealers that act as
underwriters. See Securities Act, R.S.Q., ch. V-1.1 s. 148 (2005) (failing to list underwriters as governed by the statute).
474 Dealer registration is divided into ten categories: a broker (trades in the capacity
of an agent or principal); a financial intermediary dealer (e.g., a bank, loan corporation,
trust corporation, insurance company, credit union); a foreign dealer; an international
dealer; an investment dealer (member of the IDA and trades in the capacity of an agent or
principal); a limited market dealer; a mutual fund dealer (trades exclusively in shares or
units of mutual funds); a scholarship plan dealer (trades exclusively in shares or units of
securities of a scholarship or educational plan or trust); a securities dealer; and a security
issuer (issuer registering as dealer to distribute its own securities exclusively for its own
account. This category is rarely used). See Securities Act, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 1015, s. 98
(2006) (Can.). In addition, SRO membership is required to obtain registration as a broker
or investment dealer. See SRO Membership—Securities Dealers and Brokers, OSC Rule
31-507 § 1.1 (2006), available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/
Current/Part3/rule_20000818_31-507_fr.jsp.
475 Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, ch. S.5, s.25(1)(a) (2006). This section also requires
registration of the dealer, partners, officers, and employees that perform trading activities
such as the purchase and sale of securities. This allows personal liability of individuals
for violations of the OSA.
476 Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. § 275.203A-1 (2006).
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whether as his main activity or only as a secondary activity.”477
Curiously, persons seeking to register as a dealer or adviser of a
mutual fund, a scholarship plan, or an investment contract
dealer (and its representative) must register with the AMF in accordance with An Act Respecting the Distribution of Financial
Products and Services (Quebec) (FP&S Act) instead of the QSA.478
Exchange Act Rule 15c3-1 requires securities firms to have
specified levels of initial and ongoing capital to meet the current
demands of their business activities and to protect customers and
creditors from losses in the event of financial failure.479 Adequate liquidity must be maintained at all times. Accordingly,
minimum net capital requirements vary based on the type of activities engaged in by the securities firms. Minimum net capital
is determined by reducing net worth by all assets that cannot be
readily converted into cash and by a percentage of the market
value of securities and commodities held in the securities firms’
proprietary accounts to reflect market risk.480 Certain firm assets are deducted in their entirety from net worth, including real
estate, furniture and fixtures, exchange memberships, prepaid
rent, insurance and other prepaid expenses, goodwill, and organizational expenses.481 Unsecured and partly secured receivables
and certain insurance claims must also be deducted from the
firm’s net worth,482 along with undue concentrations of securities.483 Subordinated liabilities, however, may be added back to
477 Securities Act, R.S.Q. ch. V-1.1 s. 5(2) (2006) (Can.). In Quebec, there are also
categories of dealer registration with a restricted practice instead of an unrestricted practice (standard full-service securities dealers): security issuer (issuers intending to limit
their activity to the distribution of their own securities), independent trader (members of
recognized stock exchanges trading on their own behalf or on behalf of a dealer), dealer
distributing Quebec business investment company (QBIC) shares, debt security dealer
(limited to the distribution or sale of debt securities issued by the federal and provincial
governments, municipalities and certain other public bodies), and any other category that
may be designated by the AMF. See R.S.Q. ch. D-9.2 s. 192.
478 An Act Respecting the Distribution of Financial Products and Services, R.S.Q.
ch. D-9.2 s. 72 [hereinafter FP&S Act]. However, Quebec did not decide to participate in
the web-based National Registration database until January 2005. Press Release, National Registration Database Information, The Autorité des Marchés Financiers (the
“AMF”) Has Announced Its Participation in the National Registration Database (NRD)
(Sept. 23, 2004), available at http://www.nrd-info.ca/news/news040923.jsp.
479 Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2005). The Commission is authorized to
ensure that securities firms maintain reserves with respect to customers’ deposits or
credit balances and establish minimum financial responsibility requirements for all brokers and dealers. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(3)(A).
480 Mid America Fin. Serv., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 WL 29920, at *3 (Nov. 8,
1982). These deductions are designated as haircuts. Haircuts are designed to reflect the
price volatility, liquidity, and risk inherent in the securities firms’ proprietary accounts.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)(A)–(K).
481 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(iv)(A).
482 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(iv)(B)–(E).
483 An undue concentration of a single security means that the securities firm has a
relatively large amount of the security in its proprietary account. This circumstance
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net worth to determine the firm’s minimum net capital requirements.484 Financial regulation is also supplemented by the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, which established the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC). SIPC, funded by
the securities industry, provides restitution to customers of firms
that are no longer financially viable.
The OSC and the CVMQ also require registered dealers to
maintain sufficient capital to protect investors in the event of insolvency. The OSC requires dealers to maintain certain capital
and insurance requirements.485 In Ontario, all dealers (except
securities issuers) must maintain minimum capital (designated
as free capital). The required amount of free capital is determined by identifying the maximum deductible under any bonding
or insurance policy, plus $25,000486 of net free capital487 and a
varying percentage of adjusted liabilities.488 In addition, all dealers (except mutual fund dealers489 and security issuers) must
have a broker’s blanket bond in the amount of $200,000, or a
greater amount if the dealer’s directors determine that a greater
amount is needed.490 The CVMQ requires unrestricted dealers or
discount brokers to maintain minimum capital of $250,000; unrestricted dealers must also have a risk adjusted capital greater
than $0.491 Introducing brokers must have minimum capital of
$75,000.492 Restricted dealers must maintain minimum capital
of $50,000 plus the amount of the deductible under their broker’s
blanket bond or insurance policy.493 In addition, both unrestricted and restricted dealers must subscribe for insurance or
bonding meeting minimum coverage requirements under the
QSA and in accordance with applicable SROs.494 Mutual fund,
means that the firm’s liquidity may be threatened if it has to liquidate a large position
quickly because it may not be able to realize the security’s full market value.
484 See Mid-America Fin. Serv., Inc., 1982 WL 29920, at *3.
485 Securities Act, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 1015 ss. 107–112 (2006) (Can.).
486 R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 1015 s. 107.
487 Net free capital is defined in Ontario Securities Act R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 1015 s. 96.
See also R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 1015 s. 107(1)(a)–(b).
488 Adjusted liabilities are defined in R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 1015 s. 96.
489 Mutual fund dealers must maintain at least $50,000 in bonding or insurance for
each employee. See R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 1015 s. 108(2)(a), (4).
490 However, the OSC Director has discretion to waive or reduce this coverage. See
R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 1015 s. 108(1).
491 Autorité des marchés financiers [AMF] Securities Reg. § 207 (2005). Risk adjusted capital is calculated according to the method prescribed by the ME. In addition,
the deductible under the insurance policy (blanket broker’s bond), required by AMF Securities Reg. § 213 (2005), must be included in the calculation for risk adjusted capital.
492 AMF Securities Reg. § 207.
493 Id. §§ 207–208, 213.
494 Minimum insurance or bonding coverage requirements for dealers registered in
Quebec include: $500,000 for each category of risks covered for a dealer with an unrestricted practice or for a discount broker; $200,000 for each category of risks covered by
the financial institution bond for an introducing broker; $100,000, plus $50,000 for each
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scholarship plan and investment contract dealers must subscribe
for professional liability insurance coverage in accordance with
the provisions of the FP&S Act; the AMF will not accept a financial institution bond for these categories of dealer.495 Finally,
like the Commission, compliance by registered dealers and their
employees with the applicable securities laws of the OSC and the
CVMQ is facilitated by imposing minimum levels of proficiency
assessed by examination.496
Business conduct rules are enforced and promulgated by
SROs, with the approval of the Commission. The NASD’s business conduct rules are designed to ensure that securities firms
and their employees “observe high standards of commercial
honor and just and equitable principles of trade” when dealing
with investors and other members of the securities industry.497
These rules cover approximately five major categories concerning
legal and appropriate business conduct by firms and their employees and associated persons in the securities industry including general standards of commercial honor and principles of
trade;498 communications with customers and the public;499
transactions with customers;500 commissions, mark-ups, and
charges;501 special accounts;502 securities distributions;503 special
products;504 responsibilities to other brokers or dealers;505 responsibilities relating to associated persons, employees, and others’
employees;506 and alternative dispute resolution.507 The OSC and
the CVMQ also require dealers to supervise their registered
salespersons, officers, and partners with a view towards ensuring
compliance with Ontario and Quebec securities laws and the
employee, for a debt security dealer or a dealer distributing QBIC shares; and $10,000 for
securities advisers. AMF Securities Reg. § 213. Registration requirements for mutual
fund, scholarship plan and investment contract dealers are set out in the regulations
adopted under the FP&S Act. See generally FP&S Act, supra note 478.
495 AMF Securities Reg. § 213.
496 See Proficiency Requirements for Registrants, OSC Rule 31-502 § 2.1. These rules
detail which industry courses must be completed and the level of previous registration or
experience required for each type of registration. The OSC prescribes certain time limits
to complete the required exams and courses. OSC Rule 31-502 § 1.2. In addition, professional training requirements for representatives of mutual fund, scholarship plan and investment contract dealers are prescribed in FP&S Act regulations. See generally FP&S
Act, supra note 478.
497 NASD Manual Rule 2110 (2006).
498 NASD Manual Rule 2100 Series.
499 NASD Manual Rule 2200 Series.
500 NASD Manual Rule 2300 Series.
501 NASD Manual Rule 2400 Series.
502 NASD Manual Rule 2500 Series.
503 NASD Manual Rule 2700 Series.
504 NASD Manual Rule 2800 Series.
505 NASD Manual Rule 2900 Series.
506 NASD Manual Rule 3000 Series.
507 NASD Manual Rule 10300 Series.
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terms and conditions imposed by the OSC and the CVMQ for registration in their respective jurisdictions.508 Included in the
business conduct rules of the NASD is the “Know-YourCustomer” rule.509 Although the Know-Your-Customer Rule is
not codified in the Exchange Act, it is expressly stated in the
OSA and the QSA.510
Under OSC Rule 31-505, § 1.5 and QSA § 161 a dealer is required to comply with the Know-Your-Client Rule.511 Under this
Rule, a dealer is required to ascertain the identity, creditworthiness, and investment needs of its customer before recommending
transactions (purchase or sale) in specific securities to the customer.512 However, this rule is limited because the dealer only
has to determine customer creditworthiness if it is financing the
customer’s securities transaction. In addition, if the customer
has a registered adviser, the dealer is only required to determine
the creditworthiness of the registered adviser.513 Moreover, there
is no obligation to ensure the suitability of the trade if the adviser gives the instruction to execute to the dealer.514
Selective federal preemption facilitates consistency, and
therefore reliability, in the securities regulatory framework. In
the U.S., all policy, laws, and rules must be approved by one entity, the Commission. In Canada, although the provinces of Ontario and Quebec dominate Canada’s securities markets, the approval of policy, laws, and rules is a much more arduous process
simply because, at least theoretically, all thirteen SRAs must
agree. As we have seen, complete agreement is an anomaly.
2. Ensuring that Markets are Fair, Efficient, and
Transparent
Under the IOSCO Standard, ensuring fair, efficient, and
transparent markets requires regulator approval of exchange
and trading system operators and their trading rules. The regu508 Advisers must also supervise their registered officers and partners in accordance
with Ontario and Quebec securities laws and any terms and conditions imposed by the
OSC and the CVMQ for registration in their respective jurisdictions. See In re Dundee
Securities Corporation Settlement Agreement, 26 O.S.C.B. 6070, ¶ 47 (Aug. 8, 2003)
(Can.).
509 NASD Manual Rule 2310 (2006).
510 Securities Act, R.S.Q. ch. V-1.1 s. 161 (2006) (Can.).
511 Id.; OSC Rule 31-505 § 1.5–1.6 (1998). Section 4.1 of OSC Rule 31-505 permits the
OSC Director, in his discretion, to exempt a dealer from complying with the Know-YourClient Rule. See In re Fidelity Investments Canada Ltd. and Valspar Inc., 25 O.S.C.B.
1069, app. (Feb. 12, 2002) (Can.).
512 OSC Rule 31-505 §§ 1.5–1.6 (1998).
513 However, the dealer must ascertain the creditworthiness of the customer represented by the registered adviser if payment of the account is not guaranteed by the adviser. See OSC Rule 31-505 § 1.6(1)–(2) (1998).
514 See OSC Rule 31-505 § 1.7 (1998).
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latory structures for exchanges and trading systems in the U.S.
and Canada are designed to detect, deter, and penalize market
manipulation and other unfair trading practices. Both countries
have laws and require SROs to have rules that ensure transparency of trading. Under the IOSCO Standard, transparency is defined “as the degree to which information about trading (both for
pre-trade515 and post-trade516 information) is made publicly
available on a real-time basis.”517 Also, the IOSCO Standard
emphasizes timely access as an integral component of transparency. “Timely access to relevant information about . . . trading
allows investors to better look after their own interests and reduces the risk of manipulative or other unfair trading practices.”518 In the U.S. and Canada, registered national securities
exchanges (including ECNs/ATSs registered as exchanges) must
promulgate rules designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices. Moreover, they must have the capacity to
enforce compliance with the rules and regulations of applicable
securities laws as well as the exchange’s rules.519 However, the
absence of selective federal preemption in the Canadian securities regulatory framework makes this process less consistent and
transparent because there is no national entity with jurisdiction
over all thirteen provinces and territories. For example, RS is
the SRO responsible for regulating equities trading but is only
authorized to regulate equity trading in five of Canada’s thirteen
provinces.520 Finally, the admission criteria and procedures for
exchanges and trading systems in the U.S. and Canadian securities markets do not unduly favor some market users over others.
3. The Reduction of Systemic Risk
The IOSCO Standard requires merely the reduction of systemic risk because systemic risk is essential to compete successfully in the global securities market. Regulators must manage
systemic risk by implementing processes and procedures designed to minimize market disruptions and their impact on the
515 “Pre-trade information concerns the posting of firm bids and offers [in both quote
and order-driven markets] as a means to enable investors to know, with some degree of
certainty, whether and at what prices they can deal.” IOSCO Pub. Doc. 154, supra note 6,
at 6.
516 “Post-trade information is related to the prices and the volume of all individual
transactions actually concluded.” Id.
517 Id.
518 Id. at 43.
519 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (2000); Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, ch. S.5 s. 21 (2006);
Quebec Securities Act, R.S.Q., ch. V-1.1, s.169 (2006); Alberta Securities Act, R.S.A. 2000,
ch. S-4, ss. 62–63 (2006). Transactions on unregistered exchanges are strictly prohibited
unless specifically exempted by the Commission upon application of Exchange Act § 5.
See § 78e.
520 Market Regulation Services Inc., About RS, supra note 326.
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respective securities markets. Such processes and procedures
would include decreasing the risk of financial failure of market
intermediaries and its impact on the securities markets,521 facilitating adequately supervised clearing and settlement procedures
that are accurate and efficient,522 and cooperating and sharing information across jurisdictional boundaries in the global securities
market.523
Both the U.S. and Canada include procedures and processes
designed to reduce systemic risk. Both regulatory frameworks
have systems in place that reduce the impact of financial failures
of market intermediaries, supervised clearing and settlement
procedures, and have entered into cooperation and information
sharing both inside and outside their respective jurisdictions.524
However, the use of selective federal preemption provides greater
flexibility and efficiency with respect to decreasing systemic risk
in the U.S. securities regulatory framework. The author concedes that the Commission must consult with various stakeholders in the securities markets before implementing rules for
administering federal securities laws. However, after the consultative process is complete, the Commission has the authority, indeed the mandate, to promulgate and to enforce the rules naIn Canada, the absence of selective federal
tionwide.525
preemption makes promulgating rules designed to reduce systemic risk slow and unnecessarily complex. The fragmented Canadian securities regulatory framework, at a minimum, would
make cooperation and information sharing in the pursuit of stability more difficult. Moreover, systemic stability cannot be protected in a system in which each SRA is autonomous and there is
no federal regulatory authority to consistently facilitate systemic
stability in Canada’s securities markets. Although all of Canada’s SRAs are members of the CSA, membership, and more importantly adoption in whole or in part of CSA national instruments designed to reduce systemic risk, is voluntary. Without
federal preemption, there is no single federal regulatory author521 This means establishing systems and procedures that attempt reasonably “to isolate the risk to the failing institution.” This would include specifying minimum capital
requirements for market intermediaries and establishing and maintaining various programs for market intermediaries designed to reduce systemic risk. IOSCO Pub. Doc. 154,
supra note 6, at 6–7.
522 The IOSCO Standard defines clearing and settlement systems as “systems providing the process of presenting and exchanging data or documents in order to calculate the
obligations of the participants in the system, to allow for the settlement of these obligations, and the process of transferring funds [and/or] securities.” Id. at 45.
523 Id. at 7.
524 See generally id.
525 See SEC, What We Do, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited
Sept. 26, 2006) (noting that the SEC works closely with many other institutions, but remains the primary overseer and regulator of the U.S. securities markets).
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ity empowered to set a coherent policy by mandating that all
provinces adhere to national instruments promulgated by the
CSA. The CSA is comparable to NASAA, where member participation is voluntary and adoption of the Uniform Securities Act is
not mandatory.
B. The IOSCO Standard for Securities Regulator: Selective
Federal Preemption Requires a Federal Securities Regulator
Selective federal preemption combined with a federal securities regulator is required to meet the IOSCO Standard for securities regulator (IOSCO Standard Regulator) in the global securities market.526 Only a regulator at the federal level will have the
requisite power to make decisions that bind all securities markets and market participants. The IOSCO Standard Regulator:
(1) is operationally independent because it has sufficient and stable funding; (2) is accountable based on public monitoring and
judicial review of orders issued in connection with its regulatory
activities; (3) is clear, consistent, transparent, and fair in the exercise of its authority and formulation of policy, and considers
whether its regulatory activities unnecessarily burden capital
formation; (4) actively promotes investor and other market participant education because it recognizes that its regulatory
framework is based on disclosure of material facts; (5) uses the
assistance of SROs to meet its regulatory functions and responsibilities; (6) has comprehensive enforcement powers; and (7) has
the authority to conduct cross-border activities, e.g., to obtain
and provide information to its regulatory counterparts in other
countries.527
The securities regulators in the U.S. and Canada (specifically Ontario and Quebec) have many of the attributes enumerated in the IOSCO Standard Regulator. The Commission, the
OSC, and the AMF/CVMQ have a stable and sufficient source of
funding. The Commission’s entire budget is funded from fee collection generated by statutorily required filings by market participants. All fees collected are deposited in the U.S. Treasury
except the portion used to fund the Commission’s budget. Total
fees collected are more than sufficient to fund the Commission’s
budget. In 2003, total fees collected were $1.076 billion,528 of
526 However, IOSCO contends that “[t]here need not be a single regulator, [and that]
[i]n many jurisdictions, the desirable attributes of the regulator . . . are in fact the shared
responsibility of two or more government or quasi-government agencies.” IOSCO Pub.
Doc. 154, supra note 6, at 9 n.11.
527 Id. at 9–16.
528 25% was from securities registrations, 74% was from securities transactions, and
1% was from tender offer, merger, and other filings. SEC, ANNUAL REPORT 2003, at 4
(2003), available at http://sec.gov/pdf/annrep03/ar03full.pdf.
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which $716.4 million was used to fund the Commission. The
OSC and AMF/CVMQ are also funded from fees paid by market
participants. In 2004, fees collected by the OSC totaled $76.61
million and expenses totaled $54.97 million, generating a surplus
of $21.64 million.529 In 2004–05, AMF/CVMQ revenues totaled
$94.7 million with a surplus of $28.7 million.530 The Commission,
the OSC, and the AMF/CVMQ are all publicly monitored and orders issued by the three regulators are subject to judicial review.
Each of the three regulators also have education programs for
the investing public and securities markets participants. In addition, the Commission, the OSC, and the AMF/CVMQ delegate
many of their regulatory functions to SROs under their jurisdictions; SROs performing regulatory functions on behalf of the
three regulators are overseen by the applicable regulator.
The U.S., but not Canada, substantially incorporates the
IOSCO Standard Regulator attributes of clear and consistent exercise of authority, formulation of policy, and comprehensive enforcement. According to the IOSCO Standard for a securities
regulator, these attributes in a securities regulator are required
to compete successfully in the global securities market.531 The
U.S. has established a regulator at the federal level using selective federal preemption to consistently exercise authority, formulate policy, and conduct comprehensive enforcement. This federal regulator, the Commission, is legally authorized to represent
and make binding decisions for the U.S. securities markets in the
global securities market.532 Each of Canada’s thirteen regulators
is statutorily empowered to exercise authority, formulate policy,
and conduct comprehensive enforcement only within their respective borders. Only the CSA purports to represent Canada’s thirteen SRAs at the national level, but participation, and adherence
to CSA decisions, is purely voluntary.
It is impossible to achieve the IOSCO Regulator Standard
without using selective federal preemption implemented by a securities regulator at the federal level. Each of the securities
regulators in Canada and the U.S. has substantially the same attributes as those enumerated in the IOSCO Standard for a securities regulator. However, Canada does not have a securities
regulator at the federal level to ensure consistency in the exercise
of authority, policymaking and enforcement in all thirteen prov529 OSC, 2004 MANAGEMENT’S DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 2 (2004), available at
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/AnnualRpt/rpt_index.jsp (follow “Management’s Discussion and Analysis in PDF” hyperlink below the heading “2004”).
530 AMF RAPPORT ANNUEL 2004–2005, at 36 (2005) (Can.).
531 IOSCO Pub. Doc. 154, supra note 6, at i–ii.
532 See SEC, What We Do, supra note 525.
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inces. Successfully competing in the global securities market requires a regulator at the federal level using selective federal preemption to regulate securities markets. The U.S. understands
the importance of a securities regulator at the federal level to
maintain its competitive position in the global securities market.
Therefore, it consolidates regulatory authority in the Commission, its securities regulator at the federal level, with increasing
use of selective federal preemption in its securities regulatory
framework.
1. The Absence of Selective Federal Preemption and a
Federal Securities Regulator Adversely Impacts Canada’s
Securities Regulatory Framework
The absence of a federal securities regulator and selective
federal preemption causes the location of a securities transaction
to be unusually significant in the Canadian securities regulatory
framework.
This is because each province only has jurisdiction within its
own borders. In Ontario, jurisdiction under the OSA is determined by “whether a person has engaged in ‘trading’ in a security
so as to give rise to the dealer registration requirement in s.
25(1)(a).”533 Section 25(1)(1) of the OSA defines trade as “any act,
advertisement, solicitation, conduct or negotiation directly or indirectly in furtherance of” a sale or purchase of a security.534
This definition is problematic because, frequently, all the components of a securities transaction do not occur in a single province.
This means that in each case brought by provincial securities
regulators, jurisdiction may be raised as a first defense of the
party being sued instead of addressing first whether there has
been a violation of the OSA. In addition, factors identified in
each province to determine the location of a securities transaction (and thus provincial jurisdiction) may vary considerably.
This fact alone would cause inconsistency in the exercise of authority and enforcement as well as make it more difficult to attract capital to Canadian securities markets. In a Quebec case,
Gregory & Co. v. Quebec Securities Commission, the court determined that a promoter, doing business in Quebec was trading in
securities in Quebec even though the promoter mailed bulletins
to prospective investors in provinces other than Quebec.535 In R.
v. W. McKenzie Securities Ltd., a court in the province of Manitoba determined that an Ontario broker-dealer was trading in se533

1 VICTOR P. ALBOINI, SECURITIES LAW AND PRACTICE § 11.1.5 at 11-28 (2d ed.

534
535

The definition also includes an offer to sell. Id.
Id. § 11.1.5 at 11-29 (citing [1961] S.C.R. 584).

1984).
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curities in Manitoba because it mailed literature and made telephone calls to Manitoba residents.536
In Gregory, the promoter had three offices in Quebec and its
registration as a broker in Quebec had been revoked for refusing
to cease publishing his weekly bulletins. Subsequently, the promoter alleged lack of jurisdiction in Quebec even though his activities included: (1) preparing and printing its bulletin in Quebec; (2) soliciting trades in securities listed on the Montreal
Exchange from non-Quebec residents; (3) asserting its ability to
execute trades through the Montreal Exchange; (4) accepting
payment for trades from non-Quebec residents in its offices in
Quebec; and (5) maintaining its bank accounts in Quebec.537 In
addition, the shares of companies in which the promoter solicited
to non-Quebec residents could only be transferred in Quebec.
Trading in securities was found by the court based on the fact
that the shares were traded on the Montreal Exchange. The
court might not have reached the same result if the company’s
shares were traded on an exchange located outside of the province of Quebec.
In McKenzie, the Manitoba court determined that trading occurred within Manitoba’s jurisdiction even though the dealer was
registered in Ontario because: (1) the dealer made telephone calls
and mailed literature to a Manitoba resident for the purpose of
soliciting orders to purchase shares in various companies and (2)
the Manitoba resident responded to the broker-dealer’s solicitations by agreeing to purchase such shares and paying for his purchase with a check from his bank account maintained at a Manitoba bank and mailing the check to the dealer in Toronto.538 The
Court determined that the trade took place at least in part in
Manitoba and that
[t]he Securities Act of Manitoba is not designed to reach out beyond
provincial borders and to restrain conduct carried on in other parts of
Canada or elsewhere. Its operation is effective within Manitoba, and
nowhere else. For a person to become subject to its restraint he must
trade in securities in Manitoba. This is not to say that a non-resident
of Manitoba can never become subject to the controls of the statute. If
the activities of such a non-resident can fairly and properly be construed as constituting trading within the province, then they fall
within the purview of the Act.539
Id. (citing [1972] S.C.R. 409).
Gregory & Co. v. Quebec Sec. Comm’n, [1961] S.C.R. 584, 586–89.
ALBOINI, supra note 533, at 11–30.
Id. See also Midland Doherty Ltd. v. Zonailo, [1982] 36 B.C.L.R. 326, 339 (giving
supplementary reasons for judgment); rev’d on other grounds, [1983] 43 B.C.L.R. 138
(B.C. Ct. App.); In re a Company, June 1968 O.S.C.B. 129, 132 (“[F]urnishing the potential purchaser at his request with a prospectus and an order form” constitutes trading be536
537
538
539
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Moreover, to add to the lack of consistency and clarity, each
province has discretion to provide a waiver to persons with respect to determining location of trade under its securities act and
applicable case law. In In the Matter of a Company, the OSC decided not to impose sanctions based on equitable reasons despite
the fact that precedent indicated violations of the OSA requiring
the imposition of sanctions.540 In Company, the OSC alleged that
a company, through its three directors, violated the OSA by trading as an issuer and by way of primary distribution in Ontario
without an Ontario prospectus. The company was registered in
British Columbia and had a British Columbia prospectus. The
company’s three directors were residents of British Columbia,
but one of the directors was formerly a resident of Ontario and
was also “known to a number of people in [Ontario] . . . to have
brought a mine to success in each of two former ventures. Without solicitation from the company or its directors these people
and their friends . . . wrote to the company in Vancouver [British
Columbia] requesting a prospectus.”541 Based on advice from the
issuer’s lawyer, the issuer sent copies of its British Columbia
prospectus and a subscription form to the people residing in Ontario, issued shares to the Ontario residents upon receipt of their
checks, and completed subscription forms. The OSC determined
that the company and its three directors violated the OSA by distributing and trading the company’s securities in Ontario without an Ontario registration and prospectus. The OSC held that
by using the Post Office to place the British Columbia prospectus and
the order form in the hands of the prospective purchasers in Ontario . . . [the company and its directors had ‘traded’ in Ontario
and] . . . [t]he fact that there was no act of solicitation and the fact
that the final acts of sale and issue of the shares took place in British
Columbia and not in Ontario . . . is beside the point; furnishing the potential purchaser at his request with a prospectus and an order form
were acts done in furtherance of a sale and done in Ontario. [S]ending
from outside Ontario and in response to a spontaneous request a prospectus and an order form to a person in Ontario constitutes sufficient
dealing in Ontario with members of the Ontario public to call for their
protection by the supervisory devices of registration and prospectus
filing exercised by the Ontario Securities Commission in pursuance of
the Ontario Act.542

In Company, the discretion exercised by the OSC in not imposing sanctions despite recognized violations of the OSA adcause such activities are considered “acts done in furtherance of a sale and done in Ontario.”).
540 In re a Company, June 1968 O.S.C.B. at 133.
541 Id. at 130–32.
542 Id. at 132–33.
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versely impacts Canada’s securities regulatory framework. Clarity and consistency in enforcement of securities acts are essential
to a globally competitive securities market. Such uneven enforcement of the OSA reduces the consistency and clarity of the
Canadian securities regulatory framework. It also makes it more
difficult for lawyers to advise their clients when they are unsure
of whether a particular regulatory requirement might be waived
by one of Canada’s thirteen provincial securities regulators.
Lack of consistency in enforcement of provincial securities laws
leads to increased costs to ensure compliance with applicable requirements in the fragmented Canadian securities regulatory
framework.
NASDAQ Canada543 and the Renegade Province of
Quebec
NASDAQ Canada is an excellent example of why selective
federal preemption implemented by a securities regulator at the
federal level is necessary to compete successfully in the global securities market. NASDAQ Canada was established in response
to Canada’s reorganization of its securities markets in order to
increase its competitiveness in the global securities market. Initially, Canadian SRAs understood that consolidation was required in order to maintain the viability of Canada’s securities
markets in the global securities market. However, the agreement brokered in 1999 to consolidate Canada’s securities market
completely disintegrated when the province of Quebec, and subsequently British Columbia, decided to withdraw from the 1999
agreement and allow NASDAQ U.S. to establish NASDAQ Canada in Montreal, Quebec.544 As a consequence, the Canadian securities regulatory framework was essentially invaded by the
U.S. securities regulatory framework. The U.S., through NASDAQ Canada, now had regulatory control over a portion of Canada’s securities markets, and Quebec again had equity trading
within the province.
Quebec amended its laws to allow the creation of NASDAQ
Canada and provide primary regulatory control of NASDAQ
Canada to the U.S. “[NASDAQ] Canada is a recognized [SRO]
under Quebec law for purposes of carrying on business in Quea.

543 NASDAQ Canada was initially established to become a “standalone Canadian [securities] market on the [NASDAQ] trading platform . . . . Phase 2 of [NASDAQ] Canada[]
was to have been an ambitious attempt to create an electronic market competing directly
with the Toronto Stock Exchange and nascent alternative trading systems.” It was going
to be “a new exchange in Canada . . . trad[ing] Canadian stocks in Canadian dollars.”
Marotte, supra note 357, at B5.
544 NASDAQ Canada’s incentive package included a 10-year tax holiday. Marotte,
supra note 543.
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bec. NASDAQ Canada’s parent, [NASDAQ U.S.], is similarly
recognized as an SRO under Quebec law for purposes of carrying
on business in Quebec.”545 Moreover, “[t]he rules of NASDAQ
Canada are those of NASDAQ [U.S.] and are overseen by the
[U.S.] Securities and Exchange Commission . . . .”546 NASDAQ
Canada allows the Canadian dealer to have an NASD affiliate incorporated in the U.S. but co-located within the Canadian
dealer’s office in Quebec. Dually-engaged employees are also
permitted, “thus reducing costs and enabling better compliance
and regulatory controls.”547 The Canadian dealer’s NASD affiliate must be registered with the Commission and must be a
member of the NASD. Accordingly, the Canadian dealer’s NASD
affiliate is not required to become registered in Quebec nor to become a member of the IDA.548 However, the Canadian dealer of
the NASD affiliate must remain an IDA member in good standing.549 Quebec also attempts indirect regulation of the NASD affiliate by requiring the Canadian dealer to: (a) have duallyengaged employees with its NASD affiliate; (b) require its NASD
affiliate to comply with NASD rules and, therefore, with U.S. securities laws, rules, and regulations; (c) require its NASD affiliate to have only exempt clients and to only engage in U.S. transactions; and (d) require its NASD affiliate to consent to the
jurisdiction, in any action or proceedings, of any provincial or
provincially-recognized SRA in the province.550 Apparently, Quebec believes that it has maintained regulatory control by sharing
regulatory authority with the U.S. However, this patchwork
regulatory framework probably makes the Canadian securities
regulatory framework even more difficult to navigate and it may
have an anticompetitive effect in the global securities market.
Supporters of NASDAQ Canada contend that the primary
benefit of NASDAQ Canada is to allow small to medium broker545 Romano, supra note 358, at 1. NASDAQ Canada was recognized similarly by the
province of British Columbia. In both provinces, registered dealers establish affiliates
(incorporated in the U.S. but headquartered in the province), as well as the facilities, of
the applicable Canadian dealer. As previously discussed, this allowed such affiliates to
trade directly through NASDAQ U.S.’s facilities. Id. at 3.
546 Id. at 2. According to Mr. Romano, prior to the establishment of NASDAQ Canada, many Canadian dealers transmitted orders to NASDAQ U.S. indirectly using ECNs,
their U.S. broker/dealer affiliates or other U.S. broker-dealers, who then transmitted such
orders directly to [NASDAQ] U.S. However, such indirect access methods were “administratively cumbersome.” Direct access would “reduce costs, enhance market visibility and
transparency for Canadian dealers, . . . reduce customer risk, and [benefit] Canadian
capital markets generally.” Id.
547 Id. at 3.
548 Provided that the NASD affiliate only has clients classified as accredited investors
and other clients who do not require Canadian registration (i.e., non-exempt clients) and
only execute U.S. transactions. Id.
549 Id.
550 Id. at 3–4.
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dealers to directly, and therefore less expensively, access U.S.
capital markets.551 Unfortunately (or fortunately, according to
one’s perspective), the Canadian securities marketplace operates
next to the largest securities marketplace in the world, therefore
making it vulnerable to being gobbled up by the U.S. securities
markets, or at least becoming a “branch investment banking” securities market for the U.S. securities markets.
NASDAQ Canada may be the first step in diminishing the
relevance of the Canadian securities markets in the global securities market. This diminution of importance would lead to Canada taking a “back seat” on the bus of meaningful participation
in shaping the regulatory structure of the global securities market.
C. Selective Federal Preemption Implemented by a Federal
Securities Regulator—Lesson Learned
The U.S. and Canada are quite similar in their approaches to
the framework for securities regulation; the primary difference is
that the U.S. has a single federal regulatory authority, the Commission, to guide policy and to ensure consistency both domestically and in the global securities marketplace. The U.S.’s understanding of the importance of a single federal regulatory
authority is reflected in the steady increase in federal preemption
in its securities regulatory framework. Given the experiences of
our neighbor to the north, increasing federal preemption in the
U.S. securities regulatory framework is the better strategy for at
least maintaining the competitiveness of securities markets in
the global securities marketplace; regulatory power selectively
consolidated in a federal regulator, the Commission, enables the
U.S. to speak with one voice in the global securities marketplace,
craft a coherent policy, and provide consistent enforcement of its
securities regulatory framework. This is important from a global
perspective because regulatory authorities in the global securities market only need to negotiate with one entity when dealing
with the U.S. securities markets. In Canada, they must negotiate with thirteen provinces if they wish to access all Canadian
securities markets. This is the primary reason that the Commission reacted so strongly to the actions of New York Attorney
General Spitzer. Given the importance of the NYSE, domiciled
in Spitzer’s jurisdiction, in the overall U.S. securities regulatory
framework, actions taken in the state of New York have policy
implications for all U.S. securities markets. Although Spitzer is
to be applauded for his excellent work, it is not in the best inter551

Id. at 3.
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ests of U.S. securities markets to allow one state—New York—to
set policies for all U.S. securities markets.552 Moreover, market
participants, especially issuers, should not be held to a higher
standard in one state despite its preeminence in the U.S. securities markets. A domestically and globally competitive securities
market must treat substantially similar conduct equally. This
means that Spitzer, and any other SSRA, must consult with the
Commission to ensure that the U.S. securities markets continue
to “speak with one voice” and therefore remain competitive in the
global securities market.
Lest I offend my brethren to the north, they, too, realize the
importance of selective federal preemption implemented by a
federal securities regulator. The Canadian federal government
(Ottawa), along with market participants and issuers, recognizes
the need for a single federal regulator to compete successfully in
the global securities market. Ottawa realizes that Canada’s
fragmented securities regulatory framework causes significant
transaction delays and the imposition of onerous costs because
market participants must deal with thirteen SRAs. Moreover, a
senior securities counsel in Canada asserted that “[a]ll other
problems pale in comparison to the lack of harmonization” between Canada’s thirteen provinces.553 Moreover,
at the end of the day, [Canada] will still have 13 securities regulators
instead of one. International investors, and indeed Canadians, will
still be drawn to the clarity of the U.S. regime, over the relative complexity of [Canada’s]. And Canadian public companies will continue to
overwhelmingly call for more dramatic reform, to no avail. Only in
Canada.554

“[I]t is simply not credible to argue that the involvement of multiple regulators that exists [sic] within the CSA can achieve the
efficiency of a national securities regulator.”555 Under Canada’s
securities regulatory framework, “it is not entirely clear who, if
anyone, speaks for Canada.”556 Moreover, Barbara Stymiest, the
CEO of the TSX, echoing the sentiments of the Ontario’s Minister
552 Note that New York, like Ontario, houses the largest and most powerful securities
markets and exchanges in the nation’s securities markets. See NYC.com, Financial District
(Lower
Manhattan),
http://www.nyc.com/visitor_guide/Financial_District_
Lower_Manhattan.75852/editorial.aspx (last visited Oct. 23, 2006) (noting that New York
“houses some great economic powerhouses, including the headquarters of major banks,
the New York Stock Exchange, [and] the World Financial Center”).
553 REGULATORY BURDEN TASK FORCE, REPORT TO THE ONTARIO SECURITIES
COMMISSION 10 (2003), available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/Governance/
Accountability/ga_20031212_rbtf-rpt.pdf.
554 Michael Den Tandt, Charest Won’t Want Single Regulator, GLOBE AND MAIL
(Can.), Apr. 17, 2003, at B2.
555 FIVE YEAR REVIEW COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT, supra note 34, at 37 (quoting
comment letter on the Issues List of Torys LLP).
556 Id.
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of Finance, stated that
the current system, fractured as it is, burdens companies with duplicative costs and impairs Canada’s stature on the world stage. . . .
....
[Moreover,] Canada must “get its act together” and begin speaking
with a unified voice. The U.K. securities watchdog, for instance, refuses to open up trading on its exchanges to Canadian brokerages on a
province-by-province basis, while China’s regulator has expressed its
displeasure at having to negotiate a recent deal with four separate
provinces . . . .557

The author of this article would extend this sentiment one
step further. Most likely, Canadian companies would also bypass Canadian capital markets given the proximity of the U.S.
securities markets if their securities could be traded in both Canadian and U.S. dollars. In fact, Level II of NASDAQ Canada included allowing users to trade in Canadian companies listed on
NASDAQ Canada from either the U.S. or Canada simultaneously
in either Canadian or U.S. dollars.558 If this were to occur, Canadian issuers would probably be sorely tempted to bypass Canadian capital markets altogether.
CONCLUSION
Federal preemption should be crafted to “clear away some of the regulatory underbrush that adds to the cost of capital[,] without compromising investor protections.”559

Selective federal preemption administered by a federal securities regulator is the better regulatory model for competing successfully in the global securities market. Congress apparently
understands this, based on the trend of increasing selective federal preemption in the securities regulatory framework of the
U.S. securities markets. State authority to bring securities fraud
cases should be preserved in the delicate balance of selective federal preemption because state securities regulators have a strong
interest in putting away “the bad guys” within their jurisdictions.
“Bringing suit for common law fraud in no way interferes with
the regulatory mandates of the [federal government] . . . . [T]he
purpose underlying state common law fraud actions—to deter
fraudulent practices—is consistent with federal securities
557 Sinclair Stewart & Heather Scoffield, Ottowa to “Act Quickly” to Pave Way for National Securities Watchdog, GLOBE AND MAIL (Can.), Mar. 24, 2004, at B12.
558 Press Release, NASDAQ, Helen Kearns Named President of NASDAQ Canada
(May
1,
2001),
available
at
http://www.nasdaq.com/newsroom/news/pr2001/
ne_section01_143.html.
559 Rachel Witmer, Legislation: Congress Passes Major Securities Bill; Clinton Expected to Sign It OMB Says, 28 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1211, 1212 (1996).
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law . . . as both seek to deter fraud.”560 Federal preemption must
be carefully used to “‘maintain uniformity and certainty’ in U.S.
securities markets so that they may remain ahead of markets ‘in
London, Frankfurt, Tokyo or Hong Kong.’”561 Moreover, allowing
the Commission to operate exclusively in certain areas in which
it previously shared regulatory authority with state SRAs led to
a reduction in cost, complexity, and redundancy.
Federal preemption also supports the flexibility required to
compete successfully in the global securities marketplace. Enron, Worldcom, Adelphia, and their ilk dealt a severe blow to investor confidence and the perceived transparency and fairness of
U.S. securities markets. Without a regulatory framework incorporating selective federal preemption and a federal securities
regulator, the necessarily rapid regulatory response to shore up
investor confidence and the perceived fairness and transparency
of U.S. securities markets would likely not have occurred. A
swift response was necessary to ensure that U.S. securities markets remain the premier markets in the world. A tarnished U.S.
securities marketplace could result in foreign investors less likely
to invest in U.S. issuers, depriving issuers of an important source
of capital. In turn, investors would have less investment opportunities because issuers would be less willing to access capital
markets perceived as lacking fairness and transparency.
It is obvious that the principle of cooperation or harmonization of securities laws between state or provincial securities regulators is not feasible. The primary problem is that none of the
members of the CSA or NASAA are required to adopt uniform securities laws and regulations that have not been adopted by their
legislators. Also, wholesale adoption of the provisions of uniform
laws is simply not the norm.
The consequence of not “speaking with one voice” is, at best,
becoming irrelevant in setting policy in the regulatory framework
for the global securities market.

560 Common Law Fraud Claims Not Preempted By Federal Securities Law, Court
Concludes, 33 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1634, 1635 (2001).
561 Witmer, Litigation Reform, supra note 3, at 1402.

